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The quantum physics literature provides many diﬀerent characterizations of
decoherence. Most of them have in common that they describe decoherence
as a kind of influence on a quantum system upon interacting with an another
system. In the spirit of quantum information theory, we adapt a particular
viewpoint on decoherence which describes it as the loss of information into
a system that is possibly controlled by an adversary. We use a quantitative
framework for decoherence that builds on operational characterizations of the
min-entropy that have been developed in the quantum information literature.
It characterizes decoherence as an influence on quantum channels that reduces
their suitability for a variety of quantifiable tasks such as the distribution of
secret cryptographic keys of a certain length or the distribution of a certain
number of maximally entangled qubit pairs. This allows for a quantitative and
operational characterization of decoherence via operational characterizations
of the min-entropy.
In this thesis, we present a series of results about the estimation of the min-
entropy, subdivided into three parts. The first part concerns the estimation
of a quantum adversary’s uncertainty about classical information—expressed
by the smooth min-entropy—as it is done in protocols for quantum key distri-
bution (QKD). We analyze this form of min-entropy estimation in detail and
find that some of the more recently suggested QKD protocols have previously
unnoticed security loopholes. We show that the specifics of the sifting sub-
routine of a QKD protocol are crucial for security by pointing out mistakes
in the security analysis in the literature and by presenting eavesdropping at-
tacks on those problematic protocols. We provide solutions to the identified
problems and present a formalized analysis of the min-entropy estimate that
incorporates the sifting stage of QKD protocols.
In the second part, we extend ideas from QKD to a protocol that allows
to estimate an adversary’s uncertainty about quantum information, expressed
by the fully quantum smooth min-entropy. Roughly speaking, we show that
a protocol that resembles the parallel execution of two QKD protocols can be
used to lower bound the min-entropy of some unmeasured qubits. We explain
how this result may influence the ongoing search for protocols for entanglement
distribution.
The third part is dedicated to the development of a framework that allows
the estimation of decoherence even in experiments that cannot be correctly
described by quantum theory. Inspired by an equivalent formulation of the
min-entropy that relates it to the fidelity with a maximally entangled state,
we define a decoherence quantity for a very general class of probabilistic the-
ories that reduces to the min-entropy in the special case of quantum theory.
v
This entails a definition of maximal entanglement for generalized probabilistic
theories. Using techniques from semidefinite and linear programming, we show
how bounds on this quantity can be estimated through Bell-type experiments.
This allows to test models for decoherence that cannot be described by quan-
tum theory. As an example application, we devise an experimental test of a
model for gravitational decoherence that has been suggested in the literature.
vi
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Quantum theory describes the laws that govern the behavior of elementary
particles. Some phenomena predicted by quantum theory—and observed in
laboratories around the world—defy an explanation in terms of the classical
laws of physics that we encounter with macroscopic objects in everyday life. In
the popular literature, this has led to a mystification of the so-called quantum
eﬀects. They are often described as limitations. For example, Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle famously states that one cannot know both the position
and the momentum of a particle. Another example is the no-cloning theorem,
stating that there cannot be a process that copies an arbitrary quantum state.
Quantum information theory takes a diﬀerent viewpoint. It does not see
the quantum eﬀects as limitations, but instead as useful properties that can be
exploited to our benefit (for an interesting exposition of this viewpoint with a
historical account, see for example the introduction of the thesis of van Assche
[Ass06]). While in general, the range of such useful eﬀects and their suggested
applications is very broad, we center our attention on a particular type of
phenomenon.
We will discuss decoherence and its estimation. Quantum decoherence
estimation enables information processing tasks that are impossible to achieve
classically. Moreover, we will see how the concept of decoherence estimation
can be generalized to more general probabilistic theories that include quantum
theory as a special case. We will describe these applications in more detail
when we look at the summary of the results of this thesis in section 1.4.
Before we come to that, we start with an informal warm-up. In the fol-
lowing sections, we will recapitulate some of the properties of decoherence
processes that have been declared as the defining characteristics of decoher-
ence. There is no commonly accepted definition of decoherence. We will briefly
touch on some characterizations that can be found in the literature, but due to
the very widespread use of the word, we necessarily miss out some of the mean-
ings behind the term “decoherence”. For more extensive treatments of various
meanings of decoherence, the reader is advised to consult the corresponding
review literature, such as [Zur03], [Sch05].
In this thesis, we adopt a particular viewpoint on decoherence that may
be summarized in one sentence as follows: decoherence is the loss of infor-
mation into the environment. This is not a new understanding but rather a
viewpoint that is ubiquitous in quantum information science. In the arguably
3
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most well-known textbook on quantum information theory [NC00], Nielsen
and Chuang write “A key concept in understanding the merit of a particu-
lar quantum computer realization is the notion of quantum noise (sometimes
called decoherence)” and “Generally speaking, anything which causes loss of
(quantum) information is a noise process”.
We will approach this viewpoint through a series of examples. While many
of the characterizations of decoherence refer to the density matrix formalism
and are of a more theoretical interest, we aim for an operational and quan-
titative treatment. The goal of sections 1.2 and 1.3 is to get some intuition
about the benefits of such a treatment when dealing with information process-
ing tasks. Before we come to that, we will look at some other characterizations
of decoherence in section 1.1.
1.1 What is decoherence?
The origin of the word “decoherence” seems to be unclear. However, it has
been an established notion in the physics community, at least since an article
by Zurek [Zur91] popularized it to the broader scientific community [Sch05].
Although virtually all quantum physicists have encountered the word “deco-
herence” and most of them have developed some familiarity with it, there is no
generally accepted definition of this term. If you were to ask three physicists
what decoherence is, you may very well get three diﬀerent answers that use
very diﬀerent vocabulary, such as “the vanishing of the oﬀ-diagonal terms of
a system’s density matrix”, “the emergence of classical behavior of quantum
systems” [Joo+03] or, as mentioned above, “the loss of information into the
environment”. While each of these explanations is meaningful in its own right,
their widespread coexistence illustrates that the term “decoherence” does not
refer to one single idea. Instead, it is associated with a multitude of over-
lapping ideas that share similarities. One such similarity is that most of the
characterizations of decoherence can—in some sense—be seen as a loss of in-
formation.
To make things more concrete, it is helpful to look at some simple exam-
ple. Let us consider a spin-12 particle in the state “up” with respect to the
z-direction, |0i = | "zi. If the spin of this system was measured with respect
to the z-direction, it would yield the outcome “up”. However, if the system
was measured with respect to the x-direction, it would yield the outcomes “up”
and “down” with equal probability, because the system is in a superposition of
the two eigenstates in the x-direction,






This situation changes if the measurements are carried out after a dynamic
evolution of the system. If the particle undergoes some process in which it
interacts with another system, its state will change and, in general, it will no
longer be a pure state but instead become mixed (see figure 1.1). In the most
extreme case, the state will become the fully mixed state 1/2.
While this state would still reproduce the same probability distribution if
measured along the x-direction, it has lost its spin-information along the z-
4




Figure 1.1: A simple decoherence process. We will often consider a
decoherence process as a “black box”, that is, we only see the system before
and after the process, but we do not know what systems it interacts with.
While this state would still reproduce the same probability distribution if
measured along the x-direction, it has lost its spin-information along the z-
direction. This can also be seen as the state losing its “coherence terms”, that

















This is sometimes described as decoherence.
The loss of the coherence terms is often interpreted as a loss of phase
information. To see why, let us consider a diﬀerent type of system. Instead of a
spin-12 system with the z- and x-direction as bases, let us consider a photon with
the diagonal polarizations and the horizontal/vertical polarizations as bases.
Consider a beam of diagonally polarized photons sent through a Mach-Zehnder
interferometer [Mac92; Zeh91] (see figure 1.2). A polarizing beam splitter
(PBS) splits the beam into beams of horizontal and vertical polarization. After
travelling through their respective arm, the two beams hit another PBS, and
two photon detectors are set up at the two sides of the second PBS to see
which exit the photons take. By varying the length diﬀerence between the two
arms of the interferometer, a relative phase between the horizontal and the
vertical component of the beam can be introduced, and the relative detection
frequency of the two detectors shows an interference pattern. If the Mach-
Zehnder interferometer is modified by removing the second PBS, then the setup
constitutes a measurement in the horizontal/vertical basis,1 which decoheres
the photons that were originally diagonally polarized into the fully mixed state.
The relative detection frequencies no longer have a dependency on the length
of the arms, and hence, phase information is lost.
This description of decoherence as a loss of phase information is rather
specific to a particular setting. Moreover, a loss of the coherence terms is basis-
specific: while the example above describes full decoherence, leading to the
basis-independent fully mixed state, partial decoherence that merely reduces
the magnitude of the oﬀ-diagonal terms depends on the basis in which the
system decoheres. One may therefore want to use another characteristic of an
evolution like (1.2) to characterize decoherence: it turns a pure state into a
mixed state. An operation that does that can obviously not be unitary, which
is another feature of decoherence.
We said that the dynamic evolution of the system is a process in which the
system interacts with other systems. For a better understanding of decoher-
1 A better way to look at this is that the first PBS entangles the polarization degree of
freedom with the path degree of freedom (c.f. the diagram in figure 1.3).
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photon PBS mirror
detector
Figure 1.2: Loss of phase information in a modified Mach-Zehnder
interferometer. In a Mach-Zehnder interferometer, varying the relative
length of the arms yields interference patterns that show the relative phase
of the two components. If the second polarizing beam splitter (PBS) is re-
moved, the phase information gets lost.
We said that the dynamic evolution of the system is a process in which the
system interacts with other systems. For a better understanding of decoher-
ence, it is helpful to incorporate these other systems into the picture. Since
we have several systems now, it is a good idea to give them their own names.
The system of interest that we looked at above shall be denoted by A, and the
systems that it interacts with can be grouped together to a system E. The
latter is often referred to as the environment. Incorporating the environment
into the picture leads to a closed system which, according to the postulates of
quantum mechanics, evolves unitarily. We shall call this the purified picture,
in contrast to the single-system picture that we had above in figure 1.1.
Let us consider a concrete example of a dynamic evolution. For our pur-
poses, a particularly useful example is the one in which the environment mea-
sures system A in the x-basis, recording the outcome in a system E. As a
circuit diagram, this can be written as in figure 1.3.
|0ih0|AA : H




Figure 1.3: Measurement as a unitary evolution. For our purposes, a
particularly important example of a decoherence process is a measurement. It
fits seamlessly with the axiom of unitary evolution of closed systems. In this
diagram, H denotes the Hadamard gate, and right of that, we see a CNOT
gate. The reader unfamiliar with the circuit representation of a measurement
is referred to [NC00].
How does the picture change when incorporating system E? The overall
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Figure 1.3: Measurement as a unitary evolution. For our purposes, a
particularly important example of a decoherence process is a measurement. It
fits seamlessly with the axiom of unitary evolution of closed systems. In this
diagram, H denotes the Hadamard gate, and right of that, we see a CNOT
gate. The reader unfamiliar with the circuit representation of a measurement
is referred to [NC00].
How does the picture change when incorporating system E? The overall
process transforms the joint state as
|0iA ⌦ |0iE 7! |0iA ⌦ |0iE + |1iA ⌦ |1iEp
2
=: | iAE , (1.3)
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that is, it turns the initial product state into an entangled state. In contrast,








While, as we noted above, an observer without side information (who sees
(1.4)) has lost the information about the z-component of the particle’s spin,
an observer holding system E has access to that information: (s)he just needs
to check in which state system E is in order to know the z-component of
the spin. The fact that information is lost in the single-system picture but
preserved in the purified picture has led some authors to defining decoherence
as “the loss of information into the environment”.
Moreover, while the transformation on system A alone, equation (1.2), is
not unitary, the measurement as a transformation on the joint system AE is
unitary (since it can be written as a quantum circuit). Thus, while in the
single-system picture, we see a fully mixed output state, the overall state in
the purified picture is pure. The coherence terms are preserved, as they can
be obtained back by reversing the unitary on AE.
Single-system picture Purified picture
• information lost (z-spin, phase) • information accessible
• coherence terms lost • coherence terms preserved
• non-unitary • unitary
• mixed output state • pure output state
Table 1.1: Comparison of the single-system picture and the purified
picture. Each of the listed diﬀerences between the single-system picture (in
which the system is an open system) and the purified picture (in which the
overall system is closed) can be seen as a characteristic of decoherence.
This discussion gives us some of the characterizations of decoherence in the
form of diﬀerences between the single-system picture and the purified picture.
We have summarized the discussed properties in table 1.1.
1.2 Asymptotic quantification of decoherence
The decoherence process that we considered in the previous section, namely
the measurement in figure 1.3 and equation (1.4), is an extreme case of deco-
herence: the coherence terms vanish completely. In the single-system picture,
this can be seen as the action of the phase damping channel of full strength (we
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For p = 1, this gives the same channel as in (1.4), and for p = 0, the channel
just leaves the system invariant. What about intermediate cases of decoher-
ence? Can the characteristics that we identified in the previous section be used
to derive a quantitative measure of decoherence?
The characteristics we identified compare the single-system picture with a
purified picture. Thus, if we want to use some characteristics of table 1.1 for a
quantification of decoherence, we need to answer the following question. Given
a channel
CA : ⇢A 7! CA(⇢A) , (1.7)
is there a unitary UAE and an environment system E in a state | ih |E such
that
tr(UAE(⇢A ⌦ | ih |E)U †AE) = C(⇢A) for all density operators ⇢A ? (1.8)
A corollary of the Stinespring dilation theorem [Sti55] states that every channel
can be extended this way. Such an extension is called a channel purification,
and for a given channel, all such purifications are equivalent in a certain sense.
We will see this more formally in section 3.3, but for now, it is suﬃcient to
know that we can always unambiguously refer to a purification of the channel.
Which of the characteristics of table 1.1 could we use to quantify deco-
herence? The loss of the coherence terms and the loss of information (in the
sense of changing an observable’s probability distribution) are unsatisfactory,
as they are basis-dependent. There also seems to be no straightforward mea-
sure of “non-unitarity”. Instead, as a first step towards a quantitative treat-
ment of decoherence, we could use a measure of “mixedness” to compare the
single-system picture with the purified picture.
One such measure is the von Neumann-entropy H of a system S, defined
by
H(S) =  tr(⇢S log ⇢S) , (1.9)
where log denotes the binary logarithm. It can be seen as such a measure,
because H(S) = 0 iﬀ ⇢S is pure, and H(S) is maximal when ⇢S is fully mixed.
If we compare the mixedness of the overall state with the mixedness of the
output state in the single-system picture, we get
H(AE) H(A) = H(AE) H(E) (1.10)
=: H(A|E) , (1.11)
the first equality follows from the fact that H(A) = H(E) when the state of
the system AE is pure. The quantity H(A|E) is called the conditional von
Neumann entropy. It can be seen as a measure for how much information an
observer holding system E has about system A.
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Here, we motivated the conditional von Neumann entropy in a rather ad-
hoc way. The purpose of this was just to connect the characteristics of deco-
herence that are typically stressed in the physics literature with the quanti-
tative treatment that we are aiming for. In quantum information theory, the
von Neumann entropy has been formulated in a rigorous framework of axioms
and operational characterizations. One such operational characterization is
the connection between the coherent information, defined by Schumacher and
Nielsen [SN96], and the channel capacity.
To discuss the coherent information, we need to extend the above picture.
For increased convenience in the discussion below, we now distinguish between
the input system and the output system of the channel, giving them distinct
labels A0 and B, respectively (see figure 1.4). Thus, we consider a channel
CA0!B. The initial state ⇢A0 of the system may not be a pure state, in general.
However, we can consider a purification of ⇢A0 , that is, a reference system
A and a bipartite pure state | iA0A such that trA(| ih |A0A) = ⇢A0 (we will
discuss this in more detail in section 3.3).
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the first equality follows from the fact that H(A) = H(E) when the state of
the system AE is pure. The quantity H(A|E) is called the conditional von
Neumann entropy. It can be seen as a measure for how much information an
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Here, we motivated the conditional von Neumann entropy in a rather ad-
hoc way. The purpose of this was just to connect the characteristics of deco-
herence that are typically stressed in the physics literature with the quanti-
tative treatment that we are aiming for. In quantum information theory, the
von Neumann entropy has been formulated in a rigorous framework of axioms
and operational characterizations. One such operational characterization is
the connection between the coherent information, defined by Schumacher and
Nielsen [SN96], and the channel capacity.
To discuss the coherent information, we need to extend the above picture.
For increased convenience in the discussion below, we now distinguish between
the input system and the output system of the channel, giving them distinct
labels A0 and B, respectively (see figure 1.4). Thus, we consider a channel
CA0!B. The initial state ⇢A0 of the system may not be a pure state, in general.
However, we can consider a purification of ⇢A0 , that is, a reference system
A ans a bipartite pure state | iA0A such that trA(| ih |A0A) = ⇢A0 (we will








Figure 1.4: Diagram for the coherent information. The initial state ⇢A0
of the system is purified by a reference system A. Taking this into account,
the overall system after the channel consists of three subsystems A, B and E.
In this setting, the coherent information is defined with respect to the
state ⇢AB as
I(AiB)⇢ := H(B) H(AB) (1.12)
=  H(A|B)⇢ . (1.13)
Taking the channel purification E into account, we can write this as
I(AiB)⇢ =  H(A|B)⇢ (1.14)
= H(A|E) , (1.15)
where the last equality follows from the fact that the overall state ⇢ABE is pure
[NC00].
The coherent information I(AiB)⇢ has been shown to be related to the
quantum channel capacity Q(CA0!B) of the channel, which is known as the
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Taking the channel purification E into account, we can write this as
I(AiB)⇢ =  H(A|B)⇢ (1.14)
= H(A|E) , (1.15)
where the last equality follows from the fact that the overall state ⇢ABE is pure
[NC00].
The coherent information I(AiB)⇢ has been shown to be related to the
quantum channel capacity Q(CA0!B) of the channel, which is known as the
Lloyd-Shor-Devetak (LSD) theorem [Llo97; Sho02; Dev05]. Roughly speak-
ing, the quantum capacity quantifies how much quantum information can be
transmitted through the channel (for more information, we refer to quantum
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where I(AniBn)⇢ is the coherent information for ⇢AnBn = 1⌦nA ⌦C⌦nA0!B(⇢An(A0)n)
and ⇢An(A0)n is a purification of ⇢(A0)n . The state 1⌦nA ⌦ C⌦nA0!B(⇢An(A0)n) results
from the n-fold use of the channel CA0!B to transmit (A0)n, i.e. n copies of
system A0, while the purification An of (A0)n remains unchanged. Thus, the
r.h.s. of (1.16) is the coherent information in the limit of infinitely many
channel uses. Likewise, the quantum capacity Q(CA0!B) is the limit of the
achievable rate for quantum data transmission in the limit of infinitely many
channel uses. One says that the quantum capacity, and therefore the coherent
information, is an asymptotic quantity. This has the disadvantage that from
the coherent information, only very limited statements about finitely many
uses of the channel can be made.
The von Neumann entropy has other very important roles, such as in the
asymptotic analysis of quantum key distribution (QKD), discovered by Ben-
nett and Brassard [BB84] and Ekert [Eke91]. To discuss this, it is helpful to
switch to the information-theoretic paradigm, in which the systems A and E
are controlled by parties with intentions and interests, rather than being dead
physical objects. In a QKD protocol there are three parties A, B and E, called
Alice, Bob and Eve. It is a cryptographic protocol in which Alice wants to
send a secret key to Bob using a public channel such that the eavesdropper
Eve (who has control over the channel) cannot learn it. Here, a key is a string
of random bits that Alice and Bob want to use for encrypting messages in a
one-time pad.2
Classically, a secure exchange of secret keys through public communica-
tion is impossible without relying on assumptions of computational hardness.
Quantum mechanically, however, it is (in principle) possible to do this securely
by the use of decoherence estimation. For our purposes, it is particularly in-
sightful to consider this in an entanglement-based protocol, invented by Ekert,
rather than in a prepare-and-measure protocol, as invented by Bennett and
Brassard.
In a simple entanglement-based QKD protocol, Alice prepares maximally
entangled pairs of qubits and sends one half of each pair to Bob using a quan-
tum channel. The quantum channel is insecure, so there could be an eaves-
dropper Eve trying to read out the quantum information that Alice sends to
Bob (see figure 1.5). For each pair, Alice and Bob independently measure
their qubit in either the Pauli-X basis or the Pauli-Z basis, where the basis is
chosen at random. Afterwards, Alice and Bob compare part of their data. If
they do that in a clever way, they can determine with high confidence whether
an eavesdropper was present. More precisely, from the compared data, they
can bound the amount of information that any eavesdropper (or any channel
purification) has about the data that Alice and Bob did not compare. The
2 The one-time pad is a symmetric key cipher that allows for perfectly secret communica-
tion between two parties over a public communication channel. The one-time pad requires
the use of a secret key. Fore more information about the one-time pad and symmetric key
ciphers in general, see [Sti05].
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bound is of the form H(X|E)   f( ), where X is the data that Alice holds
and has not communicated, and where f( ) just stands symbolically for a
function of parameters that they determined in the comparison. This is called
parameter estimation. (We will learn more about concrete QKD protocols in
chapter 5.) Thus, they can determine how secret their information is by means
of experiment—which is something without a classical analogue. It is a form














measurement? full decoherence?no eavesdropping?
? ??
Figure 1.5: Diagram for an entanglement-based QKD protocol. By
comparing measurement statistics, Alice and Bob can lower bound the con-
ditional von Neumann entropy H(X|E). If there is no eavesdropping, they
will find that H(X|E) = n, where n is the number of bits in the outcome
string X. If Eve measures every qubit passing the channel, she gets classically
correlated with Alice, H(A|E) = 0. In the most extreme case, Eve keeps the
sent qubit and forwards another system to Bob, thereby creating entanglement
with Alice, in which case H(A|E) =  n.
Apart from QKD, the (conditional) von Neumann entropy has many more
operational characterizations that we will not cover here. However, it has
a huge drawback concerning its practical applicability: it is an asymptotic
quantity. For the QKD example, this means that security proofs based on the
von Neumann entropy only hold in the limit where Alice and Bob exchange
infinitely many (qu)bits. Since real-world applications are always finite, this
means that the results are never applicable for actual QKD protocols.
1.3 Quantification of single-shot decoherence
To make quantum key distribution applicable in practice, one needs to account
for the fact that Alice and Bob only exchange a finite amount of data. Thus,
11
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their statistical tests can only give them a bounded confidence about an eaves-
dropper’s knowledge. Concretely, speaking in the last section’s language, Alice
and Bob can never conclude with certainty that there was no decoherence in
the transmission (in which case H(X|E) = n) when they only exchange a finite
amount of data. However, the one time pad encryption, for which Alice and
Bob want the key, only works with perfectly secret keys if perfect security is
required.
Thus, in actual QKD protocols, one needs a method to turn keys with
partial uncertainty of Eve into smaller keys with (almost) full uncertainty of
Eve. This is done with quantum leftover hashing [Tom+11]. It turns an n-bit
string X about which Eve has partial knowledge into an l-bit string (with
l < n) about which Eve has (almost) no information. The quantum leftover
hashing lemma, which we will encounter in chapter 4, states the conditions
under which this is possible. These conditions are not formulated in terms of
the von Neumann entropy but in terms of the smooth conditional min-entropy,
introduced by Renato Renner [Ren05]. (We will see its formal definition in
chapter 3.) Roughly speaking, the quantum leftover hashing lemma [Tom+11]
states that from a string X with H"min(X|E) > l, one can extract an l-bit key
K which is approximately uniformly random and uncorrelated with Eve, that
is
⇢KE ⇡ ⇡K ⌦ ⇢E , where ⇡K = 1K
2l
. (1.17)
We will see the precise statement (and also the role of the parameter " in
chapter 4. Thus, finite-size QKD protocols work with the min-entropy rather
than the von Neumann entropy. Again, the estimation of the min-entropy
H"min(X|E) can be seen as a form of decoherence estimation.
The motivation for the min-entropy that we have just given is an application-
specific one and might seem quite far away from the more intuitive character-
izations of decoherence that we mentioned further above. There are, however,
other characterizations of the min-entropy that bring us back to a more in-
tuitive picture. For example, the (non-smooth) min-entropy can be seen as a
measure for how far away Eve is from a situation in which she is maximally
entangled with Alice. More precisely, it has been shown [KRS09] that
Hmin(A|E)⇢ =   log dA maxRE!A0 F
2( AA0 ,1A ⌦RE!A0(⇢AE)) , (1.18)
Here, the maximum is taken over all operations RE!A0 that Eve can perform
on her part of the system, F is the fidelity that measures how close two states





|iiA ⌦ |iiA0 . (1.19)
(For a definition of the fidelity F , see definition 3.14.) Thus, the min-entropy
measures how close Eve can bring herself to sharing the state  AA0 with Alice.
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1.4 Summary of the results presented in this
thesis
In the previous sections, we have seen that decoherence can be thought of in
many diﬀerent terms: some that are more intuitive, but which refer explicitly
to the mathematical representation of a state as a density operator, and some
that are very application-specific. In this thesis, we will see three diﬀerent
results, all of which have in common that they concern decoherence in some
sense, and technically correspond to bounding the min-entropy.
The first result concerns QKD protocols, and will be presented in chapter 5.
We will investigate in detail how QKD protocols estimate the conditional min-
entropy H"min(X|E). We will find that an error has spread in the more recent
QKD literature that leads to an incorrect bound on the min-entropy. More
precisely, we analyze iterative sifting, a recently suggested procedure in which
Alice and Bob communicate past measurement basis choices to ensure that
they end up with enough bits measured in the same basis. We find that
iterative sifting leads to two previously unnoticed problems that break the
security proof of the QKD protocol. We will see attack strategies that exploit
these problems, and see how the protocol can be modified to avoid them. We
present a detailed formal proof of the min-entropy bound for the resulting
protocol, thereby seeing at what point iterative sifting breaks the security
proof of QKD.
In chapter 6, we will use ideas from QKD to devise a protocol that achieves
the distribution of secret quantum information. While in QKD, the goal is to
distribute a classical random bit string which is decoupled from Eve, we will
see a protocol in which Alice sends qubits to Bob that are decoupled from Eve.
The protocol can be thought of as a modified QKD protocol, in which qubits
are measured at random in the X-basis, in the Z-basis, or not at all. As we will
see, Alice and Bob can then exchange and analyze their measurement results
in the X- and Z-basis to obtain a bound H"min(A|E), where A is the system
of Alice’s unmeasured qubits. Such a protocol can be extended to a protocol
where Alice and Bob process their unmeasured qubits to distill entanglement
between each other.
Finally, chapter 7 is dedicated to the question of how decoherence can be
estimated in situations where quantum theory may no longer be a correct
description of nature. This is interesting for the investigation of phenomena
for which there is no quantum description. For example, since there is no
consistent theory of quantum gravity, eﬀects of gravitational decoherence are
likely to fall outside of the realm of quantum theory. We will generalize the
probabilistic structure of quantum theory to a framework of generalized prob-
abilistic theories where quantum theory forms a special case. This framework
is general enough to encompass any theory with probabilistic measurement
outcomes satisfying a set of minimal assumptions. This way, one may hope to
have a framework at hand that is general enough to encompass the theory that
correctly describes gravitational decoherence, without knowing which theory
exactly it is. For these generalized probabilistic theories, we derive a framework
of decoherence estimation. Taking expression (1.18) as an inspiration, we de-
rive a generalized decoherence quantity Dec(A|E) for any probabilistic theory
13
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that has a notion of a “maximally correlated state”, in analogy to maximally
entangled states in quantum theory. We will show that this quantity can be es-
timated by CHSH measurements performed on a maximally correlated particle
pair, where one half of the pair undergoes the decoherence process in question.
This way, one obtains a bound of the form Dec(A|E)  f( ), where f is a
function of the measured CHSH parameter  . This way, one can test proposed
models for gravitational decoherence by calculating Dec(A|E) for these models
and checking whether the obtained value is compatible with the experimen-
tally derived bound of the form Dec(A|E)  f( ). This might provide a useful
falsification tool in the search for a model for gravitational decoherence. As
an example application of this framework, we will suggest an optomechanical
experiment to test Diosi’s theory of gravitational decoherence.
1.5 Outline of the thesis
The general structure of this thesis is as follows. It is divided into four parts:
introduction (part I), preliminaries (part II), contributions (part III) and ap-
pendix (part IV).
The preliminaries serve as a summary of the technical prerequisites that
are required to understand the contributions made in this thesis. They should
more be considered as a reminder than as an introduction for beginners. They
start with a lookup-table of our conventions and notation before we reca-
pitulate some formal details of discrete probability theory in chapter 2. In
chapter 3, we revise the definitions of the quantum framework as it is typically
used in quantum information theory, including min- and max-entropy formal-
ism. In chapter 4, we will recapitulate those operational characterizations of
the min-entropy that are relevant for our contributions.
Part III forms the main part of this thesis, and is dedicated to the results
that we have summarized in the previous section: the problems of iterative
sifting in QKD (chapter 5), the protocol for the distribution of secret quan-
tum information (chapter 6), and the decoherence estimation framework for
generalized probabilistic theories (chapter 7). We will round things oﬀ in chap-
ter 8, where we make some concluding remarks and have an outlook on future
research that may follow up the contributions of this thesis.







• We use the  1 superscript notation to denote preimages of elements or
subsets under maps. For example, for a map f : A ! B, an element
y 2 B and a subset S ✓ B, we write
f 1(y) = {x 2 A | f(x) = y} , (1.20)
f 1(S) = {x 2 A | f(x) 2 S} . (1.21)
• The logarithm is with respect to base 2, i.e. log := log2.
• The natural logarithm (to base e) is denoted by ln.
• We denote the positive integers by N+ := {1, 2, 3, . . .}.
• For n 2 N+, we write [n] := {1, . . . , n},
• We use the following notation for multinomial coeﬃcients:✓
n










In most of the quantum information literature—especially research papers—
elements of probability theory such as random variables or conditionings are
addressed rather implicitly. For example, when a quantity is said to be a ran-
dom variable, the underlying probability space and the form of the random
variable as a map are typically not modeled explicitly. The more formally in-
clined reader is then left to figure out the underlying probability space structure
himself. This is usually not a problem, and leaving the precise mathematics
implicit can save space in research publications to talk about the more central
topics of the paper.
In much of the material presented in this thesis, however, these elements
of probability theory are very central. In chapter 5, for example, we will look
at some probabilistic aspects of a QKD protocol in great detail and point out
mistakes that occurred in current research literature. These mistakes would
have probably not been made if the underlying probability space structure
had been treated more formally. For this reason, we will model probability
spaces and random variables explicitly whenever this is useful and feasible.
The material in this section is a recap of the aspects of probability theory
that need to be understood in order to grasp our probability space models
on a formal level. It is more a reminder and an indication of our notational
conventions rather than a complete introduction to the subject.
2.1 Probability spaces, random variables and events
Probability theory is the theory of probability spaces. In general, a probability
space is given by a triple (⌦, E , µ), where ⌦ is a set, E is a sigma-algebra and
µ is a measure. However, for our purposes, it is not necessary to know what a
sigma-algebra or a measure is. We will only deal with cases in which the set ⌦
is countable (i.e. finite or countably infinite). In this case, probability theory
can be reduced to the study of discrete probability spaces, which are defined
as follows.
Definition 2.1 : A discrete probability space is a pair (⌦, P ), where ⌦
is a countable set (called the sample space) and P is a probability mass
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function on ⌦, that is, a function P : ⌦! [0, 1] such thatX
!2⌦
P (!) = 1 . (2.1)
The elements of ⌦ are called elementary events.
We will often say “probability distribution” when we mean a probability
mass function. Since discrete probability spaces are the only probability spaces
that we will encounter, it is unnecessarily cumbersome to refer to “discrete”
probability spaces all the time. Instead, we make the following convention.
Convention 2.2 : Throughout this thesis, the term “probability space” refers
to a discrete probability space.
Definition 2.3 : Let (⌦, P ) be a probability space. A random variable X
on (⌦, P ) is a map X : ⌦! ⌦X to some set ⌦X . The set ⌦X is the codomain
of X. The probability distribution PX of a random variable X is given
by the probability mass function




P (!) . (2.2)
Convention 2.4 : Throughout this thesis, we will write random variables in
uppercase letters (such as X) and its values, i.e. the elements of its codomain,
in lowercase letters (such as x).
Remark 2.5: A random variable X on a probability space (⌦, P ) as in defi-
nition 2.3 induces a probability space (⌦X , PX). The following diagram helps






Remark 2.6: Roughly speaking, one can say that “functions of random vari-
ables are again random variables”. In more detail, consider a probability space
(⌦, P ) and a random variable X : ⌦ ! ⌦X . Then, for a map f : ⌦X ! ⌦Y
to some set ⌦Y , there are two equivalent ways in which we can see ⌦Y as the
codomain of a random variable Y : either, we see Y = f  X as a random vari-
able on the probability space (⌦, P ), or we consider f as a random variable on
the probability space (⌦X , PX). The relation between these two views can be










In this case, where a random variable Y is defined via a map f , we write
Y = f(X) and say that the random variable Y is a function of the random
variable X.
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Definition 2.7 : Let (⌦, P ) be a probability space, let X, Y be random vari-
ables on (⌦, P ). Then the joint probability distribution of X and Y is the
probability mass function




P (!) , (2.5)
where ⌦XY = ⌦X ⇥ ⌦Y and where X ⇥ Y is the map
X ⇥ Y : ⌦ ! ⌦X ⇥ ⌦Y
! 7! (X(!), Y (!)) . (2.6)
This gives rise to a probability space (⌦XY , PXY ).
Remark 2.8: In analogy to remark 2.5, we point out that two random vari-
ables X and Y on a probability space (⌦, P ) also induce a probability space
(⌦XY , PXY ). Moreover, definition 2.7 generalizes to joint distributions PX1...Xn
on ⌦X1...Xn for any number n of random variables in the obvious way, leading
to probability spaces (⌦X1...Xn , PX1...Xn).
Definition 2.9 : For a probability space (⌦, P ), an event A is a subset A ✓ ⌦




P (!) . (2.7)
Convention 2.10 : Note the diﬀerent notations we use for probabilities: for
elementary events ! 2 ⌦, we write P (!), for values x of a random variable X,
we write PX(x), and for events A ✓ ⌦, we write P [A] (in square brackets).
All events that we will consider are given by equalities or inequalities in-
volving random variables. For example, if (⌦, P ) is a probability space and X
is a random variable, then the set
(X = x) := {! 2 ⌦ | X(!) = x} (2.8)
is an event. It has the probability






P (!) = PX(x) . (2.9)
We will often consider random variables whose codomains are subsets of the
real numbers. In that case, the set ⌦X is an ordered set, so we can consider
events of the form
(X  x) := {! 2 ⌦ | X(!)  x} . (2.10)
Such events have the probability
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For two random variables X and Y , we can consider events like
(X + Y  8 ^X   3) := {! 2 ⌦ | X(!) + Y (!)  8 and X(!)   3} , (2.12)
where ^ denotes the logical “and”. More generally, we interpret any equality
or inequality involving random variables (such as the left hand side in equa-
tions (2.8), (2.10) and (2.12)) as an event. All random variables that we will
consider are of this form. For the definitions in this chapter, we denote events
by A and B and think of them as placeholders for equalities or inequalities
involving random variables.
Definition 2.11 : Let (⌦, P ) be a probability space, let A and B be events
such that P [B] 6= 0. The conditional probability P [A|B] of A conditioned
on B (or A given B) is defined as
P [A|B] = P [A \ B]
P [B]
. (2.13)
If A is of the form X = x for a random variable X, we write
PX|B(x) := P [X = x|B] = P [(X = x) \B]P [B] . (2.14)
If, in addition, B is of the form Y = y for a random variable Y , we write
PX|Y (x|y) := P [X = x|Y = y] = PXY (x, y)PY (y) . (2.15)
We will make use of the law of total probability, which can be formulated
in terms of random variables X and Y as follows.
Proposition 2.12 (Law of total probability): For two random variables





PY (y)PX|Y (x|y) . (2.16)
We will also make use of the following result.
Theorem 2.13 (Bayes’ Theorem): Let A, B be events such that P [A] 6= 0
and P [B] 6= 0. Then
P [A|B] := P [A]P [B|A]
P [B]
. (2.17)
In chapter 5, when we talk about eﬃciencies of protocols, we will see that
eﬃciencies are random variables. In order to compare eﬃciencies of protocols,
we will compare their expectation values, which are defined as follows.
Definition 2.14 : For a random variable X, the expectation value hXi of




PX(x) x . (2.18)
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The expectation value of a random variable can be decomposed in a way
similar to the law of total probability above as shown by the following propo-
sition.





PY (y)hX|Y = yi , (2.19)
where
hX|Y = yi :=
X
x2⌦X
PX|Y (x|y) x (2.20)
Definition 2.16 : The quantity hX|Y = yi as in equation (2.20) is called the
conditional expectation of X given the event Y = y.
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In this chapter, we give a summarized overview of some basics of quantum
information theory. The material presented here should not be seen as an
introduction to the topic but as reminder of well-established definitions and
results in quantum information theory. It also serves as a means to introduce
our notational conventions. For an introduction to quantum information the-
ory, we recommend the textbooks by Nielesn and Chuang [NC00] and by Wilde
[Wil13]. For an introduction to quantum measurements with an account on
its history, see [Kra83].
3.1 Basic definitions of the quantum formalism
3.1.1 States
In quantum theory, a system is associated with a complex Hilbert space H.
Throughout this thesis, we restrict ourselves to systems whose Hilbert space is
finite-dimensional. In other words, all quantum systems that we consider are
associated with a finite-dimensional complex inner product space, and we will
always denote such a space by the symbol H.
Convention 3.1 : Throughout this thesis, quantum systems are assumed
to be finite-dimensional, and the symbol H always denotes finite-dimensional
complex inner product spaces.
We assume that the reader has some familiarity with linear algebra. We
use the bra-ket notation (or Dirac notation), i.e. we denote vectors by a “ket”
| i 2 H and their dual vectors by a “bra” h | 2 H⇤. We assume that this
notation is clear. Readers unfamiliar with this notation are referred to any
standard textbook on quantum mechanics or quantum information theory,
such as [Wil13].
For operators on H, we use the following notation.
Definition 3.2 : The space of endomorphisms on H, given by
End(H) := {L : H! H | L linear} , (3.1)
is a vector space. The Hermitian operators on H,
Herm(H) :=  L 2 End(H) | L† = L (3.2)
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(where L† denotes the Hermitian adjoint of L) form a linear subspace of
End(H). The states (or density operators) ⇢ on H are given by
S(H) := {⇢ 2 Herm(H) | ⇢   0, tr(⇢) = 1} , (3.3)
where ⇢   0means that the operator ⇢ is positive and tr(⇢) denotes the trace of
the operator ⇢. It is often convenient to consider the subnormalized states
on H, given by
S(H) := {⇢ 2 Herm(H) | ⇢   0, tr(⇢)  1} . (3.4)
An important distinction among quantum states is the distinction between
pure and mixed states. Pure states can be thought of as states of maximal
knowledge. We assume that this interpretation is clear and will not recall
it here. The reader unfamiliar with this concept is referred to textbooks on
quantum information theory, such as [NC00] or [Wil13].
Definition 3.3 : Let ⇢ 2 S(H) be a state. The state ⇢ is pure if there is a
normalized vector | i 2 H such that ⇢ = | ih |.
While the usage of the term “pure state” in the literature is clear, the usage
of the term “mixed state” is not. Some authors call a state ⇢ mixed if it is
not pure. Other authors use the term as a synonym for “density operator”,
meaning that they do not assume that the state is pure (but allowing for that
case). We will call a state mixed if it is not pure.
To distinguish between spaces corresponding to diﬀerent systems, we use
subscripts, i.e. HA, HB is the space associated with system A, B, respectively.
Joint systems of several subsystems are associated with the tensor product of
the spaces of the subsystems, e.g. the space of the joint system AB consisting
of subsystems A and B is given by HAB = HA⌦HB. Instead of “joint” system,
we will also write “composite” system. A composite system consisting of two or
three subsystems, is also called a “bipartite” or “tripartite” system, respectively.
Definition 3.4 : For a subnormalized state ⇢AB 2 S(HAB) of a composite
system AB, the reduced state on system A is defined as
⇢A := trB(⇢AB) , (3.5)
where trB is the partial trace over B, that is, trB is the unique linear operator
trB : End(HAB)! End(HA) such that
trB(V ⌦W ) = V tr(W ) 8V 2 End(HA) , 8W 2 End(HB) . (3.6)
Likewise, the reduced state on system B is defined as ⇢B = trA(⇢AB).
It holds that trA(trB(⇢AB)) = trB(trA(⇢AB)) = tr(⇢AB). Definition 3.4 ex-
tends to partial traces over arbitrarily many subsystems of arbitrary composite
systems.
Convention 3.5 : In contexts where a state of a composite system has already
been defined, we will refer to the reduced states of the system simply by
omitting the subscripts of traced-out systems. For example, in a context where
a density operator ⇢ABC 2 S(HABC) has already been defined, we will simply
write ⇢A and implicitly mean ⇢A = trB(trC(⇢ABC)).
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A particularly important type of state is a maximally entangled state, de-
fined as follows.
Definition 3.6 : Consider two systems A and A0 of equal dimension. A state
⇢AA0 is a maximally entangled state if it is of the form
⇢AA0 = | ih |AA0 , where | iAA0 =
PdA
i=1 |iiA ⌦ |iiA0p
dA
(3.7)
for some orthonormal basis (|iiA)dAi=1 of A and some orthonormal basis (|iiA0)dAi=1
of A0.
Maximally entangled states are basis-dependent, that is, for diﬀerent choices
of the bases (|iiA)dAi=1 and (|iiA)dA0i=1, we get diﬀerent states of the form as in
equation (3.7). Nonetheless, in many situations it is common to refer to the
maximally entangled state. Lemmata 3.7 and 3.8 will help us to understand
in which situations it is safe to do so. The following lemma can be found in
[Tom12].
Lemma 3.7 (Mirror lemma): Let ⇢AA0 = | ih |AA0 be a maximally en-
tangled state (with | iAA0 as in equation (3.7)), let UA be a unitary on A, let
UA0 be the unitary on HA0 that acts the same way with respect to the basis
(|iiA0)dAi=1 as UA acts with respect to (|iiA0)dAi=1.1 Then
(UA ⌦ 1A0)| iAA0 = (1A ⌦ UTA0)| iAA0 , (3.8)
where UTA0 denotes the transpose of UA0 with respect to the basis (|iiA0)dAi=1.
Lemma 3.7 can be proved by simple direct calculation, which we omit
here. The mirror lemma states that the application of a unitary on one half
of a system in a maximally entangled state corresponds to the applicaton of
another unitary on the other half. This allows to prove the following, lemma,
which is widely used in quantum information (see, for example, [NC00] and
[Wil13]).
Lemma 3.8 : Let ⇢AA0 and  AA0 be maximally entangle states of the same
system AA0. Then there is a unitary UA0 on HA0 such that
⇢AA0 = (1A ⌦ UA0) AA0(1A ⌦ U †A0) . (3.9)
Proof. Let | iAA0 , | iAA0 2 HAA0 be such that
⇢AA0 = | ih |AA0 ,  AA0 = | ih |AA0 . (3.10)
Since any two bases are related by a unitary, there is a unitary VA on HA and
a unitary WA0 on HA0 such that
| iAA0 = (VA ⌦WA0)| iAA0 (3.11)
= (1A ⌦WA0)(VA ⌦ 1A0)| iAA0 . (3.12)
According to the mirror lemma, it holds that
(VA ⌦ 1A0)| iAA0 = (1A ⌦ V TA0)| iAA0 , (3.13)
1 More precisely, UA0 = S 1A0!AUASA!A0 , where SA!A0 maps the basis (|iiA)dAi=1 to the
basis (|iiA0)dAi=1.
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Inserting (3.13) into (3.12) yields
| iAA0 = (1A ⌦WA0)(1A ⌦ V TA0)| iAA0 (3.14)
= (1A ⌦WA0V TA0)| iAA0 (3.15)
= (1A ⌦ UA0)| iAA0 , (3.16)
where UA = WA0V TA0 is a unitary.
Lemma 3.8 tells us that when we consider functions of states that are in-
variant under local unitaries on one system, then any two maximally entangled
states yield the same function value. In this sense, all maximally entangled
states are equivalent.
Another important special state that we consider is the maximally mixed
state, defined as follows.
Definition 3.9 : Consider a dA-dimensional system A. The maximally mixed







where {|ii}dAi=1 is any basis of HA (the state is independent of the choice of the
basis).
An important property of maximally entangled states is that the reduced
state (on either side) is always a maximally mixed state.
3.1.2 Evolution
An evolution of a quantum system is any process that changes the state of
the system. This may also involve a change of the type of quantum system.
In simple terms, an evolution is a map from the states S(HA) of a quantum
system A to the states S(HB) of a quantum system B. Quantum information
scientists like to think of the evolution of a quantum system as a channel CA!B:
it takes a system A in some state ⇢A as its input and outputs a system B in a
state ⇢B:
A quantum channel CA!B B (3.18)
In order to correspond to a physical evolution of the system, the map CA!B
needs to satisfy three properties. Firstly, such a map needs to preserve the trace
of the state, tr(CA!B(⇢A)) = tr(⇢A). Secondly, considerations of probabilistic
consistency require the map CA!B to be linear [NC00]. Thirdly, it needs to
map positive operators to positive operators (otherwise, states would not be
mapped to states), that is, it needs to be a positive map:
CA!B(⇢A)   0 8 ⇢A   0 . (3.19)
Consistency considerations lead to a requirement stronger than (3.19): it needs
to remain a positive map even if it becomes part of a larger evolution in which
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another system remains unchanged:
A quantum channel CA!B B
E E
(3.20)
This is summarized in the following formal definition of a quantum channel.
Definition 3.10 : Let A and B be quantum systems. A quantum channel
from A to B is a linear map
CA!B : End(HA)! End(HB) (3.21)
which is trace-preserving, i.e.
tr(CA!B(⇢A)) = tr(⇢A) 8 ⇢A 2 End(HA) , (3.22)
and which is completely positive. That is, for any quantum system E of any
dimension dE 2 N+, the map CA!B⌦1E (with 1E denoting the identity channel
1E(⇢E) = ⇢E) is a positive map,
(CA!B ⌦ 1E)(⇢AE)   0 8 ⇢AE 2 HAE . (3.23)
Such a map is called a trace-preserving completely positive map (abbre-
viated as TPCPM).2
For some situations, it is convenient to introduce the following notation.
Definition 3.11 : For vector spaces V and W , we denote the vector space of
linear maps from V to W by Hom(V,W ). It is the space of homomorphisms
from V toW . In particular, we denote the space of linear maps from End(HA)
to End(HB) by Hom(End(HA),End(HB)).
By virtue of definition 3.11, we can denote channels CA!B as special ele-
ments of the vector space Hom(End(HA),End(HB)). In this thesis, we consider
two physical situations that we will describe by quantum channels. In the first
situation, a party Alice sends some quantum information to a distant party
Bob, and thereby uses some sort of quantum channel, for example, a glass fiber.
This situation is typically considered in protocols where secret information is
communicated. In such a situation, one is not allowed to make assumptions
about the quantum channel that is implemented by the glass fiber, as it is
possible that some eavesdropper modifies the fiber. In this case, we need to
consider channel purifications, which we will discuss in section 3.3.
The second situation that we consider are measurements. These are pro-
cesses that change the state of a quantum system, and since a channel is the
most general description of such a process, it can be described as a quantum
channel. We will see this in the second half of section 3.1.3 below.
2 According to this definition, the terms “channel” and “TPCPM” are equivalent. In
practice, the term channel is preferred when speaking of the evolution of a system in a
physical sense, while the term TPCPM refers to the map as a mathematical object. However,
this distinction is often not very strict.
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3.1.3 Measurements
Measurement statistics
The statistics of a measurement on a quantum system are completely described
by a positive operator valued measure (POVM), defined as follows.
Definition 3.12 : Let A be a quantum system. A positive operator valued
measure is a set {Mi}ni=1 of positive operators on HA such that
nX
i=1
Mi = 1A , (3.24)
where 1A is the identity operator on HA.3 If system A is initially in a state
⇢A and is measured with respect to the POVM, then the probability of an
outcome i 2 [n] is given by tr(Mi⇢A).
We will often consider measurements on qubit systems. A system A is a
qubit system if HA is isomorphic to C2. We will speak of measurements with
respect to the X-basis and with respect to the Z-basis. This is a very common
terminology, and just means that measurements are performed with respect to
the POVMs




























They correspond to measurements in the eigenbasis of the Pauli operators  x
and  z, respectively. These POVMs are in fact projective measurements, i.e.
each of the four operators above are orthogonal projectors. For projective
measurements, it is straightforward to assign post-measurement states (see
further below).
It is common and handy to use a special notation for the eigenstates of these
measurements, which can be represented as |vihv| for some eigenvector |vi of



























3 We use the same symbol 1 for the identity operator and the identity channel, as the
identity channel can be seen as the multiplication with the identity operator.
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Note that
tr(Z0|0ih0|) = tr(Z1|1ih1|) = tr(X0|+ih+|) = tr(X1| ih |) = 1 , (3.30)
so if a system is in an eigenstate of a basis, it has a definite outcome.
In chapter 5, we will consider product measurements on multiple qubits. As
an example, for a system composed of n qubits, one can consider the product
POVM
{Zz1 ⌦ Zz2 ⌦ . . .⌦ Zzn | zi 2 {0, 1} 8 i 2 [n]} , (3.31)
which corresponds to each qubit being measured in the Z-basis. Instead of
denoting outcomes by numbers z1, . . . , zn 2 {0, 1}, we can denote a set of
outcomes by a string
z = (z1, . . . , zn) 2 {0, 1}n . (3.32)
This way, the POVM (3.31) can be rewritten as




The reader may wonder why we have added a subscript Z in the notation for
the projector ⇧Z(z). This will become clear in the following paragraph.
For an n-qubit system A in a state ⇢A, the numbers tr(⇧Z(z)⇢A) indexed
by z 2 {0, 1}n form a probability distribution. Thus, we can consider the
probability space induced by the measurement. In most cases, there is no
benefit in doing so, but when we study QKD measurement statistics in detail
in section 5.8, this will prove useful. It will allow us to connect the formalism
of classical probability spaces that we recapitulated in chapter 2 with the
statistics of quantum measurements. This allows us to formally speak of the
random variables of measurement outcomes and functions thereof. For our
above example, we can consider the probability space (⌦Z , PZ), where ⌦Z =
{0, 1}n and where
PZ : ⌦Z ! [0, 1] ,
z 7! tr(⇧Z(z)⇢A) . (3.34)
On this probability space, the random variable Z of the outcome string z is
simply given by the identity map,
Z : ⌦Z ! ⌦Z ,
z 7! z . (3.35)
This formalism can be extended to distributed measurements of several
parties. Consider a joint quantum system AB, where both A and B are n-
qubit systems. Then we can describe the statistics of a measurement where
both Alice and Bob measure all their qubits in the Z-basis by the POVM
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This induces the probability space (⌦ZZ0 , PZZ0), where ⌦ZZ0 = {0, 1}n⇥{0, 1}n
and where
PZZ0 : ⌦ZZ0 ! [0, 1] ,
(z, z0) 7! tr(⇧ZZ0(z, z0)⇢AB) . (3.37)
On this probability space, the random variables Z and Z 0 of the outcome
strings z and z0 are simply the projections on the respective component, e.g.
Z : ⌦ZZ0 ! ⌦Z (= {0, 1}n) ,
(z, z0) 7! z . (3.38)
This induction of probability spaces is essentially just a change of nota-
tion, but a particularly useful one. It allows to readily apply the formalism
of classical probability spaces on measurement statistics of quantum systems.
At the same time, we can infer properties of the probability distributions from
properties of the state. (This will be very useful when we discuss the uni-
form sampling property and the absence of a basis information leak of sifting
protocols in section 5.8.)
Post-measurement states
If a projective measurement {⇧i}i is performed on a system A which is initially
in a state ⇢A and yields outcome k, then after the measurement, the system is





However, typically, after a quantum system is measured, it is no longer avail-
able in an experiment (for example, a measured photon may be absorbed).
Moreover, not all measurements are projective measurements. Non-projective
measurements arise from projective measurements on larger composite systems
[NC00].
Even in such situations, it makes sense to consider a post-measurement
state, where the outcome of the measurement outcome is stored in a classical
register. For example, if a qubit system A is initially in a state ⇢A and then is





where {|xi}x=0,1 is a fixed basis of a classical register system X and where
PX(x) = tr(Xx⇢A) . (3.41)
The transformation ⇢A 7! ⇢X is a quantum channel. A density operator of the
form (3.40), i.e. a state which is diagonal in a fixed basis, is called a classical
state. Why is it beneficial to consider such a density operator instead of just
considering the outcome probabilities PX(x)?
One case where this is useful is the case where an adversary holds quantum
side information. Consider the case where a party Alice and an adversary Eve
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share a quantum system ⇢AE. If Alice performs a measurement in the X-basis




PX(x)|xihx|⌦ ⇢xE , (3.42)
where PX is as above and where
⇢xE =
trA((Xx ⌦ 1E)⇢AE(Xx ⌦ 1E))
PX(x)
. (3.43)
The state transformation ⇢AE 7! ⇢XE is a quantum channel. A state of the
form (3.42) is called a classical-quantum state, or CQ-state, for short. Given
this state, Eve can perform operations (e.g. measurements) on system E in
order to learn something about the value of the random variable X. In this
case, where Eve holds quantum side information rather than classical side in-
formation, Eve is strictly more powerful than if she would only hold classical
information [KR11], which makes it necessary to incorporate Alice’s measure-
ment result into a quantum state as in (3.42). An important application of
this is the quantum leftover hashing lemma that we will see in section 4.2 and
use in section 5.8.
Intercept-resend attacks
Another case where it is useful for us to consider post-measurement states are
intercept-resend attacks in QKD, which we will consider in section 5.5. Say
that Alice sends a quantum system A to Bob. Eve intercepts the sent quantum
system and performs a projective measurement on it (say Eve measures in
the Z-basis, see figure 3.1). Then Eve prepares the system in an eigenstate
associated with the measurement outcome (see equation (3.30)) and sends it
to Bob. This yields the same state for Bob as the post-measurement state of
equation (3.39), but physically it is not a post-measurement state but a newly
prepared state.
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Figure 3.1: An intercept-resend attack. Alice wants to send a quantum
system A in some state ⇢A to Bob. Eve intercepts system A and measures
it (with respect to the Z-basis, for example). Then Eve reprepares system A
in the eigenstate corresponding to the measurement outcome and sends it to
Bob.
This changes the state of the system ⇢A to a state ⇢B which, in general, dif-
fers from ⇢A. In section 5.5, when we determine error rates for intercept-resend
attacks in entanglement-based QKD protocols, it is important to understand
how exactly the state is changed. We will consider the case where Alice pre-
pares a qubit pair in a maximally entangled state




Figure 3.1: n intercept-resend attack. Alice wants to send a quantum
system A in some state ⇢A to Bob. Eve intercepts system A and measures
it (with respect to the Z-basis, for example). Then Eve reprepares system A
in the eigenstate corresponding to the measurement outcome and sends it to
Bob.
This changes the state of the system ⇢A to a state ⇢B which, in general, dif-
fers from ⇢A. In section 5.5, when we determine error rates for intercept-resend
attacks in entanglement-based QKD protocols, it is important to understand
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how exactly the state is changed. We will consider the case where Alice pre-
pares a qubit pair in a maximally entangled state
| iAA0 = |0iA ⌦ |0iA0 + |1iA ⌦ |1iA0p
2
(3.44)
and sends system A0 to Bob. Thereby, Eve intercepts this transmission with
an intercept-resend attack (see figure 3.2).
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and sends syste 0 to Bob. hereby, Eve intercepts this trans ission ith








both measure in Z
Z 0
Figure 3.2: Intercept-resend attack in an entanglement-based QKD
protocol. In an entanglement-based QKD protocol, Alice prepares a qubit
pair in a maximally entangled state and sends on half to Bob. In an intercept-
resend attack, the transmission is intercepted by Eve, who performs an attack
as shown in figure 3.1 above. Then Alice and Bob measure their half of the
system in a randomly chosen basis. If Alice and Bob happen to choose the same
basis, but Eve chooses a diﬀerent basis, then there is a non-zero probability
that Alice’s and Bob’s measurement outcomes diﬀer. If Eve measures in X
and Alice and Bob measure in Z (or vice versa), we get that P [Z 6= Z 0] = 1/2
(or P [X 6= X 0] = 1/2, respectively).
In this case, if Eve attacks in the Z-basis and obtains an outcome z, then
Bob will receive |0iB if z = 0 and |1iB if z = 1 (as one can see from (3.30)
above). Moreover, Alice obtains the post-measurement state (c.f. equation
(3.43) above)
⇢zA =
trB((1A ⌦ Zz)| ih |AB(1A ⌦ Zz)
tr((1A ⌦ Zz)| ih |AB) , (3.45)
which is ⇢0A = |0ih0| if z = 0 and ⇢1A = |1ih1| if z = 1. Thus, taken together,
Alice and Bob receive the state
|0iA ⌦ |0iA0 if z = 0 ,
|1iA ⌦ |1iA0 if z = 1 . (3.46)
Analogously, if Eve attacks in the X-basis, then Alice and Bob receive the state
|+iA ⌦ |+iA0 if x = 0 ,
| iA ⌦ | iA0 if x = 1 . (3.47)
where
|+i = |0i+ |1ip
2
, | i = |0i   |1ip
2
. (3.48)
For the error rate calculations in section 5.5, we will consider the case
where Alice and Bob measure in the same basis (X or Z). From (3.46) and
(3.47), we get that if Eve attacks in the same basis as Alice and Bob measure
their systems, then Alice and Bob will get the same outcome with certainty.
However, if Eve attacks in X and Alice and Bob measure in Z (or vice versa),
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For the error rate calculations in section 5.5, we will consider the case
where Alice and Bob measure in the same basis (X or Z). From (3.46) and
(3.47), we get that if Eve attacks in the same basis as Alice and Bob measure
their systems, then Alice and Bob will get the same outcome with certainty.
However, if Eve attacks in X and Alice and Bob measure in Z (or vice versa),
then Alice and Bob get diﬀerent outcomes with probability 1/2, because for
i = 0, 1, we get that
tr((X0 ⌦ X1)(|iihi|A ⌦ |iihi|B)) = tr((X1 ⌦ X0)(|iihi|A ⌦ |iihi|B)) = 1
4
, (3.49)
and for i = +, , we get
tr((Z0 ⌦ Z1)(|iihi|A ⌦ |iihi|B)) = tr((Z1 ⌦ Z0)(|iihi|A ⌦ |iihi|B)) = 1
4
. (3.50)
We will speak of an error when Alice and Bob get diﬀerent measurement
outcomes despite measuring in the same basis. The above shows that if Alice
and Bob measure in the same basis as Eve’s attack, they will have no error, but
if Eve uses a diﬀerent basis than Alice and Bob, the error probability is 1/2.
3.2 Distance measures
Many of the definitions that we will see below make use of distance measures
between quantum states. We will not go far beyond the mere definitions here.
For more information about these measures, see [NC00] (for the trace distance
and the fidelity) and [Tom12] (for the generalized fidelity and the purified dis-
tance). Another good source for distance measures and the distinguishability
of quantum states with a large collection of references is the PhD thesis of
Christopher Fuchs [Fuc95].
We start with the definition of the trace distance and the fidelity. They are
defined in terms of the trace norm, which is defined as follows.
Definition 3.13 : On the vector space End(H), we will use the following
norms. The trace norm is given by







Definition 3.14 : Let ⇢,   2 S(H) be states. The trace distance between




k⇢   k1 . (3.52)
The fidelity between ⇢ and   is defined as









As the following lemma shows, the trace distance and the fidelity share a
symmetry property that is very practical in practive: they are invariant under
under the simultaneous application of a unitary.
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Lemma 3.15 : Let ⇢,   2 H be states, let U be a unitary on H. Then
D(U⇢U †, U U †) = D(⇢,  ) , (3.55)
F (U⇢U †, U U †) = F (⇢,  ) . (3.56)
Another useful fact is that for two states that are diagonal in the same
basis, the trace distance and the fidelity become functions of the diagonal




PX(x) |xihx| ,   =
X
x
QX(x) |xihx| . (3.57)







=: d(PX , QX) , (3.59)
where d(PX , QX) is the total variation distance or classical trace distance be-
tween the probability distributions PX and QX . The fidelity between these
two states is given by





= b(PX , QX) , (3.61)
where b(PX , QX) is the Bhattacharyya coeﬃcient or classical fidelity between
the probability distributions PX and QX .
Such a connection between the quantum trace distance and fidelity and
their classical counterparts does not only hold for states that are diagonal in
the same basis. In a modified way, it holds for any pair of states. The prob-
ability distributions PX and QX can be seen as the probability distributions
over the outcomes that one would get if the systems were measured in the basis
with respect to which they are diagonal. Extending on this idea, one may also
consider the classical fidelity or the classical trace distance between probability
distributions induced by the states when measured in other bases. Roughly
speaking, it turns out that the trace distance and the fidelity equal their clas-
sical counterparts of the measurement-induced distributions when the basis is
chosen such that the two states look as diﬀerent as possible (as measured by
the classical quantities). The following proposition states this formally.
Proposition 3.16 : For two quantum states ⇢ and   of the same system, it
holds that




|tr(Mi⇢)  tr(Mi )| , (3.62)






where the optimizations run over all POVMs {Mi}i of the system.
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For a proof of proposition 3.16, see [NC00]. When the two states are
diagonal in the same basis, then the optima in (3.62) and (3.63) are achieved
for the measurement in that basis. The connection between the classical trace
distance / classical fidelity and their quantum counterparts will be important
for us when we define distance measures for generalized probabilistic theories
in chapter 7.
Now we will recapitulate the definitions of the generalized fidelity and the
purified distance. For our purposes, their role is to allow us to formally define
the smooth min- and max-entropy in section 3.4 below. To avoid potential
confusion for readers that have seen definitions of the smooth min- and max-
entropy elsewhere, we point out that the preferred definition of these quantities
has changed over time. Since they have first been defined in Renato Renner’s
seminal work on quantum key distribution [Ren05], diﬀerent distance measures
have been used for the smoothing of the min- and the max-entropy (among
other aspects that changed). In this thesis, we will follow the definitions in
[Tom12], which use the purified distance for smoothing.
The purified distance is defined in terms of the generalized fidelity as fol-
lows.
Definition 3.17 : Let ⇢,   2 S(H) be subnormalized states. The general-
ized fidelity between ⇢ and   is defined as





(1  tr⇢)(1  tr ) ,
The purified distance between ⇢ and   is defined as
P (⇢,  ) :=
p
1  F (⇢,  )2 .
Note that for normalized states ⇢ and   that are diagonal in the same basis
(as in (3.57)), the purified distance is given by







The purified distance enters the definition of the smooth min- and max-entropy
below (definition 3.28) in the form of the "-ball with respect to the purified
distance. It is defined as follows.
Definition 3.18 ("-ball): Let ⇢ 2 S(H) be a subnormalized state and let
0  " ptr(⇢). We define the "-ball around ⇢ as
B"(⇢) := {  2 S(H) | P ( , ⇢)  "} ,
Another measure that we will use is the operator norm. We will use it
when we define the preparation quality for the smooth min-max uncertainty
relation (theorem 3.30). It is defined as follows.
Definition 3.19 (Operator norm): For a Hilbert space H, the operator
norm on End(H) is defined as






where k · kH denotes the norm on the Hilbert space H.
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3.3 State purification and channel purification
In section 3.1.2, we said that the general evolution of a system (which is not
assumed to be closed) is given by a TPCPM. In the introduction, we briefly
mentioned that every channel can, in an essentially unique way, be seen as the
eﬀect of a unitary evolution of a larger, closed system, of which the original
system is a subsystem. In this section, we make this statement more precise
by recapitulating the concept of channel purification. Before we come to that,
we start with an easy warm-up and first look at state purification.
3.3.1 State purification
In quantum information theory, mixed states are interpreted as states of in-
complete knowledge about the preparation of the system. It turns out that
any system in a mixed state can be seen as part of a larger system in a pure
state. This is called a purification of the mixed state, and is defined as follows.
Definition 3.20 : Let ⇢A be a state of a system A. A purification of ⇢A is a
pure state ⇢AE, where E is some other system, such that trE(⇢AE) = ⇢A. Such
a system E is called a purifying system.
In the case where the state ⇢A is pure, it can be seen as its own purification,
in which case E is the trivial system with HE ' C so that HAE ' HA. In
general, for every dA-dimensional system, one can find a purification with a
purifying system E of at most the same dimension as A, dE  dA [NC00].
For a mixed state, a purifying system E is necessarily correlated with A,
i.e. ⇢AE is not a product state. This is of utmost importance in cryptographic
settings, where A is a system whose state encodes information that is meant
to be secret and where E is a system that may be controlled by an adversary
who tries to learn something about the information encoded in A.
Purifications are not unique. However, as we argue in the following, all
purifications of a state are equivalent when it comes to assessing an eaves-
dropper’s ability to learn about the information encoded in A. The following
proposition is a first step in this direction.
Proposition 3.21 : Let ⇢A be a state of a system A and let E be a fixed
system that is large enough to purify A. Then any two purifications ⇢AE and
 AE of ⇢A are related by a unitary on the purifying system. That is, for any
two such purifications, there is a unitary UE on E such that
 AE = (1A ⌦ UE)⇢AE(1A ⌦ U †E) . (3.66)
For a proof, see [NC00]. Proposition 3.21 tells us that as long as we consider
a fixed purifying system held by Eve, it does not matter which purification we
consider since Eve can switch between any of them by applying a unitary on
the system that she controls. Does this picture change if we allow Eve to have
any purifying system rather than a fixed one?
To answer this question, let us consider a state ⇢A of a system A and a
purification ⇢AE, where the dimension of E is the smallest possible to purify
A.4 Clearly, if we allow Eve to hold a diﬀerent purifying system E 0 of equal
4 It can be shown that the smallest such dimension is dE = rank(⇢A) [NC00].
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dimension, nothing changes concerning Eve’s abilities, so we need to consider
the case where Eve holds a larger purifying system E 0. There are two such
cases: (a) HE is a linear subspace of HE0 , (b) E is part of a composite system
E 0 = ER. The following proposition gives us the necessary information for
these two cases.
Proposition 3.22 : Let ⇢AE be a pure state of some joint system AE. Then
the following holds:
(a) The reduced states ⇢A and ⇢E have the same spectrum.
(b) Every state ⇢AER for some system R with trR(⇢AER) = ⇢AE satisfies
⇢AER = ⇢AE ⌦ ⇢R.
Proofs of these statements can be found in [NC00]. Two states having
the same spectrum implies that they have the same rank. Therefore, part (a)
of the proposition tells us that allowing Eve to hold a larger system E 0 does
not change anything for Eve because the purification cannot have support on
the extra dimensions. Part (b) means that any additional systems do not
help either because they are necessarily uncorrelated with the already purified
system AE. Eve can always add or remove such an uncorrelated system.
The essence of the above discussion is that in cryptographic settings, it
does not matter which purification is considered. Eve is equally powerful in
any purification. The above can elegantly be summarized by stating that any
two purifications of a state are related by an isometry [Wil13].
3.3.2 Channel purification
We have just seen that every state can, in an essentially unique way, be purified.
In other words, any system in a state of incomplete information can be seen
as part of a larger system with complete information. If anything is correlated
with a system A, then it is found in the purification.
Now let us consider a situation where Alice wants to send quantum in-
formation to Bob. She encodes the information in a system A and sends it
through a channel to Bob who receives it as a system B. In general, the state
⇢B received by Bob is not pure, even if the input system ⇢A to the channel is
pure. Thus, information about the system has been lost in the transfer. Where
did it go?
If Alice and Bob use the channel in a cryptographic setting, where the
information encoded in A is meant to be confidential, they need to assume
that the information that they lost in the transfer is held by Eve. Since we
said above that anything that is correlated with B must be contained in its
purification, this means that Eve needs to be assumed to hold a purification
⇢BE of ⇢B. However, the situation is insuﬃciently described by just one such
purification, because that purification purifies the output ⇢B for a given input
state ⇢A. It could be that some input states get strongly decohered, whereas
others are not decohered at all. One needs to find a description that not only
purifies one particular output state, but the whole channel. That is, given a
channel
CA!B : S(HA)! S(HB) , (3.67)
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we are looking for a map S(HA)! S(HBE) that maps an input state ⇢A to a
purification ⇢BE of the output CA!B(⇢A) of the channel. A special case5 of the
Stinespring dilation theorem [Sti55] states that there is always such a map.
Theorem 3.23 (Stinespring dilation theorem): Let HA and HB be
Hilbert spaces of finite dimension dA and dB, let C : End(HA)! End(HB) be
a TPCPM. Then there is a Hilbert space HE of dimension dE  dAdB and an
isometry
V : HA ! HBE (3.68)
such that
trE(V ⇢AV †) = C(⇢A) 8 ⇢A 2 End(HA) . (3.69)
At first glance, one may be surprised to find that the dimension of the
purifying system E satisfies only dE  dAdB rather than dE  dB. The reason,
however, is simple. In the case where the input state ⇢A is not pure, we also
need to consider a purifying system A0 for the input system (see figure 3.3).
The purifying system A0 can be chosen such that dA0  dA (see the previous
subsection). Thus, E needs to purify A0B and thus dE  dA0dB  dAdB.
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Figure 3.3: Stinespring dilation of a channel. Every channel can be seen
as the visible part of an operation that preserves the information encoded in
the initial state.
The fact that the Stinespring dilation V of a channel C is an isometry
means that no information is “lost” but rather leaked to Eve. This is because
isometries preserve Hilbert space angles and therefore the distinguishability
of quantum information. From an information-theoretic point of view, the
Stinespring dilation of a channel is the ultimate answer to the question of
what Alice and Bob need to consider when they ask themselves where the
information that they communicate over the channel is leaked: if information
is leaked away from B, it is contained in the output of a Stinespring dilation
of the channel.
Some people refer to a Stinespring dilation of a channel as a channel purifi-
cation. For our treatment of decoherence in generalized probabilistic theories
(and for foundational aspects of quantum theory), it is interesting to note that
a Stinespring dilation of a channel can in turn be seen as part of a unitary
5 In full generality, the Stinespring dilation theorem makes a statement for arbitrary (not
necessarily finite-dimensional) Hilbert spaces, while we only consider the finite-dimensional
case here.
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a Stinespring dilation of a channel can in turn be seen as part of a unitary
with a larger input system (see figure 3.4). We consider an additional input
system E 0 of dimension dE0 = dBdE/dA (such that dAdE0 = dBdE) in a fixed
pure state | ih |E0 . Then we define a map
eU : spann| iA ⌦ | iE0     | iA 2 HAo! HBE (3.70)
as the linear extension of
| iA ⌦ | iE0 7! V | iA 8 | iA 2 HA . (3.71)
It is not diﬃcult to see that such a map is an isometry and that it can be
extended to a unitary U : HAE0 7! HBE. Some authors call such a unitary
extension a channel purification (and therefore use this term in a diﬀerent way
than people who call a Stinespring dilation this way).
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Figure 3.4: Unitary dilation of a channel. Every channel can be seen as
the visible part of a unitary evolution of a larger, closed system.
This reconciles channels with the unitary evolution postulate of quantum
theory: non-unitary channels are evolutions of open systems that behave uni-
tarily when the scope is extended to include the whole, closed system. It
will also help us in the formulation of a decoherence estimation framework for
generalized probabilistic theories, as it allows us to see the overall operation
acting on one large system rather than mapping from a smaller input system
to a larger output system.
3.3.3 Choi-Jamiolkowski representation of a channel
In section 4.4, when we discuss the decoupling theorem, we will refer to the
Choi-Jamiolkowski representation of a channel. It is a way to represent a
channel CA!S as a bipartite state ⌧A0S. This representation is given in the form
of a map which is called the Choi-Jamiolkowski isomorphism. It is defined as
follows.
Definition 3.24 : Let A and S be quantum systems, let A0 be a copy of A
(that is, a quantum system of the same dimension), let (|iiA)dAi=1 and (|iiA0)dAi=1





|iiA0 ⌦ |iiA . (3.72)
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3.3.3 hoi-Ja iolko ski representation of a channel
In section 4.4, when we discuss the decoupling theorem, we will refer to the
Choi-Jamiolkowski representation of a channel. It is a way to represent a chan-
nel CA!S as a bipartite state ⌧A0S. This representation is given in the form
of a map which is called the Choi-Jamiolkowski isomorphism. This isomor-
phism has first been considered by Choi [Cho75]. In the quantum information
commun ty, it has become habit to name it after Jamiolkowski as well, who
studied a similar but diﬀ rent isomorphism [Jam72] that was introduced by de
Pillis [Pil67]. Both isomorphisms have a relation to the Stinespring dilation
theorem that we encountered in the last section; for more information, see
[Pau03].
The Choi-Jamiolkowski isomorphism is defined as follows.
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Definition 3.24 : Let A and S be quantum systems, let A0 be a copy of A
(that is, a quantum system of the same dimension), let (|iiA)dAi=1 and (|iiA0)dAi=1





|iiA0 ⌦ |iiA . (3.72)
The Choi Jamiolkowski isomorphism with respect to the bases (|iiA)dAi=1
and (|iiA0)dAi=1 is the linear map
⌧ : Hom(End(HA),End(HS)) ! End(HA0 ⌦HS)
CA!S 7! (1A0 ⌦ CA!S)| ih |A0A . (3.73)
For a channel CA!S, the state
⌧CA0S := ⌧(CA!S) (3.74)
is the Choi-Jamiolkowski representation of CA!S with respect to the
bases (|iiA)dAi=1 and (|iiA0)dAi=1. When the channel C is clear from the context,
we drop the superscript C and write ⌧A0S instead of ⌧CA0S.
The map (3.73) is an isomorphism of vector spaces, that is, it is a bijective
linear map. More interestingly, the restriction of ⌧ to channels (TPCPMs)
bijectively maps the set of all channels from A to S to the set of all bipartite
states ⇢A0S for which trS(⇢A0S) = 1A0/dA. This is because of the following two
equivalences:
• CA!S is completely positive () ⌧CA0S is positive,
• CA!S is trace-preserving () trS(⌧CA0S) = 1A0/dA
The Choi-Jamiolkowski isomorphism is not a canonical isomorphism: it
depends on the choice of the bases (|iiA)dAi=1 and (|iiA0)dAi=1. Nonetheless, in
many situations, it is common to refer to the Choi-Jamiolkowski represen-
tation of a channel. This is similar to referring to the maximally entangled
state, although there are many (see the discussion at the end of section 3.1.1).
These two things are related, as becomes apparent in the proof of the following
proposition.
Lemma 3.25 : Let A and S be quantum systems, let CA!S be a channel from
A to S, let ⌧A0S and ⌧ 0A0S each be a Choi-Jamiolkowski representation of CA!S
(with respect to diﬀerent bases, in general). Then there is a unitary UA0 on A0
such that
⌧A0S = (UA0 ⌦ 1S)⌧ 0A0S(U †A0 ⌦ 1S) . (3.75)
Proof. According to definition 3.24,
⌧A0S = (1A0 ⌦ CA!S)| ih |A0A , (3.76)
⌧ 0A0S = (1A0 ⌦ CA!S)| ih |A0A , (3.77)
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where | ih |A0A and | ih |A0A are maximally entangled. By virtue of lemma 3.8,
there is a unitary VA0 on A0 such that
| iA0A = (1A0 ⌦ VA)| iA0A . (3.78)
By the mirror lemma (see lemma 3.7),
(1A0 ⌦ VA)| iA0A = (V TA0 ⌦ 1A)| iA0A . (3.79)
Thus,
⌧A0S = (1A0 ⌦ CA!S)(V TA0 ⌦ 1A)| ih |A0A((V TA0)† ⌦ 1A) (3.80)
= (V TA0 ⌦ 1S)(1A0 ⌦ CA!S)| ih |A0A((V TA0)† ⌦ 1S) (3.81)
= (V TA0 ⌦ 1S)⌧ 0A0S((V TA0)† ⌦ 1S) (3.82)
= (UA0 ⌦ 1S)⌧ 0A0S(U †A0 ⌦ 1S) , (3.83)
where UA0 = V TA0 .
Lemma 3.25 is similar to lemma 3.8. A diﬀerence is that in lemma 3.25, the
unitary is a unitary on the A0 system (which is not transformed by the map
1A0 ⌦ CA!S), while in lemma 3.8, either side has a unitary that transforms the
two states into one another.
The important consequence of lemma 3.25 is that as long as we are only
interested in functions that are invariant under unitaries on A0, it does not mat-
ter which Choi-Jamiolkowski representation of a channel we consider. When
we look at the decoupling theorem in section 4.4, an important quantity will be
the min-entropy of the Choi-Jamiolkowski representation of a channel. As we
will see in the following section, this quantity is invariant under local unitaries
(see lemma 3.29).
3.4 Min- and max-entropy
In this section, we recapitulate the definitions and some basic properties of
the smooth min- and max-entropy of quantum states. The quantification of
uncertainty by means of entropic quantities is an intensely studied subject in
(quantum) information theory. Entropy as an uncertainty measure was intro-
duced in a semial work by Shannon [Sha48], which is seen as the founding
work of classical information theory. Von Neumann introduced an analogous
entropic measure for quantum states [Neu27]. Since then, many diﬀerent en-
tropic measures have been introduced. In this thesis, we consider the condi-
tional min- and max-entropy for quantum states, or min- and max-entropy,
for short, which has been introduced by Renner [Ren05]. The concept of en-
tropy smoothing, which Renner developed for the min- and max-entropy for
quantum states [Ren05], goes back to Cachin and Maurer [CM97; Cac97], who
introduced it for classical Rényi entropies [Rén60].
We will not go far beyond merely stating the definitions and properties
of the (smooth) min- and max-entropy here. In chapter 4, we will have a
closer look at characterizations of the (smooth) min-entropy that are relevant
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for our purposes. We can see these characterizations as the motivation for
the min-entropy. Thus, we postpone the motivation for the (smooth) min-
and max-entropy formalism to a later point. More information on the smooth
min- and max-entropy formalism can be found in [Tom12].
We start with the definitions of the non-smooth versions of the min- and
max-entropy.
Definition 3.26 : Let ⇢AB 2 S(HAB) be a subnormalized bipartite state.
The min-entropy of A conditioned on B for the state ⇢AB is defined as
Hmin(A|B)⇢ := max
 2S(HB)
sup{  2 R | ⇢AB  2  IA ⌦  B} . (3.84)







We will often drop the state subscript when it is clear from context for
which state the entropy is evaluated. For our proofs in section 5.8, it will be
useful to have a simplified expression for Hmax(X|Y ) for the case where X and




PXY (x, y) |xihx|⌦ |yihy| (3.86)
for some probability distribution PXY . In this case, the max-entropy can be
written as [Tom12]













whereHmax(X)P y is the unconditional max-entropy of the distribution PX|Y=y(X),
namely





We will often consider min- and max-entropies for reduced states of already
defined states. The following convention makes that easier.
Convention 3.27 : In contexts where a multipartite state ⇢ is already defined,
the min-entropy Hmin( · | · )⇢ and the max-entropy Hmax( · | · )⇢ are evaluated for
the reduced state associated with the labels inHmin( · | · )⇢ andHmax( · | · )⇢. For
example, for a tripartite state ⇢ABC 2 S(HABC), the min-entropyHmin(A|B)⇢
is evaluated for the reduced state ⇢AB = trC(⇢ABC). The same convention holds
for the smooth min- and max-entropies that we will define below.
The smooth min- and max-entropies are defined as optimization problems,
where the min- and max-entropy is optimized over all states that are "-close to
the state in question. Thereby, “closeness” is measured in the purified distance
that we defined in section 3.2 (see the definition of the "-ball, definition 3.18).
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Definition 3.28 : Let ⇢AB 2 S(HAB) be a bipartite state and let "   0. We
define the "-smooth min- and max-entropies of A conditioned on B for







An important property of the smooth min- and max-entropy is that these
quantities are invariant under local unitaries, as stated by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.29 : Let ⇢AB 2 S(HAB) be a bipartite state, let UA and UB be
unitaries on system A and B, respectively, let "   0. Then
H"min(A|B)⇢ = H"min(A|B)  , (3.90)
H"max(A|B)⇢ = H"max(A|B)  , (3.91)
where
 AB = (UA ⌦ UB)⇢AB(U †A ⌦ U †B) . (3.92)
A proof of lemma 3.29 (or of a more general statement in terms of isome-
tries) can be found in [Tom12]. As we will see in chapter 4, the smooth
min-entropy H"min(A|E) quantifies the number of uniformly random bits that
can be extracted from A such that E is fully decoupled from these bits (that
is, Eve has no knowledge about them). This is called privacy amplification,
and will be discussed in section 4.2. This is very important in quantum key
distribution, where E is a purifying system of a composite system AB in which
Alice and Bob hold information. Alice and Bob cannot estimate H"min(A|E),
directly. However, they can estimate H"max(A|B) and then use the smooth min-
max uncertainty, proved by Tomamichel and Renner [TR11]. Here we directly
formulate it for the qubit case that we are interested in.
Theorem 3.30 (Smooth min-max uncertainty): Let ⇢ABE 2 S(HABE)
be a pure tripartite state where A is an n-qubit system, let X = {X0,X1}
and Z = {Z0,Z1} be qubit POVMs. Consider the states ⇢XBE and ⇢ZBE
that arise from measuring all of the n qubits of system A with respect to X
and Z, respectively, and storing the outcomes in a classical register X and Z,








PZ(z) |zihz|⌦ ⇢zBE . (3.94)
Then for "   0,
H"min(X|E)⇢ +H"max(Z|B)⇢   nq , (3.95)
where
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The parameter q is the preparation quality. If X and Z are mutually un-
biased such as the Pauli measurements in equations (3.26) and (3.27), then
q = 1.
In a QKD protocol, Alice and Bob estimate H"max(Z|B) by performing a
measurement on B. This is because measurements on the side information can
only increase the max-entropy, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.31 : Let "   0 and ⇢ZB 2 S(HAB) be a bipartite state. Let ⇢ZZ0
arise from a measurement on system B. Then
H"max(Z|B)  H"max(Z|Z 0) . (3.97)
Lemma 3.31 is a corollary of a general data processing inequality, proved
by Tomamichel [Tom12]. Applying inequality (3.97) to inequality (3.95), we
get the following corollary.
Corollary 3.32 : Let ⇢ABE 2 S(HABE) be a pure tripartite state where A
and B are n-qubit systems, let X, Z, q, ", ⇢XBE be as in theorem 3.30 and let
⇢ZZ0E arise from measuring all of the 2n qubits of A and B with respect to Z.
Then
H"min(X|E)⇢ +H"max(Z|Z 0)⇢   nq . (3.98)
We will use the uncertainty relation in the form of inequality (3.98) when
we prove the security of protocols in section 5.8. Another useful lemma for
QKD concerns the reduction of the min-entropy upon learning some classical
information. This is important because in a QKD protocol, Alice and Bob
communicate classical information about A and need to estimate the impli-
cations on the eavesdropper’s uncertainty. The following lemma provides a
bound for this case. We will use it in the next chapter.
Lemma 3.33 : Let ⇢AEY be a QQC-state, let 0  " < 1. Then
H"min(A|EY )   H"min(A|E)  log dY . (3.99)





In section 3.4, we gave the mathematical definitions of the min-entropyHmin(A|B)
and the smooth min-entropy H"min(A|B). In this section, we want to breathe
life into these quantities by giving them operational interpretations. In other
words, we demonstrate that the min-entropy quantifies how well some oper-
ational tasks can be performed, given a quantum state with a certain min-
entropy as a resource. The material presented in this section is a selection of
some results that have been shown in [KRS09; Tom+11; Dup+10; Tom+12],
without any claim on completeness. Of particular importance for our pur-
poses are the characterizations of the min-entropy in terms of the length of
an extractable shared secret key (section 4.3), in terms of state merging (sec-
tion 4.5) and in terms of the minimal distance to the maximally entangled
state (section 4.6), whereas the characterizations of section 4.1, section 4.2
and section 4.4 should be seen as preparation.
4.1 Maximal guessing probability
The first characterization that we look at is not of direct relevance for the work
presented in this thesis, but it is very suitable for an easy warm-up. In their
work on the operational interpretation of the min- and max-entropy [KRS09],
König, Renner and Schaﬀner give several characterizations of the min- and the
max-entropy. One of them concerns the special case of classical information
X, held by Alice, with quantum side information E, held by Eve. That is,





PX(x)|xihx|⌦ ⇢xE . (4.1)
Now consider the task where Eve has to guess the value of X. To this end,
she measures her part of the quantum system and makes a guess depending
on the outcome of that measurement. For a POVM M = {Mx}x on E, Eve’s







and the guessing probability using an optimal POVM M is given by
pguess(X|E) := maxM pguess(X|E)M . (4.3)
König, Renner and Schaﬀner show that
pguess(X|E) = 2 Hmin(X|E) . (4.4)
Therefore, Hmin(A|E) can be seen as expressing the uncertainty of Eve about
the classical information X as a decreasing function of her optimal probability
of guessing X correctly, Hmin(X|E) =   log pguess(X|E).
4.2 Privacy amplification
In this section, we look at privacy amplification. The concept of privacy am-
plification goes back to work by Bennett et al. [BBR88], who introduced it
in the context of quantum key distribution [Ben+92; Ben+95]. The technical
result that enables privacy amplification is the leftover hashing lemma, which
also has other applications (see [Sti02] for an overview). The first formula-
tion of the leftover hashing lemma was made by Impagliazzo et al. [ILL89],
who introduced it in the context of pseudorandom number generation. The
analysis of the more general case of leftover hashing against quantum side in-
formation (also called quantum leftover hashing), which is the relevant case
for us, was initiated by König, Maurer and Renner [KMR05; RK05]. Here,
we present the quantum leftover hashing lemma in a further developed form
that has been derived by Tomamichel et al. [Tom+11]. For other examples of
further development in quantum leftover hashing, see [HT16] and references
therein.
As in the previous section, we consider the case where Alice holds classical
information X and Eve holds quantum side information E, but this time we
give a characterization of the smooth min-entropy instead of the unsmoothed
one. Let us assume that the quantum system X is a bit string of length n. Eve
has some knowledge about that bit string, quantified by H"min(X|E). Now one
may ask the following question: Is it possible for Alice to map the n-bit string
X to a shorter bit string K of length l < n such that K is uniformly random
and uncorrelated with Eve? More precisely, is there an operation mapping the
n-bit system X to an l-bit system K such that the resulting state is








is the maximally mixed state on the l-bit string? Such an operation is called
privacy amplification, because it turns a string about which Eve has partial
knowledge into a string about which Eve has no knowledge. It can be seen
as the extraction of secret uniform randomness: system K in the maximally
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mixed state provides Alice with uniform randomness, and this randomness
is secret because Eve’s system E is fully decoupled (i.e. uncorrelated) from
system K.
In general, it is not possible to achieve condition (4.5) perfectly. However,
it is possible for Alice to achieve this condition approximately. Let us assume
that Alice is satisfied if the resulting state satisfies
1
2
k⇢KE   ⇡K ⌦ ⇢Ek1    (4.7)
for some small enough  . The idea is that if the initial uncertainty of Eve
H"min(X|E) is large enough and the length l of Alice’s resulting string K is
small enough, then this might be possible.
As it turns out, such a thing cannot be achieved using a fixed function,
in general. However, the quantum leftover hashing lemma [Tom+11] states
that this can be achieved by a so-called two-universal hashing. The idea is as
follows. Alice applies a function f : {0, 1}n ! {0, 1}l to map her n-bit string
X to an l-bit string K, but instead of using a fixed function, she randomly





 f(x),f(y)  2 l for all x, y 2 {0, 1}n with x 6= y , (4.8)
where   denotes the Kronecker delta. Inequality (4.8) means that for every
pair x, y 2 {0, 1}n of non-identical strings, the probability that a function
f 2 F , chosen uniformly at random, maps x and y to the same l-bit string is
not higher than if they would be assigned to random elements of {0, 1}l.








|xihx|⌦  xE , (4.10)





Suppose that Alice chooses a function f 2 F uniformly at random, applies it
to the bit string X to obtain a bit string K and keeps a record of her choice















4.3. EXTRACTION OF A SHARED SECRET KEY
The reader may wonder why it is helpful to consider an extra register F with a
record of the choice of the function f . The reason is that it helps to formulate
a strong result: it turns out that the bit string K is approximately uniformly
random and decoupled from Eve even if Eve is given that register F (i.e. even
if Eve knows which function f 2 F has been applied). This is the statement of
the quantum leftover hashing lemma, formulated and proved by Tomamichel
et al. [Tom+11].
Theorem 4.1 (Quantum leftover hashing lemma): Let F be a two-
universal family of functions f : {0, 1}n ! {0, 1}l, let ⇢XE and ⇢KEF be
defined as in equations (4.1) and (4.12), respectively. Then
1
2
k⇢KEF   ⇡K ⌦ ⇢EFk1    , (4.14)
where




and where ⇡K is the maximally mixed state as in equation (4.6).
Therefore, considering the bipartite system EF as the system that Eve
controls after the hashing, i.e. E 0 = EF , we can rewrite inequality (4.14) as
k⇢KE0   ⇡K ⌦ ⇢E0k1    , (4.16)
so the condition of (4.7) is satisfied even if Eve is fully informed about how
Alice transformed the string X into the string K. A randomness extraction
process with this property is called a strong extractor . This property will be
of major importance in the following subsection.
The distance  , which quantifies how far the extraction is from a perfect
extraction, has the expected behavior: the smaller the resulting string length l
and the higher Eve’s initial uncertainty H"min(X|E) about X is, the better the
extraction performs. For a fixed distance  , inequality (4.15) can be solved








Equation (4.17) shows that H"min(X|E) quantifies the length of a secret uni-
formly random bit string that can be extracted from X.
4.3 Extraction of a shared secret key
Building on the quantum leftover hashing lemma presented in the last subsec-
tion, we will now look into the important role that the smooth min-entropy
plays in quantum key distribution (QKD). To this end, we extend the bipartite
setting of the last subsection to a tripartite setting. We consider three parties
Alice, Bob and Eve, where Alice and Bob are cooperating parties that trust
each other and Eve is an adversary. Consider the case where Alice, Bob and





0) |xihx|⌦ |x0ihx0|⌦ ⇢x,x0E , (4.18)
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where Alice holds system X, Bob holds system X 0 and Eve holds system E.
Analogously to the previous subsection, we consider X and X 0 to be classical
bit strings of length n with quantum side information E under the control of
Eve.
In contrast to the previous subsection, where Alice’s task was to extract
secret uniform randomness of a single system, we now consider the task where
Alice and Bob cooperatively extract a shared secret key. This means that
they want to end up in a situation in which Alice holds a bit string K, Bob
holds a bit string K 0 (the two copies of the shared key) and Eve holds some
quantum side information E 00 (the reason for the use of a double prime will
become clear below) such that two properties, called correctness and secrecy,
are satisfied. To achieve these conditions, they are allowed to perform classical
post-processing of their data X and X 0. Thereby, they communicate over
a classical communication channel which is public and authenticated. This
means that Eve can read but not modify all of the messages that Alice and
Bob exchange.
Here we closely follow [Tom+12] in the formulation of the correctness and
secrecy conditions. In order to formulate these two conditions, it is helpful to
to see the keys as random variables induced by the final state ⇢KK0E00 , jointly
distributed according to
PKK0(k, k
0) = hk|⌦ hk0|⇢KK0 |ki ⌦ |k0i . (4.19)
The ideal secrecy and correctness conditions read as follows:
• Correctness: Alice’s and Bob’s keys are identical, K = K 0.
• Secrecy: The key is uniformly random and uncorrelated with Eve, i.e.
⇢KE00 = ⇡K ⌦ ⇢E00 where ⇡K is the maximally mixed state on the key
register and ⇢E0 is the reduced state of Eve.
Note that the secrecy condition is identical to the secrecy condition in equality
(4.5) above, the only diﬀerence being that it is now formulated for the reduced
state ⇢KE00 of a tripartite state ⇢KK0E00 . Note that if secrecy and correctness
are satisfied simultaneously, then the secrecy condition also holds for Bob,
i.e. ⇢K0E00 = ⇡K0 ⌦ ⇢E00 . Correctness and secrecy together form the security
conditions, i.e. we say that we are given security when we are given correctness
and secrecy.
In analogy to the previous subsection, the ideal security conditions stated
above cannot be achieved in general. Instead, approximate security condi-
tions need to be introduced. They are formulated with respect to parameters
"cor,  > 0 and the final state ⇢KK0E00 as follows:
• "cor-correctness: The probability that Alice’s and Bob’s key diﬀer is
bounded by "cor, i.e.
P [K 6= K 0]  "cor . (4.20)
•  -secrecy: The key K is  -indistinguishable from a key which is uni-
formly random and uncorrelated with Eve. More precisely,
1
2
k⇢KE00   ⇡K ⌦ ⇢E00k1    . (4.21)
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Again, the  -secrecy condition (4.21) is the same as the condition in inequal-
ity (4.7), just that it is formulated with respect to ⇢KK0E00 .
Now we want to see how Alice and Bob can cooperatively transform the
initial state ⇢XX0E into an "cor-correct and  -secret state ⇢KK0E00 . The idea is
to do this in two sequential steps:
• In the first step, they execute an error correcting code and perform a
hash comparison (EC & HC) in order to achieve "cor-correctness,
• In the second step, they perform a privacy amplification (PA) (c.f. sec-
tion 4.2), where both Alice and Bob hash down their string to a shorter
string about which Eve has almost no knowledge. This way, they achieve
 -secrecy.
Figure 4.1 shows a diagram that helps to keep the overview during the following
discussion.










k⇢KE00   ⇡K ⌦ ⇢E00k1   
   "+ 12
p
2l H"min(X|E0)
P [X 6= X 00]  "cor
P [K 6= K 0]  "cor
pHCabort
Figure 4.1: Extraction of a shared secret key from a tripartite state.
Figure 4.1 shows a diagram that helps to keep the overview during the following
discussion.
In the first step (EC & HC), Alice and Bob carry out an error correcting
code, considering Alice’s bit string X as the “correct” bit string and Bob’s
bit string X 0 as the bit string that needs to be corrected. The details of the
applied code are not important for our purposes. For us, it is suﬃcient to
understand what the code achieves: Alice’s bit string X remains unchanged,
Bob’s bit string X 0 gets mapped to a “corrected” bit string X 00 and, since Alice
and Bob need to communicate over a public channel, Eve receives leakEC bits
of information about X for some leakEC 2 N. For more information about
error correcting codes, see [HP10].
After the error correction, Alice and Bob perform a hash comparison to
check whether X = X 00. Alice randomly chooses a function g from an "cor-
almost universal family G of hash functions g : {0, 1}n ! {0, 1}n0 , that is, a





 g(x),g(y)  "cor for all x, y 2 {0, 1}n with x 6= y . (4.22)
Such a family can always be chosen such that n0 = dlog(1/"cor)e. Then, Alice
applies g to her string to obtain an n0-bit string g(X) and sends both the
choice of the function g and the string g(X) to Bob. This gives Eve another
dlog(1/"cor)e bits of information about X (the choice of the function g is un-
correlated with X and thus does not give Eve more information about X).
This allows Bob to check whether g(X) = g(X 00). If g(X) 6= g(X 00), then
necessarily X 6= X 00, so Alice and Bob abort. If g(X) = g(X 00), then X = X 00
with probability 1  "cor and they continue the protocol.
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Figure 4.1: Extraction of a shared secret key fro a tripartite state.
The goal of the first step (EC & HC) is that the bit strings X and X 0 of
Alice and Bob are transformed into identical bit strings. To this end, they
communicate over the public authenticated channel, thereby leaking as little
information about the string as possible. This is known as information reconcil-
iation. This subject was studied, for example, by Brassard and Salvail [BS94],
building on earlier work by other authors [Rob85; BBR88; Ben+92]. For more
about information reconciliation, see [Tom+14] and references therein. Here,
we prefer to call it error correction and hash comparison instead of information
reconciliation, because it refers more specifically to what kind of scheme we
have in ind.
In that scheme, Alice and Bob carry out an error correcting code, consid-
ering Alice’s bit string X as the “correct” bit string and Bob’s bit string X 0
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as the bit string that needs to be corrected. The details of the applied code
are not important for our purposes. For us, it is suﬃcient to understand what
the code achieves: Alice’s bit string X remains unchanged, Bob’s bit string
X 0 gets mapped to a “corrected” bit string X 00 and, since Alice and Bob need
to communicate over a public channel, Eve receives leakEC bits of information
about X for some leakEC 2 N. For more information about error correcting
codes, see [HP10].
After the error correction, Alice and Bob perform a hash comparison to
check whether X = X 00. Alice randomly chooses a function g from an "cor-
almost universal family G of hash functions g : {0, 1}n ! {0, 1}n0 , that is, a





 g(x),g(y)  "cor for all x, y 2 {0, 1}n with x 6= y . (4.22)
Such a family can always be chosen such that n0 = dlog(1/"cor)e. Then, Alice
applies g to her string to obtain an n0-bit string g(X) and sends both the
choice of the function g and the string g(X) to Bob. This gives Eve another
dlog(1/"cor)e bits of information about X (the choice of the function g is un-
correlated with X and thus does not give Eve more information about X).
This allows Bob to check whether g(X) = g(X 00). If g(X) 6= g(X 00), then
necessarily X 6= X 00, so Alice and Bob abort. If g(X) = g(X 00), then X = X 00
with probability 1  "cor and they continue the protocol.
After EC & HC, Alice, Bob and Eve share a system in the overall state
⇢XX00E0 , where E 0 is Eve’s system E, together with the information about X
that was communicated over the public channel during the error correction
(leakEC bits) and during hash comparison (dlog(1/"cor)e bits). As we have just
argued, this state satisfies P [X 6= X 00]  "cor which, as we will see below, turns
into the correctness condition (see figure 4.1). For the secrecy condition in the
next step, we need to bound the information H"min(X|E 0) as a function of the
initial uncertainty H"min(X|E) (note the diﬀerence: E vs. E 0). Let us denote
the classical register with the leakEC + dlog(1/"cor)e bits of information that
Eve holds by F , so that E 0 = EF . Then we have
H"min(X|E 0) = H"min(X|EF ) (4.23)
  H"min(X|E)  log dF (4.24)
= H"min(X|E)  leakEC   dlog(1/"cor)e , (4.25)
where we used lemma 3.33 for the inequality.
Now Alice and Bob hold strings X and X 00 which are identical with prob-
ability 1   "cor and about which Eve has partial uncertainty, expressed by
inequality (4.25). Now Alice and Bob can make use of the quantum leftover
hashing lemma (theorem 4.1) and perform a simultaneous privacy amplifica-
tion. To this end, Alice chooses a function f 2 F uniformly at random, where
F is a two-universal family of hashing functions f : {0, 1}n ! {0, 1}l. Then
Alice communicates the choice of f to Bob. Since their communication is
public, Eve gets this information too, and stores it in a register F . There-
fore, Eve holds side information E 00 = E 0F . Then both Alice and Bob hash
down their string using the function f , ending up with l-bit strings K = f(X)
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and K 0 = f(X 00). According to the quantum leftover hashing lemma of the
previous subsection, the resulting state ⇢KK0E0F satisfies
1
2
k⇢KE0F   ⇡K ⌦ ⇢E0Fk1    , (4.26)
where




Rewriting inequality (4.26) with the substitution E 00 = E 0F and using the
bound (4.25) in inequality (4.27) gives
1
2
k⇢KE00   ⇡K ⌦ ⇢E00k1    , (4.28)
with




Thus, the secrecy condition (4.20) is fulfilled with a distance   that accounts
for the leakEC + dlog(1/"cor)e bits of information that were communicated for
EC & HC.
The correctness condition P [K 6= K 0]  "cor follows trivially from the
inequality P [X 6= X 00]  "cor, because the hashing only increases the likelihood
that the strings coincide. Note the importance of the fact that the hashing is
a strong extractor: since Alice and Bob need to use the same hashing function
to preserve correctness, they had to communicate the choice of f . This is why
it is important that inequality (4.28) holds with register F .
In practice, Alice and Bob fix the secrecy parameter   in advance and
then extract a key of the largest length compatible with  . Solving inequality





2(   ")e   leakEC   dlog(1/"cor)e
⌫
. (4.30)
We conclude the following.
Proposition 4.2 : Given "   0, "cor > 0, a CCQ-state ⇢XX0E and an error
correcting code that communicates leakEC bits of information, Alice can prob-
abilistically extract a "cor-correct and  -secret shared key K, K 0 of length l,
with l given in equality (4.30) and   bounded in inequality (4.27).
For Alice and Bob to know the length l of the keys that they can extract,
they need to have a bound on H"min(X|E). The extraction is probabilistic
because Alice and Bob may abort during the hash comparison with some
probability pHCabort. The probability pHCabort is a function of the state ⇢XX0 and
thus not known in practical situations. However, this is not a problem: If
Alice know H"min(X|E) for a given "   0, then conditioned on passing the
hash comparison, they know that their shared key satisfies the desired security
condition. The important point is that Alice and Bob need to knowH"min(X|E)
for a known, given " > 0. Note also the relation between " and  : for a  -
secret key, " needs to be suﬃciently much smaller than  , see equation (4.30).
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4.3.1 Application to secret communication and quantum
key distribution
What is the use of proposition 4.2? Imagine a situation where Alice and
Bob are at distant locations, and they want to generate a shared key for the
use in a one-time pad. According to proposition 4.2, all that Alice and Bob
need to achieve is to run a protocol at the end of which they share a state
⇢XX0E with Eve such that the min-entropy H"min(X|E) is bounded from below.
Then, if that protocol is followed by error correction, hash comparison and
privacy amplification, they have distributed a secure shared key. The resulting
protocol is thus a key distribution protocol, a quantum key distribution (QKD)
protocol. Thus, we can say that proposition 4.2 reduces the task of finding
a QKD protocol to finding a protocol that distributes a state ⇢XX0E with n-
bit strings X and X 0 such that the min-entropy H"min(X|E) is bounded from
below.
A typical QKD protocol consists of the following subroutines:
(i) Preparation, distribution, measurement and sifting,
(ii) Parameter estimation,
(iii) Error correction and hash comparison,
(iv) Privacy amplification.
Proposition 4.2 allows us to separate subroutines (i) and (ii) from subrou-
tines (iii) and (iv). Hence, we are looking for a protocol consisting of subrou-
tines (i) and (ii) which produces a state ⇢XX0E with a lower-bounded entropy
H"min(X|E). For increased convenience in chapter 5, we shall make the follow-
ing convention.
Convention 4.3 : We call a protocol that distributes bit strings X and X 0
to Alice and Bob in an overall state ⇢XX0E with a lower bounded min-entropy
H"min(X|E) a raw key distribution protocol.
In chapter 5, we discuss raw key distribution protocols in detail. We find
that many QKD protocols in the literature use combinations of subroutines (i)
and (ii) with a serious security flaw, i.e. with a wrong estimation of H"min(X|E).
(We will see later what exactly that means.) Reducing QKD to these two
subroutines is therefore very convenient for our purposes.
4.4 Decoupling
In section 4.2, looked at the quantum leftover hashing lemma. Roughly speak-
ing, it states that if a classical system X with quantum side information E has
a suﬃciently high min-entropy H"min(X|E), then X can be mapped to a bit
string K which is almost fully decoupled from E. Note that here, the system
that is decoupled from Eve is a classical system.
This raises the question whether this can be generalized to a fully quantum
setting, where not only the side information E is assumed to be a quantum
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register, but where also the information to be decoupled is quantum informa-
tion. For example, one may consider a system AE, where A is an n-qubit
system, and ask the following question: if H"min(A|E) is suﬃciently high, is
there an operation that maps the n-qubit system A to a smaller l-qubit sys-
tem S (with l < n) such that S is almost fully decoupled from E? This could
be seen as a generalization of leftover hashing to the case where the hashed
information is quantum information. The decoupling theorem, which we will
state in theorem 4.4 below, states such a generalization, using a decoupling
operation for quantum information. The first form of the decoupling theorem
was derived by Abeyesinghe et al. [Abe+09]. It was used by Hayden et al. to
find a new proof of the LSD theorem that relates the coherent information to
the channel capacity [Hay+08]. The one-shot version of the decoupling the-
orem that we consider here was derived by Berta [Ber08] and Dupuis et al.
[Dup09; Dup+10].
For devising such a decoupling operation, one needs to come up with an
analogue of the random hashing functions f 2 F used in the leftover hashing
(see section 4.2 which acts on quantum systems instead of on bit strings. To
gain some intuition, let us oversimplify the action of the hashing functions
f 2 F . Actual constructions of families of two-universal hash functions are
more involved, but for now, we can think of hash functions f : {0, 1}n !
{0, 1}l as being composed of a permutation of the n bits, followed by the
discarding of some bits. To get diﬀerent functions of the family F , one varies
the permutation, but discards the same bits. A bit more formally, we can write






trX1...Xn l(U  ⌦ 1E)⇢XE(U †  ⌦ 1E) . (4.31)
where U  is a unitary that permutes the bits ofX according to the permutation
  and where SF is a set of permutations of the n bits that defines the family
F of hash functions. For simplicity, we just consider the first n  l bits to be
discarded to map an n-bit string to an l-bit string. The attentative reader may
have noticed that in contrast to equation (4.12), we do not consider the case
where Eve is given the hash function f that has been applied; there is no F
register in the side information. Indeed, we modify the situation here insofar
as we do not consider strong extractors.
More generally, the operation mapping ⇢XE to ⇢KE can be thought of as
not only involving unitaries that just permute the bits but which also perform
reversible operations on those bits themselves, such as bit flips. Such combi-
nations of system permutations and bit flips would again be unitaries, so more






trX1...Xn l(UX ⌦ 1E)⇢XE(U †X ⌦ 1E) , (4.32)
where now UF is a set of unitaries that defines the family F .
The operation producing the state (4.32) is tailored for classical bit strings.
They are composed of clearly distinct subsystems (the individual bits), and
each of these subsystems has a clearly distinct basis (consisting of |0i and |1i).
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The permutations of the systems and the trace operation trX1...Xn l assume a
distinct subdivision into subsystems, and the bit flips act in a particular basis.
For general quantum systems, such distinctions are not given, in general. For
a general decoupling, we must therefore think of a generalization of these
operations.
Now consider the case where we have a quantum system AE in a state ⇢AE
that we want to map it to a smaller quantum system SE such that the resulting
state ⇢SE is almost decoupled from E. As an analogue of the trace operation
trX1...Xn l that discards particular subsystems, we consider any TPCPM TA!S
that maps the quantum system A to a smaller quantum system S. Secondly,
we replace the set UF of unitaries by the whole unitary group UA of system A.
Accordingly, the summation over the set UF becomes a Haar measure integral













(TA!S ⌦ 1E)(UA ⌦ 1E)⇢AE(U †A ⌦ 1E)dUA , (4.34)




TA!S(UA⇢AEU †A)dUA . (4.35)
The state ⇢SE can be seen as resulting from applying a random unitary, fol-
lowed by mapping the large system A down to a smaller system S using a fixed
map TA!S.
The motivation of equation (4.35) was a bit vague, but it servers the pur-
pose of giving an intuition for the operations involved in the decoupling theo-
rem. Now we are ready to state it formally (see [Dup+10]).
Theorem 4.4 (Decoupling theorem): Let ⇢AE 2 S(HAE) be a bipartite
state, let S be another quantum system, let TA!S be a TPCPM, let ⌧A0S be
its Choi-Jamiolkowski representation. Then, for every " > 0, it holds thatZ
UA2UA
   TA!S(UA⇢AEU †A)  ⌧S ⌦ ⇢E   
1
dUA  2  12H"min(A|E)⇢  12H"min(A0|S)⌧ + 12" .
(4.36)
Note that by lemmata 3.25 and 3.29, it does not matter which Choi-
Jamiolkowski representation ⌧A0S of TA!S is chosen. Inequality (4.36) states a
bound for the expected diﬀerence of the transformed state from the fully decou-
pled state ⌧B ⌦ ⇢E. The bound depends on the initial uncertainty H"min(A|E)⇢
that Eve has about A, as well as the min-entropy H"min(A|S)⌧ of the Choi-
Jamiolkowsi representation ⌧AS of the map TA!S. The latter quantifies how
suitable the map TA!S is for decoupling.
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As already mentioned above, the decoupling theorem does not make a
statement about how suitable the decoupling is as a strong extractor, which
contrasts with the quantum leftover hashing lemma. Another diﬀerence is
that here, Alice chooses from a continuous set of unitaries, instead of from
a finite set of hashing functions. However, it is possible to state decoupling
theorems for finite sets of unitaries. We will not cover such constructions. The
interested reader is referred to the decoupling theorem for unitary approximate
two-designs [HP07; Sze+13].
4.5 Quantum state merging
In the last section, we have seen how Alice can decouple her system A from an-
other system E in the case where the min-entropy H"min(A|E) is high. It is not
immediately obvious why this is useful, as the quantum information that Alice
decouples from Eve is not distributed but only held by Alice. However, the
decoupling theorem has important implications for protocols with distributed
information. Here, we are going to see one such protocol, called quantum state
merging. The information presented in this section can be found in [Dup+10].
We will first explain quantum state merging, and then explain its relation to
decoupling further below.
The notion has been introduced by Horodecki, Oppenheim and Winter
[HOW05; HOW06]. Initially, quantum state merging was considered in the
asymptotic limit. Here, we consider the more general one-shot version, which
has first been investigated in [Ber08], and preliminary results appeared in
[KRS09]. The result that we present in theorem 4.6 below has been shown in
[Dup+10]. We start by giving the formal definition of quantum state merg-
ing. Since the definition is not easy to absorb at first, the reader may have
a look at the diagram and the explaining caption of figure 4.2 while reading
definition 4.5.
Definition 4.5 : Let ⇢AB 2 S(HAB) be a bipartite state purified by a state
⇢ABE, letA0 andB0 beK-dimensional systems, letB0 andB1 be L-dimensional
systems. A TPCPM
E : End(HAA0BB0)! End(HA1B1B0B) (4.37)
is a quantum state merging of the state ⇢AB with error "   0 if E is a
local operation and classical forward communication process for the bipartition
AA0 ! A1 vs. BB0 ! B1B0B and
(E ⌦ 1E)(| ih |KA0B0 ⌦ ⇢ABE) ⇡" | ih |LA1B1 ⌦ ⇢BB0E , (4.38)
where | ih |K and | ih |L are maximally entangled states of the pairs A0B0
and A1B1, respectively, and where the symbol ⇡" denotes "-closeness in the
purified distance. The number
l" := logK   logL (4.39)
is the entanglement cost of the quantum state merging.1
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Figure 4.2: Quantum state merging. Alice and Bob share a bipartite
system in a state ⇢AB, purified by some state ⇢ABE. The goal of Alice and
Bob is to transfer the information encoded in A to a system B0 on Bob’s side,
thereby reproducing the correlations with both B and E. In other words,
they want to reproduce the state ⇢AB on Bob’s side, such that the purification
remains intact with the same purifying system. To achieve this, Alice and
Bob are provided with a pair A0B0 of K-dimensional systems in a maximally
entangled state | ih |KA0B0 . Alice and Bob cooperatively implement a TPCPME from system AA0BB0 to system A1B1B0B by performing local operations
on their systems, as well as classical communication from Alice to Bob. The
eﬀect of this operation is that the state ⇢ is moved from system ABE to the
system B0BE, and instead of aK-dimensional maximally entangled pair A0B0,
they hold a pair A1B1 of L-dimensional systems in the maximally entangled
state | ih |L. If the min-entropy H"min(A|E)⇢ of the state ⇢ABE is suﬃciently
high, quantum state merging can be achieved with L being larger than K. If
K is a power of 2, then the state | ih |K is identical to the state of logK
ebits. Thus, quantum state merging for a high min-entropy H"min(A|E)⇢ can
be seen as expanding about logK ebits to about logL ebits.
The statement of inequality (4.40) is called the achievability part of the-
orem 4.6, and the statement of inequality (4.41) is the converse part of the
theorem. In Chapter 6, we will present a protocol that distributes n-qubit sys-
tems A and B to Alice and Bob, respectively, and prove that the min-entropy
H"min(A|E) of the state ⇢ABE of these systems (for a purifying system E) is
bounded from below. At first sight, one might think that this protocol, in
combination with theorem 4.6, provides a protocol for entanglement expan-
sion. However, this is not true. The problem is that the achievability part of
the theorem only states that for states with a suﬃciently high entropy, there
exists a quantum state merging protocol that leads to entanglement expan-
sion. It does not state how this protocol looks like. In particular, it does not
provide a fixed protocol that performs entanglement expansion for all states
whose min-entropy satisfies a particular bound. Nonetheless, theorem 4.6 is a
highly important result, as it provides achievability limits that future designers
of entanglement expansion protocols can aim for.
The proof of (4.6), which can be found in [Dup+10], makes use of the de-
coupling theorem. The first part of a state merging protocol is constructed as
a decoupling operation. While this first part of the protocol is a fixed construc-
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Figure 4.2: Quantu state erging. Alice and Bob share a bipartite
system in a state ⇢AB, purified by some state ⇢ABE. The goal of Alice and
Bob is to transfer the information encoded in A to a system B0 on Bob’s side,
thereby reproducing the correlations with both B and E. In other words,
they want to reproduce the state ⇢AB on Bob’s side, such that the purification
remains intact with the same purifying system. To achieve this, Alice and
Bob are provided with a pair A0B0 of K-dimensional systems in a maximally
entangled state | ih |KA0B0 . Alice and Bob cooperatively implement a TPCPME from system AA0BB0 to system A1B1B0B by performing local operations
on their systems, as well as classical communication from Alice to Bob. The
eﬀect of this operation is that the state ⇢ is moved from system ABE to the
system B0BE, and instead of aK-dimensional maximally entangled pair A0B0,
they hold a pair A1B1 of L-dimensional systems in the maximally entangled
state | ih |L. If the min-entropy H"min(A|E)⇢ of the state ⇢ABE is suﬃciently
high, quantum state merging can be achieved with L being larger than K. If
K is a power of 2, then the state | ih |K is identical to the state of logK
ebits. Thus, quantum state merging for a high min-entropy H"min(A|E)⇢ can
be seen as expanding about logK ebits to about logL ebits.
The entanglement cost l" quantifies how many ebits Alice and Bob need to
use up in order to transfer the state. The word “ebit” is a common term to refer
to a pair of maximally entangled qubits. Ebits are an extremely important re-
source not only in quantum state merging but in a large variety of information
processing tasks. For our purposes, the most interesting aspect of quantum
state merging is that if the entanglement cost is negative, then Alice and Bob
share more entanglement after the protocol than they did before the protocol.
Thus, a quantum state merging with negative entanglement cost can be seen
as an entanglement expansion: Alice and Bob end up with more entanglement
than they started with. It cannot be seen as entanglement creation, because
in general, some initial entanglement is required for the existence of a quan-
tum state merging protocol of the desired (negative) entanglement cost. This
constitutes an interesting analogy to QKD, which should be seen as a secret
key expansion instead of a secret key generation, because an initial secret key
is needed for authentication.
In order to use quantum state merging for entanglement expansion, it is
1 This s ate merging-related ent nglement cost is not to be confused with othe meaning
of the same term (for another meaning of entanglement cost, see [Hor+09], for example).
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crucial to know for which states the entanglement cost is negative. The fol-
lowing theorem answers this question by bounding the minimal entanglement
cost of a state merging of a state ⇢AB in terms of the min-entropy.
Theorem 4.6 : For a bipartite state ⇢AB 2 S(HAB) with min-entropy
H"min(A|E)⇢ (where ⇢ABE purifies ⇢AB), there is a quantum state merging with
error " > 0 whose entanglement cost l" satisfies
l"   H"2/13min (A|E)⇢ + 4 log(1/") + 2 log(13) . (4.40)










The statement of inequality (4.40) is called the achievability part of the-
orem 4.6, and the statement of inequality (4.41) is the converse part of the
theorem. In Chapter 6, we will present a protocol that distributes n-qubit sys-
tems A and B to Alice and Bob, respectively, and prove that the min-entropy
H"min(A|E) of the state ⇢ABE of these systems (for a purifying system E) is
bounded from below. At first sight, one might think that this protocol, in
combination with theorem 4.6, provides a protocol for entanglement expan-
sion. However, this is not true. The problem is that the achievability part of
the theorem only states that for states with a suﬃciently high entropy, there
exists a quantum state merging protocol that leads to entanglement expan-
sion. It does not state how this protocol looks like. In particular, it does not
provide a fixed protocol that performs entanglement expansion for all states
whose min-entropy satisfies a particular bound. Nonetheless, theorem 4.6 is a
highly important result, as it provides achievability limits that future designers
of entanglement expansion protocols can aim for.
The proof of (4.6), which can be found in [Dup+10], makes use of the de-
coupling theorem. The first part of a state merging protocol is constructed as
a decoupling operation. While this first part of the protocol is a fixed construc-
tion, the second part of the protocol is only shown to exist. As the interested
reader may verify, this existence statement boils down to the existence of a
unitary as per lemma 3.8. If the state ⇢ABE was known, then the unitary could
be constructed. However, as long as a min-entropy bound is all that one knows
about the state, the unitary can only be shown to exist.
The construction of protocols that produce the desired output for all states
satisfying a min-entropy bound is an active research topic. State merging
protocols with this property have been referred to as universal quantum state
merging protocols. Preliminary results on such protocols for the asymptotic
case of many independent uses of the same channel can be found in [BBJ13].
4.6 Maximal achievable fidelity with a maximally
entangled state
The last characterization of the min-entropy that we look at will be very useful
in chapter 7, when we generalize the min-entropy to a decoherence quantity
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for a more general family of probabilistic theories. In contrast to the charac-
terizations that we have seen in the last three subsections, we now consider a
characterization of the unsmoothed min-entropy rather than the smooth one.
It is given in the form of the following proposition, which has been proved by
König, Renner and Schaﬀner [KRS09].
Proposition 4.7 : Let ⇢AE 2 S(HAE) be a bipartite state, let A0 be a sys-
tem of the same dimension as A (dA = dA0), let | ih |AA0 2 S(HAA0) be a
maximally entangled state.2 Then
Hmin(A|E)⇢ =   log dA maxRE!A0 F
2(| ih |AA0 ,1A ⌦RE!A0(⇢AE)) , (4.42)
where F is the fidelity and where the maximization runs over all channelsRE!A0 .
Equation (4.42) gives us a new interpretation of the min-entropy: for a
state ⇢AE, the min-entropy Hmin(A|E) can be interpreted as a measure for
how well Eve, who controls system E, can entangle her system with system A
(see figure 4.3). By choosing a recovery map RE!A0 and applying it to her
system, she transforms the state ⇢AE into the state 1A ⌦RE!A0(⇢AE). Thus,
the maximum in equation (4.42) evaluates to the maximal squared fidelity that
Eve can achieve with the maximally entangled state | ih |AA0 . Note that for







Figure 4.3: Alternative interpretation of the min-entropy. Consider a
state ⇢AE shared by Alice and Bob. Suppose that Eve tries to get her system
maximally entangled with the system controlled by Alice. To this end, she
applies a recovery map RE!A0 on her system, chosen to get as close as possible
to the maximally entangled state | ih |AA0 . Here, “as close as possible” means
that Eve tries to transform ⇢AE into a state ⇢AA0 such that the fidelity with
| ih |AA0 is as high as possible. It turns out that Hmin(A|E) is a measure for
how well she can do that.
for some unitary UA, where eRE!A0 is the channel RE!A0 , followed by the




F 2(| ih |AA0 ,1A ⌦ eRE!A0(⇢AE))
= max
RE!A0
F 2(| ih |AA0 ,1A ⌦RE!A0(⇢AE)) .
(4.47)
Thus, the choice of the maximally entangled state does not matter.
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Note that the choice of the maximally entangled state is irrelevant: by
virtue of lemmata 3.8 and 3.15, it holds that for two maximally entangled
states | ih |AA0 and | ih |AA0 ,
F 2(| ih |AA0 ,1A ⌦RE!A0(⇢AE)) (4.43)
= F 2((1A ⌦ UA0)| ih |AA0(1A ⌦ U †A0),1A ⌦RE!A0(⇢AE)) (4.44)
= F 2(| ih |AA0 , (1A ⌦ U †A0)(1A ⌦RE!A0)(⇢AE)(1A ⌦ UA0)) (4.45)
= F 2(| ih |AA0 , (1A ⌦ eRE!A0)(⇢AE)) , (4.46)
for some unitary UA, where eRE!A0 is the channel RE!A0 , followed by the
unitary U †A. Since RE!A0 7! eRE!A0 is a bijection on the set of unitaries on A,
2 As we will explain below, the choice of the maximally entangled state does not matter.
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F 2(| ih |AA0 ,1A ⌦ eRE!A0(⇢AE))
= max
RE!A0
F 2(| ih |AA0 ,1A ⌦RE!A0(⇢AE)) .
(4.47)







Sifting attacks in quantum key
distribution
5.1 Introduction
In section 4.3, we have seen that a quantum key distribution protocol can be
divided into two parts:
• In the first part, classical n-bit strings X and X 0 are distributed to
Alice and Bob, respectively, about which Eve has some quantum side
information E. Eve’s knowledge about the bit strings is limited in a
certain way, namely in that the min-entropy H"min(X|E) of the overall
state ⇢XX0E is bounded from below. We call this first part of a QKD
protocol a raw key distribution protocol. It is the part of a QKD protocol
where the data is generated and sifted (we will explain below what this
means).
• In the second part, Alice and Bob execute an error correcting code and
make a hash comparison to establish the correctness condition, inequality
(4.20). Then they perform privacy amplification, in which they map the
n-bit strings to shorter l-bit strings using two-universal hashing. This
turns the lower bound on H"min(X|E) of the raw key distribution protocol
into the security condition of inequality (4.21). This part of a QKD
protocol is referred to as the classical post-processing of the protocol.
In this chapter, we analyze the first part, the raw key distribution protocol, in
detail, whereas the classical post-processing will no longer be treated. Readers
interested in classical post-processing topics are referred to the PhD thesis of
Gilles van Assche [Ass06].
We will point out a serious security flaw that has been spread in the more re-
cent QKD literature. It has the consequence that the min-entropy H"min(X|E)
is not bounded correctly. To get an idea of what the problem is, let us have a
brief look at what a raw key distribution protocol looks like. As we mentioned
briefly in section 4.3 (see page 55), a reduced QKD protocol can itself be split
into two parts:




We refer to subroutine (i) collectively as “sifting”. Even though the word sifting
usually only refers to the process of discarding part of the data acquired in
the measurements, we refer to the preparation, distribution, measurement and
sifting together as “sifting”, because they are intertwined in iterative sifting,
the protocol that we will analyze in detail.
There are many diﬀerent protocols in the QKD literature, and the details of
(i) and (ii) depend on the particular protocol. To make things more concrete,
we will now have a brief and informal look at an example protocol. It is defined
with respect to two parameters n 2 N and qtol 2 [0, 1], where n is the length
of the resulting bit strings X and X 0 and qtol is an error tolerance parameter.
The protocol goes as follows.
(i) Sifting protocol: Let m = (4 +  )n be an integer, where   > 0 is some
small number. The first two steps of the protocol are repeated m times
(we say they perform m rounds). In round r 2 [m], Alice and Bob do
the following:
Step 1: Alice prepares a qubit pair in a maximally entangled state and
sends one half to Bob using a quantum channel controlled by
Eve.
Step 2: Alice and Bob independently choose a basis Ar, Br 2 {0, 1} at
random, where 0 and 1 are equally likely and where 0 stands for
the X-basis and 1 stands for the Z-basis. Then they measure
their half of the qubit pair in that basis and store the outcome
Yr, Y 0r 2 {0, 1}.
After these m rounds of repetition, Alice and Bob carry out the rest of
the protocol in one single run.
Step 3: Alice and Bob communicate their basis choices Ar, Br for r 2
[m] and determine the sets
U(m) = {r 2 [m] | Ar = Br = 0} , (5.1)
V (m) = {r 2 [m] | Ar = Br = 1} . (5.2)
If |U(m)| < n or |V (m)| < n, they abort the protocol. We
say that n is their quota for the X-basis and the Z-basis. If
|U(m)|   n and |V (m)|   n, they choose subsets U ✓ U(m)
and V ✓ V (m), each of size n, uniformly at random, i.e. each
subset of size n has the same likelihood of being chosen. Then
they discard the rest of the data. This discarding of data is
called sifting. With the data of the remaining 2n rounds, they
continue with parameter estimation.
(ii) Parameter estimation (PE) protocol: Alice and Bob choose a subset
W ⇢ U [ V of size n fully at random. This determines the test bits.
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They communicate their measurement results Yr, Y 0r with r 2 W . This






Yr   Y 0r . (5.3)
If ⇤test > qtol, they abort the protocol. Otherwise, they use the remaining
n measurement outcomes, which we call the raw key bits or just key bits,
as their bit strings X and X 0.
This is a simple example of a raw key distribution protocol. It is essentially
identical to a protocol considered by Shor and Preskill [SP00]. The only diﬀer-
ence is that here, we formulate it as an entanglement-based protocol instead of
a prepare-and-measure protocol.1 Compared with other protocols that we will
look at, it is an ineﬃcient protocol, but in contrast to the problematic protocol
that we will discuss below, it is a secure protocol. Instead of deriving a for-
mal lower bound on the min-entropy H"min(X|E), we will give some intuitive
arguments for why Eve cannot have too much knowledge about X (and X 0).
Let us put ourselves in Eve’s shoes. In order to gain information about X,
she may want to intercept the qubits sent from Alice to Bob. More precisely,
let us say that she performs an intercept-resend attack. This means that Eve
measures some of the qubits that Alice sends through the channel and resends
each of these qubits in the eigenstate associated with the measurement out-
come. Since Alice and Bob choose their bases at random, Eve does not know
in which basis to attack. On the other hand, if she knew which of the rounds
are key rounds (i.e. if she knew which measurement results end up in the raw
key), she could decide to only attack in these rounds. Then all test bits would
be unaﬀected, and her attack would not be detected. However, Eve does not
know that, because the key bits are sampled uniformly at random from the
bits where Alice and Bob measured in the same basis. Therefore, since Eve
really wants to gain information about X, we assume that she attacks in ev-
ery round. Since she does not know the encoding basis, she can either use a
fixed basis or randomize her basis choice. In either case, she will introduce an
expected error rate of 25%,2 so if qtol is set significantly below 25%, then Eve’s
attack will be detected.
Hence, we can say that a central assumption in QKD is that Eve has
no knowledge about which rounds are test rounds and which rounds are key
rounds. In the Shor-Preskill protocol that we just discussed, this assumption
is satisfied. Below, we will have a close look at another raw key distribution
protocol which has been used in recent literature. We will show that that
protocol violates this assumption, i.e. Eve has (partial) knowledge about which
rounds are key rounds and which rounds are test rounds. As we will show, this
breaks the security proof of the protocol.
1 In a prepare-and-measure protocol, Alice chooses two random bits Ar and Yr in each
round r and prepares a single qubit (instead of a pair) in the state Yr in the basis Ar. Then
she sends this qubit to Bob. On Bob’s side, nothing changes. From a security point of view,
these two situations are equivalent.
2 We assume here that the X-basis and the Z-basis are complementary, e.g. they corre-
spond to the  x- and  z-Pauli bases. In that case, measuring in the wrong basis leads to an
error in 50% of the cases (see the discussion in section 3.1.3). Since Eve chooses the wrong
basis with probability 1/2, this leads to an expected error rate of 25%.
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5.1.1 Summary of the results
The raw key distribution protocol that we criticize is composed of two sub-
protocols which we call iterative sifting and single-basis parameter estimation.
In contrast to the Shor-Preskill protocol above, where measurement choices
are only communicated when all the quantum communication is completed,
iterative sifting involves an iterative procedure where Alice and Bob commu-
nicate previous basis choice after each completed round until a quota is met.
This protocol design is chosen to increase the eﬃciency of the protocol, mean-
ing that less quantum communication is necessary for the same length of the
raw keys. We will describe iterative sifting and its eﬃciency motivation in
detail in section 5.2. This sifting scheme was part of theoretical protocols
[Tom+12; Lim+13; Cur+14; Lim+14] and has found experimental implemen-
tations [Bac+13]. As we describe in section 5.4, we find that iterative sifting
leads to two previously unnoticed security issues. In a nutshell, these problems
are:
• Non-uniform sampling : The sampling probability, due to which the key
bits are chosen, is not uniform. In other words, there is an a priori bias:
Eve knows ahead of time that some rounds are more likely to end up in
the sample than others.
• Basis information leak : Alice and Bob’s public communication about
their previous basis choices (which, in iterative sifting, happens before
the quantum communication is over) allows Eve to update her knowledge
about which of the upcoming (qu)bits will end up in the sample. As a
consequence, the quantum information that passes through the channel
thereafter can be correlated to this knowledge of Eve.
In section 5.5, we describe intercept-resend attack strategies for Eve that ex-
ploit these two security issues. As a figure of merit, we calculate the expected
error rates for these attacks and find that they reach values far below the value
of 25% which is expected for secure protocols such as the Shor-Preskill protocol
above.
How can these problems be avoided? One way would be to fall back on
protocols such as the one above. However, this way one would lose all the
eﬃciency benefits of iterative sifting. Instead, in section 5.6, we construct
a protocol that shows much of the eﬃciency benefits of iterative sifting, yet
suﬀers from neither of the two problems we describe. In section 5.8, we show
how the security of a raw key distribution protocol can be proved formally.
We develop two formal criteria for a sifting protocol and show that they are
suﬃcient to guarantee a correct estimation of min-entropy. Then we show that
our suggested protocol satisfies these two criteria, whereas iterative sifting does
not.
5.2 Raw key distribution protocols and eﬃciency
Further below in this section, we introduce the problematic iterative sifting
protocol. Since iterative sifting was designed with eﬃciency in mind, it is
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very helpful for its discussion to talk about the eﬃciency of raw key distribu-
tion protocols. Thus, we shall approach iterative sifting through some other
examples that illustrate eﬃciency aspects.
There are several eﬃciency aspects, but maybe the most obvious one is the
number of raw key bits per number of qubits of quantum communication. In
the Shor-Preskill protocol above, m = (4 +  )n qubits are sent for n bits of
raw key, so the fraction is n/(4 +  )n ⇡ 1/4 for small  .3 For the discussion
of eﬃciency, it is helpful to visualize the m rounds of the protocol as a bar
and to subdivide it into three parts (see figure 5.1): the X-agreements, where
both measured in X, the Z-agreements, where both measured in Z, and the
disagreements, where Alice and Bob measure in diﬀerent bases. In the Shor-
Preskill protocol, the probability px of choosing the X-basis and the probability
pz of choosing the Z-basis are both 1/2. Thus, speaking in expectation values,
the X-agreements and the Z-agreements each are about m/4 bits in size, and
there are about m/2 bits of disagreements. During parameter estimation, one
half of the agreements are used for testing (i.e. for determining ⇤test), so there
are about m/4 of bits left for the raw key.
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Figure 5.1: Eﬃciency of the Shor-Preskill protocol. In this protocol,
the basis choice probabilities and the quota are symmetric. In other protocols
below, we will distinguish between an X-quota n and a Z-quota k, but here we
have n = k. The meaning of the authenticated communication for parameter
estimation will be explained below.
How could this eﬃciency be increased? Lo, Chau and Ardehali (LCA) sug-
gested to use biased basis choice probabilities px > pz to increase the eﬃciency
[LCA05]. The idea behind this suggestion is that the expectation value 2pxpzm
of the number of disagreements becomes smaller this way. Hence, less data is
discarded during sifting (see figure 5.2). While in the Shor-Preskill protocol,
the quota for the X- and Z-agreements that need to be met are symmetric
(recall that they abort unless they have at least n X-agreements and at least
n Z-agreements), one now has asymmetric quota. We denote the quota for
the X-agreements by n and the quota for the Z-agreements by k, so we have
n > k.
As LCA noted, it would not be secure in this case to sample the test bits
3 This is a naïve eﬃciency estimation, because it does not account for the fact that Alice
and Bob may abort the protocol, in which case the final secret key length is 0, not n. For
the discussion in this subsection, this naïve notion of eﬃciency shall be suﬃcient. We will
analyze eﬃciency in more detail in section 5.6.
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Figure 5.2: Eﬃciency of the LCA-protocol. The number of disagree-
ments can be significantly reduced by choosing asymmetric basis choice prob-
abilities and quota. The proportions in this figure are drawn for px = 0.8.
As LCA noted, it would not be secure in this case to sample the test bits
from the union of the X- and Z-agreements uniformly. Instead, they make
a somewhat peculiar suggestion for parameter estimation. They suggest to
determine two error rates: one error rate is determined for the k Z-agreements
that they keep for parameter estimation, and the other rate is determined for
a randomly chosen subset of the X-agreements of the same size k. Only if both
error rates are below a certain threshold value, Alice and Bob use the remaining
n   k X-agreements as the raw key. The ratio of raw key bits per qubit of
quantum communication, when the quota n and k are chosen proportional to
the probabilities of the X- and Z-agreements, is about (p2x p2z)m/m = (p2x p2z)
and can therefore be much higher than the value of one quarter for the Shor-
Preskill protocol.
Is it really necessary to determine two error rates? As we prove in sec-
tion 5.7, it turns out that the LCA protocol is still secure when it is modified
such that only the error rate on the Z-agreements is estimated. This means
that parameter estimation is done in only one basis. Therefore, we call it
single-basis parameter estimation (SBPE). Then, all the sifted X-agreements
are used for the raw key. This has several advantages. Firstly, it simplifies
the protocol. Secondly, the ratio of raw key bits per sent qubit increases to
p2xm/m = p
2
x (see figure 5.3). Thirdly, Alice and Bob do not have to choose
the test bits at random, i.e. they do not need any randomness for the choice of
the sample. This is an advantage because this way, Alice and Bob do not have
to communicate their choice of the sample. To understand the importance of
this, let us say a few words on authentication.
In QKD, the communication between Alice and Bob needs to be authenti-
cated in order to prevent a man-in-the-middle attack. Authentication requires
some small initial secret key shared between Alice and Bob, and the more Alice
and Bob need to communicate, the larger this initial key needs to be. In this
sense, QKD should actually be regarded as secret-key expansion rather than
secret key generation. Hence, avoiding authenticated communication reduces
the required size of the initial shared secret key. In this modified scheme, the
randomness cost for parameter estimation (PE) that needs to be communi-
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bits for the LCA protocol.4 For more information about authentica-
tion in QKD, see the aforementioned book by Gilles van Assche [Ass06]. As
we discuss in more detail in section 5.6, we recommend the use of LCA sifting
and SBPE as a raw key distribution protocol. It is eﬃcient, and we formally
prove its security in sections 5.7 and 5.8.
So far, we only discussed unproblematic modifications of raw key distri-
bution protocols. Now we discuss modifications that lead to iterative sifting
which, as we will show in the next section, raises security issues. One may be
tempted to say that LCA sifting with SBPE is still unnecessarily ineﬃcient,
because the number of rounds is fixed to a number m instead of being variable
depending on basis agreements that Alice and Bob have during the quantum
communication. With a fixed number of rounds, two undesired things can hap-
pen: Alice and Bob may not meet the quota, in which case they need to abort,
or they keep the quantum communication running even though they already
met the quota. For this reason, some authors [Tom+12; Lim+13; Cur+14;
Lim+14; Bac+13] decided to make a further modification of the reduced QKD
protocol: after each round of quantum communication, Alice and Bob com-
municate their basis choice of the past round. This way, they can determine
how many X-agreements and Z-agreements they already had. If they have less
than n X-agreements or less than k Z-agreements, they continue the quan-
tum communication. Once they met both quota, they terminate the quantum
communication. At that point, they may have too many X-agreements or too
many Z-agreements (but not both). In that case, they choose a subset of size
n or k at random, respectively. We will write out the iterative sifting protocol
in detail in the next section.
The advantage of iterative sifting is that Alice and Bob never have to abort
due to quota restrictions, and on the other hand, the quantum communica-
tion never runs longer than necessary for meeting the quota. The underlying
assumption is that since Alice and Bob only communicate basis choices of pre-
vious rounds, but not of upcoming rounds, Eve does not get any advantage.
However, as we show in the next section, this assumption is wrong. Iterative
sifting breaks the security proofs that were presented for these protocols.
4 The binomial coeﬃcient gives the number of possible sample choices. Therefore, the
authenticated communication cost in bits is the logarithm of the binomial coeﬃcient.
71







its for t e rotocol.4 or ore i for atio a o t a t e tica-
tio i , see t e afore e tio e ook y illes va ssc e [ ss06]. s
e isc ss i ore etail i sectio 5.6, e reco e t e se of sifti g
a as a ra key istri tio rotocol. It is e cie t, a e for ally
rove its sec rity i sectio s 5.7 a 5.8.
f r, e l isc sse r le tic ific ti s f r e istri-
ti r t c ls. e isc ss ific ti s t t le t iter ti e sifti
ic , s e ill s i t e e t secti , r ises sec rit iss es. e e
te te t s t t sifti it is still ecess ril i e cie t,
ec se t e er f r s is fi e t er i ste f ei ri le
e e i sis ree e ts t t lice e ri t e t
c ic ti . it fi e er f r s, t esire t i s c -
e : lice t eet t e t , i ic c se t e ee t rt,
r t e ee t e t c ic ti r i e e t t e lre
et t e t . r t is re s , s e t rs [ ; i ; r ;
i ; c ] eci e t e f rt er ific ti f t e re ce
r t c l: fter e c r f t c ic ti , lice c -
ic te t eir sis c ice f t e st r . is , t e c eter i e
- ree e ts - ree e ts t e lre . If t e e less
t - ree e ts r less t - ree e ts, t e c ti e t e -
t c ic ti . ce t e et t t , t e ter i te t e t
c ic ti . t t t i t, t e e t - ree e ts r t
- ree e ts ( t t t ). I t t c se, t e c se s set f size
r t r , res ecti el . e ill rite t t e iter ti e sifti r t c l
i et il i t e e t secti .
t f it r ti sifti is t t li r t rt
t t r stri ti s, t t r , t t i -
ti r r s l r t ss r f r ti t t . rl i
ss ti is t t si li l i t sis i s f r -
i s r s, t t f i r s, s t t t .
r, s s i t t s ti , t is ss ti is r . It r ti
sifti r s t s rit r fs t t r r s t f r t s r t ls.
i i l i i f i l l i . f ,
i i i i i i l i f i i l i .
5.3. ITERATIVE SIFTING
5.3 Iterative sifting
The iterative sifting protocol has been formulated in slightly diﬀerent ways in
the literature, where the diﬀerences lie mostly in the choice of the wording and
in whether it is realized as a prepare-and-measure protocol [Tom+12; Bac+13;
Cur+14; Lim+14] or as an entanglement-based protocol [Lim+13]. These
details are irrelevant for the problems that we describe. We formulate protocols
as entanglement-based protocols, because it makes the formal treatment in
section 5.8 easier. Another diﬀerence is that some of the above-mentioned
references take into consideration that sometimes, a measurement may not
take place (no-detection event) or may have an inconclusive outcome. This
is done by adding a third symbol ; to the set of possible outcomes, turning
the otherwise dichotomic measurements into trichotomic ones with symbols
{0, 1, ;}. We choose not to do so, because the problems that we describe arise
independently of whether no-detection events or inconclusive measurements
take place. Incorporating them would not solve the problems that we address
but rather complicate things and distract from the main issues that we want
to point out.
For a formal write-up of the protocol, it is useful to clarify some notational
conventions. The protocol involves quantities that are random (such as Al-
ice’s and Bob’s basis choices Ar and Br or the raw key X and its elements
X1, . . . , Xn). Mathematically, this means that they form random variables.
We follow convention 2.4 and denote random variables by uppercase letters,
whereas we denote concrete values of the random variables by lowercase letters.
Fixed numbers, such as the quota n and k, will also be denoted by lowercase
letters. It is useful to give their sum its own letter l.
Convention 5.1 : From now on, l is defined as l := n+ k, the sum of the X-
and the Z-quota. This is to be clearly distinguished from the secret key length
in chapter 4.
From now on, we split up raw key distribution protocols into a sifting
protocol and a PE protocol. After the sifting protocol, Alice and Bob have
sifted measurement outcomes and sifted basis choices. Above, we did not give
them their own symbols, but in the following we will denote them as follows.
Alice’s sifted measurement outcomes form an l-bit string, and we denote its
random variable by S = (Si)li=1. Likewise, we denote Bob’s measurement
outcome string by T = (Ti)li=1 and the sifted basis choice string by ⇥ = (#i)li=1.
In the PE, these strings S, T and ⇥ are then transformed into the raw keys
X and X 0 (see figure 5.4).
We have written out iterative sifting in protocol 5.1. There, and in the rest













In the protocol, Alice iteratively prepares qubit pairs in a maximally en-
tangled state and sends one half of the pair to Bob (step 1). Then, Alice and
Bob each measure their qubit with respect to a basis ai, bi 2 {0, 1}, respec-
tively, where 0 stands for the X-basis and 1 stands for the Z-basis (step 2).
72









Figure 5.4: Subdivision of reduced QKD into sifting and parameter
estimation (PE). A sifting protocol produces l-bit strings of sifted measure-
ment outcomes for Alice (S) and for Bob (T ), as well as an l-bit string of sifted
basis choices (⇥). These three strings are transformed into the raw keys X
and X 0 in the PE.
Thereby, the X-basis is chosen with probability px and the Z-basis is chosen
with probability pz. These probabilities px and pz are parameters of the pro-
tocol. The important and problematic parts of the protocol are step 3 and
the subsequent check of the termination condition (TC): after each measure-
ment, Alice and Bob communicate their basis choice over an authenticated
classical channel. With this information at hand, they then check whether the
termination condition is satisfied: if they have at least n X-agreements and at
least k Z-agreements, the termination condition is satisfied and they enter the
final phase of the protocol by continuing with step 4. These quota n and k
are parameters of the protocol. If the condition is not met, they repeat the
steps 1 to 3 (which we call the loop phase of the protocol) until they meet this
condition. Because of this iteration, whose termination condition depends on
the history5 of the protocol run up to that point, we call it the iterative sifting
protocol. Its number of rounds is a random variable that we denote by M . We
denote possible values of M by m.
After the loop phase of the protocol, in which the whole data is generated,
Alice and Bob enter the final phase of the protocol, in which this data is
sifted. This sifting consists of discarding data of rounds in which Alice and
Bob measured in diﬀerent bases, as well as randomly discarding a surplus of
basis agreements, where a “surplus” refers to having more than n X-agreements
or more than k Z-agreements. This discarding of surplus is done to simplify
the analysis of the protocol, which is easier if the number of bits where both
measured in the X (Z) basis is fixed to a number n (k). After throwing away
the surplus, Alice and Bob relabel their data in an order-preserving way in
step 5, resulting in sifted measurement outcome strings S and T as well as a
sifted basis choice string ⇥. This is just done so that the labels of the output
string elements are always i = 1, 2, . . . , l without gaps, which is useful for later
analysis. It does not correspond to a practically relevant process. The idea
behind the order-preserving relabeling is shown in figure 5.5.
Iterative sifting is problematic, but to fully understand why, one needs to
see how the output of the iterative sifting protocol is processed in the subse-
quent PE. As we mentioned in section 5.2, protocols from the literature that
use iterative sifting use single-basis parameter estimation (SBPE). To make
5 By the history of a protocol run, we mean the record of everything that happened
during the run of the protocol. In the case of iterative sifting, this means the random bits
ar, br, the measurement outcomes yr, y0r etc.
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Parameters: n, k 2 N+, px, pz 2 [0, 1] with px + pz = 1.
Outputs: • Alice: l-bit string (Si)li=1 2 {0, 1}l (sifted outcomes),
• Bob: l-bit string (Ti)li=1 2 {0, 1}l (sifted outcomes),
• public: l-bit string (⇥i)li=1 2 {0, 1}lk (sifted basis choices)
The protocol
Loop phase: Steps 1 to 3 are iterated round-wise (round index r = 1, 2, . . .)
until the termination condition (TC) after step 3 is reached. In round r,
Alice and Bob do:
Step 1: Alice prepares a qubit pair in a maximally entangled state and sends
one half to Bob.
Step 2: Alice and Bob independently choose a basis Ar, Br 2 {0, 1} at ran-
dom with probability px, pz, where 0 stands for the X-basis and 1
stands for the Z-basis. Then they measure their part of the qubit
pair in that basis and get an outcome Yr, Y 0r 2 {0, 1}, respectively.
Step 3: Alice and Bob communicate their basis choice Ar and Br over a
public authenticated channel. Then they determine the sets
U(r) := {j 2 [r] | Aj = Bj = 0} ,
V (r) := {j 2 [r] | Aj = Bj = 1}
TC: If the condition (|U(r)|   n and |V (r)|   k) is reached, Alice and
Bob setM := r and proceed with step 4. Otherwise, they increment
r by one and repeat from step 1.
Final phase: The following steps are performed only once:
Step 4: Alice and Bob choose a subset U ✓ U(M) of size n at random, i.e.
each subset of size n is equally likely to be chosen. Analogously,
they choose a subset V ✓ V (M) of size k at random. Then they
discard the bits Ar, Br, Yr and Y 0r for which r /2 U [ V .
Step 5: Let Ri be the i-th element of U [ V . Then Alice determines
(Si)li=1 2 {0, 1}l, Bob determines (Ti)li=1 2 {0, 1}l and together
they determine (⇥i)li=1 2 {0, 1}lk, where for every i 2 [l],
Si = YRi , Ti = Y
0
Ri , ⇥i = ARi (= BRi) .
Step 6: Alice locally outputs (Si)li=1, Bob locally outputs (Ti)li=1, and they
publicly output (⇥i)li=1.
Protocol 5.1: The iterative sifting protocol.
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y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10
u = {2, 5, 7} , v = {4, 10}
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
Figure 5.5: Example of an order-preserving relabeling (step 5 of the
iterative sifting protocol). For this simple example, we have chosen the
quota n = 3, k = 2, and hence l = 5. Suppose that the termination condition
is reached after 10 rounds, and that Alice chooses the subsets u = {2, 5, 7} and
v = {4, 10}. Then Alice’s sifted measurement outcomes are simply s1 = y2,
s2 = y4, s3 = y5, s4 = y7, s5 = y10. The strings (ti)5i=1 and (#i)5i=1 are chosen
the same way, i.e. t1 = y02, . . . , t5 = y010 and #1 = a2, . . . ,#5 = a10.
use iterative sifting use single-basis parameter estimation (SBPE). To make
clear what we are talking about, we have written out the SBPE protocol in
protocol 5.2. It is a very simple protocol, parametrized by n, k 2 N and an
error tolerance rate qtol 2 [0, 1]. Alice and Bob communicate the test bits, i.e.
those bits Si, Ti for which ⇥i = 1, and then determine the test bit error rate
⇤test. If ⇤test exceeds qtol, they abort; otherwise, they use the bits Si, Ti with
⇥i = 0 as the raw key. The reordering in step 3 is analogous to the reordering
in step 5 of protocol 5.1. Again, we consider this reordering for the analysis in
sections 5.7 and 5.8, which is easier if X and X 0 are simply elements of {0, 1}n.
It is important to emphasize that if the output of iterative sifting serves as
the input of SBPE, then the bits that result from measurements in the X-basis
are used for the raw key, and the bits that result from measurements in the
Z-basis are used for parameter estimation (i.e. they form the sample for the
parameter estimation). Hence, the sample is determined by the basis choice.
In contrast to the Shor-Preskill protocol, no additional randomness is used to
choose the sample. This is not necessarily a problem by itself. However, as
we will show in the next section, in iterative sifting, some rounds are more
likely to end up in the sample than other rounds. This leads to non-uniform
sampling, which is a problem since uniform sampling is one of the assumptions
that enter the analysis of the parameter estimation. This seems to have gone
unnoticed so far, as we found that protocols in the literature that use iterative
sifting as a subroutine use SBPE as a subroutine for parameter estimation
[Tom+12; Lim+13; Cur+14; Lim+14; Bac+13].
5.4 The two security issues with iterative sifting
5.4.1 Non-uniform sampling
To show that iterative sifting leads to non-uniform sampling, we calculate the
sampling probabilities for some example parameters k, n 2 N as functions of
the probabilities px and pz. By a sampling probability, we mean the probability
that some subset of k of the l = n+k bits is used as a sample for the parameter
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error tolerance rate qtol 2 [0, 1]. lice and Bob co unicate the test bits, i.e.
those bits Si, Ti for hich i 1, and then deter ine the test bit error rate
⇤test. If ⇤test exceeds qtol, they abort; other ise, they use the bits Si, Ti ith
i 0 as the ra key. he reordering in step 3 is analogous to the reordering
in step 5 of protocol 5.1. gain, e consider this reordering for the analysis in
sections 5.7 and 5.8, hich is easier if and 0 are si ply ele ents of {0, 1}n.
It is i portant to e phasize that if the output of iterative sifting serves as
the input of SBPE, then the bits that result fro easure ents in the -basis
are used for the ra key, and the bits that result fro easure ents in the
Z-basis are used for para eter esti ation (i.e. they for the sa ple for the
para eter esti ation). ence, the sa ple is deter ined by the basis choice.
In contrast to the Shor-Preski l protocol, no additional rando ness is used to
choose the sa ple. his is not necessarily a proble by itself. o ever, as
e i l sho in the next section, in iterative sifting, so e rounds are ore
likely to end up in the sa ple than other rounds. his leads to non-unifor
sa pling, hich is a proble since unifor sa pling is one of the assu ptions
that enter the analysis of the para eter esti ation. his see s to have gone
unnoticed so far, as e found that protocols in the literature that use iterative
sifting as a subroutine use SBPE as a subroutine for para eter esti ation
[ o 12; Li 13; ur 14; Li 14; Bac 13].
. t s c rit iss s it it r ti sifti
5.4.1 o - ifor sa li g
o sho that iterative sifting leads to non-unifor sa pling, e calculate the
sa pling probabilities for so e exa ple para eters k, n 2 as functions of
the probabilities px and pz. By a sa pling probability, e ean the probability
that so e subset of k of the l n k bits is used as a sa ple for the para eter
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Single-Basis Parameter Estimation (SBPE)
Parameters: n, k 2 N, qtol 2 [0, 1].
Inputs: • Alice: l-bit string S = (Si)li=1 2 {0, 1}l (sifted outcomes),
• Bob: l-bit string T = (Ti)li=1 2 {0, 1}l (sifted outcomes),
• public: l-bit string ⇥ = (⇥i)li=1 2 {0, 1}lk (sifted basis choices)
Outputs: • Alice: n-bit string X = (Xj)nj=1 2 {0, 1}n (raw key),
• Bob: n-bit string X 0 = (X 0j)nj=1 2 {0, 1}n (raw key).
The protocol
Step 1: Alice and Bob communicate their test bits, i.e. the bits Si and Ti with
i for which ⇥i = 1, over a public authenticated channel.







and perform the correlation test : if ⇤test  qtol, they continue the
protocol and move on to Step 3. If ⇤test > qtol, they abort and output
X = X 0 =?.
Step 3: Let Ij be the j-th element of {I 2 [l] | ⇥I = 0}. Then Alice outputs
the n-bit string (Xj)nj=1 and Bob outputs the n-bit string (X 0j)nj=1,
where
Xj = SIj , X
0
j = TIj .
Protocol 5.2: The single-basis parameter estimation (SBPE) protocol.
estimation, i.e. the sampling probabilities are P⇥(#) for # 2 {0, 1}lk. We say
that sampling is uniform if P⇥(#) is the same for all # 2 {0, 1}lk, and non-
uniform otherwise. It turns out that the calculation of the values of P⇥(#)
is non-trivial even for small values of n and k (as we will see in the proof
of proposition 5.2 below). While non-uniform sampling already arises in the
case of the smallest possible parameters k = n = 1, the results are even more
interesting in cases where k 6= n. Let us consider iterative sifting (Protocol 5.1)
with n = 1, k = 2 and arbitrary px, pz 2 [0, 1]. We denote strings without
brackets and commas. For example, we write 110 2 {0, 1}32 instead of (1, 1, 0) 2
{0, 1}32. The possible values of the random variable ⇥ are 110, 101 and 011.
The probabilities of these strings are given as follows.
Proposition 5.2 : For the iterative sifting protocol as in Protocol 5.1 with
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n = 1 and k = 2, it holds that
P⇥(110) = g
2






For the other two possible values of ⇥, it holds that




A fully formalized proof of proposition 5.2 in accordance with the definitions
in chapter 2 would require to model the sample space ⌦ of the probability space
on which ⇥ is defined. This set models all the randomness that influences ⇥,
namely the basis choices A = A1, A2, . . . and B = B1, B2, . . . of Alice and Bob,
as well as the choices of the subsets U and V . (However, ⇥ is independent of
the outcome strings Y and Y 0.) For example, an element of ⌦ can be modeled
as
! = (1011101| {z }
a




, {4, 7}| {z }
v
) , (5.7)
its probability would be
P (!) = p2xp
5

















and it would be mapped to
# = ⇥(!) = 101 . (5.10)
Another example is as follows:
!0 = (101, 101, {2}, {1, 3}) , (5.11)














⇥(!0) = 101 . (5.14)





P (!) . (5.15)
In general, the preimages of the sifted basis choice strings # are sets of tuples
! where the length of a and b is not bounded. At the same time, not all such
tuples are elements of ⌦ (for example, the last entry of a and b needs to be a
basis agreement in iterative sifting).
This makes the set ⌦ hard to model. However, our primary goal here is
to show that iterative sifting with SBPE leads to non-uniform sampling. To
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this end, it is suﬃcient to calculate the probability of two samples and to see
that they are unequal. For these calculations, it seems exaggerated to have
the underlying sample space explicitly written out. In order to avoid unnec-
essarily complicating things, we therefore only deal with the relevant events,
random variables and their probability mass functions directly, assuming that
the reader understands what probability space they are meant to be defined
on. In section 5.6, when we treat LCA sifting in detail, we will give a full
probability space model for that protocol (which is easier than a probability
space model for iterative sifting).
For the calculation of equations (5.5) and (5.6), it is useful to introduce the
random variables Nx, Nz and Nd, standing for the number of X-agreements, Z-
agreements and disagreements in a protocol run, respectively. In this notation,
the sampling probabilities can be calculated as follows.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. We first write out the sequence of equalities that lead





































Equation (5.16) is just stating that P⇥ is the marginal of P⇥NxNzNd . The ranges
of the sums can be explained as follows. The iterative sifting protocol always
runs until there have been at least n X-agreements and at least k Z-agreements.
Therefore,
P⇥NxNzNd(#, nx, nz, nd) = 0 if nx < n or nz < k . (5.20)
In our case, n = 1 and k = 2, hence the limits of the sums.
Equation (5.17) follows from
P⇥NxNzNd(110, nx, nz, nd) = 0 for nx   2 . (5.21)
One can see (5.21) as follows: if Nx   2, then necessarily Nz = 2, because
Nx > n ^ Nz > k is impossible in iterative sifting (the loop phase of the
protocol is terminated as soon as both quota are met). This means that
during the random discarding, no Z-agreement gets discarded. Moreover, if
Nx   2, then the last round of the loop phase must be a Z-agreement. Since
this Z-agreement is not discarded, we have that ⇥ must necessarily end in a 1
if Nx   2, so ⇥ = 110 is impossible in that case.
To see why Equation (5.18) holds, note that the event
⇥ = 110 ^Nx = 1 ^Nz = nz ^Nd = nd (5.22)
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consists of all runs of the protocol in which one X-agreement, nz Z-agreements
and nd disagreements occurred, and where the X-agreement was the last round
of the loop phase. This is because in every such run, one necessarily ends up
with ⇥ = 110, and if ⇥ = 110, then the last round of the loop phase must





such runs, and each of them has the
probability p2x(p2z)nz(2pxpz)nd , and therefore










This explains Equation (5.18). Finally, equation (5.19) is just an evaluation of
the expression in the line above. This shows P⇥(110) = g2z .
It remains to be shown that P⇥(101) = P⇥(011) = (1  g2z)/2. In analogy














P⇥NxNzNd(101, nx, 2, nd) . (5.25)
Equation (5.24) is, in analogy to Equation (5.16), stating that P⇥ is the
marginal of P⇥NxNzNd , and the same argumentation for the limits of the sums
applies. Equation (5.25) is explained by a similar reasoning as for Equa-
tion (5.17): it follows from
P⇥NxNzNd(101, nx, nz, nd) = 0 for nz   3 . (5.26)
For Equation (5.26), note that if Nz   3, then Nx = 1 because Nx > n ^
Nz > k is impossible in iterative sifting. Thus, no X-agreement gets discarded.
Moreover, if Nz   3, then the last round of the loop phase must be an X-
agreement. Since this X-agreement is not discarded, ⇥ necessarily ends in a 0
if Nz   3, so ⇥ = 101 is impossible in this case.














P⇥NxNzNd(011, nx, 2, nd) . (5.28)
The next step is to realize that for every nx   2 and for every nd 2 {0, 1, 2, . . .},
it holds that
P⇥NxNzNd(101, nx, 2, nd) = P⇥NxNzNd(011, nx, 2, nd) . (5.29)
This is because the event
(⇥ = 101, Nx = nx, Nz = 2, Nd = nd) (5.30)
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and the event
(⇥ = 011, Nx = nx, Nz = 2, Nd = nd) (5.31)
consist of equally many histories of the protocol, and each of these histories
has the same probability. Equations (5.25), (5.28) and (5.29) imply P⇥(101) =
P⇥(011). Since P⇥(011) + P⇥(101) + P⇥(110) = 1 and P (110) = g2z , it holds
that P⇥(011) = P⇥(101) = (1  g2z)/2 as claimed.
Proposition 5.2 shows that diﬀerent samples have diﬀerent probabilities, in
general. In order for the sampling probability P⇥ to be uniform, in the case
where n = 1 and k = 2, we need to have P⇥(#) = 1/3 for # = 011, 101, 110.
This holds if and only if gz = g⇤z , where g⇤z = 1/
p
3, which in turn is equivalent













⇡ 0.539 . (5.32)
This is bad news for iterative sifting: it means that iterative sifting leads to
non-uniform sampling for all values of pz except pz = p⇤z. Interestingly, the
value of p⇤z does not seem to be a probability that has been considered in the
QKD literature. In particular, p⇤z corresponds to neither the symmetric case
pz = 1/2 nor to a certain asymmetric probability which has been suggested to
be chosen in order to maximize the key rate [Tom+12].
The value gz can be interpreted as the probability that in a certain round
of the loop phase, Alice and Bob have a Z-agreement, given that they have
an agreement in that round (this conditional is why the p2z is renormalized
with the factor 1/(p2z + p2x)). Hence, g2z is the probability that Alice and Bob’s
first two basis agreements are Z-agreements. Therefore, P⇥(110) = g2z is what
one would intuitively expect: to end up with ⇥ = 110, the first two basis
agreements need to be Z-agreements, and conversely, whenever the first two
basis agreements are Z-agreements, Alice and Bob end up with ⇥ = 110.
More generally, it turns out that for n = 1 and for k 2 N arbitrary, the
iterative sifting protocol leads to






for all other # 2 {0, 1}lk . (5.34)














Hence, we conclude that iterative sifting does not lead to uniformly random
sampling, unless px and pz are chosen in a very particular way. This particular
choice does not seem to correspond to anything that has been considered in
the literature so far.
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5.4.2 Basis information leak
In iterative sifting, information about Alice’s and Bob’s basis choices reaches
Eve in every round of the loop phase. In Step 3 of round r, Alice and Bob
communicate their basis choice Ar, Br of that round. They do so because they
want to condition their upcoming action on the strings A1 . . . Ar and B1 . . . Br:
if they have enough basis agreements, they quit the loop phase; otherwise they
keep looping.
What seems to have remained unnoticed in the literature is that Eve can
also condition her actions on the information previously communicated. More
precisely, if there is a round r+1, Eve can condition her actions in that round
on A1 . . . Ar and B1 . . . Br, thereby correlating the state of the qubit that Alice
sends to Bob in round r + 1 with A1 . . . Ar and B1 . . . Br. Hence, the state
of the qubit that Bob measures is correlated with the classical register that
keeps the information about the basis choice. Note that the basis information
leak tells Eve how close Alice and Bob are to meeting their quotas for each
basis. Eve can tailor her attack on future rounds based on this information.
For example, if Alice and Bob have already met their Z-quota, but not their
X-quota, then Eve can measure in the X-basis, knowing that, if Alice and Bob
happen to both measure Z, the round may be discarded anyway.
We want to emphasize that the basis information leak is not resolved by
using additional independent randomness for the choice of the sample. As we
will discuss in Section 5.6, such additional randomness can ensure that the
sampling is uniform, but it does not help against the basis information leak.
Randomness injection for the sample is eﬀectively equivalent to performing a
random permutation on the qubits [Ren07]. This does not remove the corre-
lation between the classical basis information register and the qubits.
We will see more concretely how the basis information leak is a problem
when we present an eavesdropping attack in the next section and when we
treat the problem more formally in Section 5.8.
5.5 Attack strategies exploiting the two security
issues
A detailed analysis of the eﬀect of non-uniform sampling and basis information
leak on the key rate is beyond the scope of this thesis. It would involve
developing a new security analysis for a whole protocol involving iterative
sifting. Instead of attempting to find a modified analysis for iterative sifting,
we will discuss alternative protocols in Section 5.6.
However, to give an intuitive idea of the eﬀect, we will calculate another
figure of merit: the error rate for an intercept-resend attack. We devise a
strategy for Eve to attack the iterative sifting protocol during its loop phase






Si   Ti (5.37)
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that results from this attack. One would typically expect an error rate no lower
than 25% for an intercept-resend attack [HE94], which is why our results below
are alarming.
5.5.1 Attack on non-uniform sampling
Let us first consider an attack on non-uniform sampling, i.e. on the fact that
not every possible value of ⇥ is equally likely. It will be a particular kind
of intercept-resend attack, i.e. Eve intercepts all the qubits that Alice sends
to Bob during the loop phase, measures them in some basis and afterwards,
prepares another qubit in the eigenstate associated with her outcome and sends
it to Bob. Then we will show that the attack strategy leads to an error rate
below 25%.
For the error rate calculation, we assume that the X- and Z-basis is the
same for Alice, Bob and Eve, and that they are mutually unbiased. This way,
if Alice and Bob measure in the same basis, but Eve measures in the other
basis, then Eve introduces an error probability of 1/2 on this qubit (recall the
discussion in section 3.1.3). Moreover, for simplicity, we make this calculation
for the easiest possible choice of parameters. Consider the iterative sifting
protocol with the parameters k = n = 1. From Equations (5.35) and (5.36),












These sampling probabilities are uniform for the symmetric case px = pz, but
are non-uniform for all other values. In the following, we assume px > 1/2,
which makes the sample ⇥ = 01 more likely than the sample ⇥ = 10. We
choose the following attack: in the first round of the loop phase, she attacks
in the X-basis, and in all the other rounds, she attacks in the Z-basis. We
choose the attack this way because we know that the first non-discarded basis
agreement is more likely to be an X-agreement, whereas the second one is more
likely to be a Z-agreement.6
We calculate the expected error rate for this attack in Appendix A.1. The
black curve in Figure 5.6 shows hEi as a function of px for this attack. Notice
that hEi falls below 25% for 1/2 < px < 1, and reaches a minimum of hEi ⇡
22.8% for px ⇡ 0.73.
The concerned reader might worry that the 25% error rate associated with
the intercept-resend attack was derived under the assumption of equal weight-
ing for the two bases X and Z, whereas it seems here that we choose unequal
weightings. However, for the protocol under consideration, the a priori prob-
ability distribution {px, pz} is not the relevant quantity. Rather, the fact that
n = k in our example ensures that the X and Z bases enter in with equal
weighting.
6 The attentive reader may point out that this attack could be improved by making Eve’s
basis choice dependent on the communication between Alice and Bob. This is correct, but
we intentionally design the attack such that Eve ignores Alice and Bob’s communication.
That allows one to see the eﬀect of non-uniform sampling alone and to compare it to attacks
on basis information leak alone, see Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3.
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px
hEi
Figure 5.6: The error rate for three diﬀerent eavesdropping attacks on iter-
ative sifting: (1) attack on non-uniform sampling (long-dashed, black curve),
(2) attack on basis-information leak (short-dashed, blue curve), (3) attack on
both problems (solid, red curve).
5.5.2 Attack on basis information leak
We now give an eavesdropping strategy that exploits the basis information
leak. It is an adaptive strategy, in which Eve’s actions in round r + 1 depend
on the past communication of the strings a1 . . . ar and b1 . . . br. Again, we
consider the simple case of n = k = 1. To make sure our attack is really
exploiting the basis information leak and not the non-uniform sampling, we
set px = pz = 1/2. In this case, from Eq. (5.38), the sampling is uniform:




Before we define Eve’s strategy, we want to give some intuition. Suppose
that during the protocol, Eve learns that Alice and Bob just had their first
basis agreement. If this first agreement is a Z-agreement, say, what does this
mean for Eve? She knows that the protocol will now remain in the loop phase
until they end up with an X-agreement. Suppose that she now decides that
she will measure all the remaining qubits in the X-basis. Then, if the next
basis agreement of Alice and Bob is an X-agreement, Eve knows the raw key
bit perfectly, and her measurement on that bit did not introduce an error. If
the next basis agreement is a Z-agreement, she may introduce an error on that
test bit. However, there will be a chance that Alice and Bob discard this test
bit, because they have a total of two (or more, in the end) Z-agreements, and
the protocol forces them to discard all Z-agreements except k = 1 of them.
Hence, learning that the first basis agreement was a Z-agreement brings Eve
into an favorable position: she knows that attacking in the X-basis for the rest
of the loop phase will necessarily tell her the raw key bit, while she has a high
chance to remain undetected.
This intuition inspires the following intercept-resend attack. Before the first
round of the loop phase, Eve flips a fair coin. Let F be the random variable
of the coin flip outcome and let 0 and 1 be its possible values. If F = 0,
then in the first round, Eve attacks in the X basis, and if F = 1, she attacks
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in the Z-basis. In the subsequent rounds, she keeps attacking in that basis
until Alice and Bob first reached a basis agreement. If it is an X-agreement
(equivalent to ⇥ = 01), Eve attacks in the Z-basis in all remaining rounds,
and if it is a Z-agreement (equivalent to ⇥ = 10), she attacks in the X-basis
in all remaining rounds.7
We calculate the expected error rate for this attack in the Appendix A.2.
We find that
hEi = 2  ln 2
8
⇡ 16.3% . (5.40)
Hence, the basis information leak allows Eve to go far below the typical ex-
pected error rate of 25% for intercept-resend attacks [Sca+09]. The blue curve
in Figure 5.6 shows, more generally, hEi as a function of px, for this attack.
5.5.3 Independence of the two problems
Are non-uniform sampling and basis information leak really two diﬀerent prob-
lems, or is one a consequence of the other? We will argue now that the two
problems are in fact independent. To this end, we describe a protocol that
suﬀers from non-uniform sampling but not from basis information leak, and
another protocol that suﬀers from basis information leak but not from non-
uniform sampling.
We have already seen an instance of a protocol that suﬀers from basis
information leak but not from non-uniform sampling: in section 5.5.2, we
looked at the iterative sifting protocol with n = k = 1 and px = pz = 1/2, in
which case the sampling is uniform. Hence, there was no exploitation of non-
uniform sampling, but the attack strategy exploited basis information leak.
What about the other way round? Can non-uniform sampling occur with-
out basis information leak? A closer look at the attack on non-uniform sam-
pling presented in Section 5.5.1 hints that this is possible: the attack strategy
works, even though it completely ignores the communication between Alice
and Bob, so it did not make any use of the basis information leak due to this
communication.
A more dramatic example shows clearly that non-uniform sampling can
occur without basis information leak. To this end, we forget about iterative
sifting for a moment and look at a diﬀerent protocol. Consider a sifting-
protocol in which Alice and Bob agree in advance that they will measure
the first n = 100 qubits in the X-basis, and that they will measure the second
k = 100 qubits in the Z-basis, without any communication during the protocol.
Of course, there is no hope for this protocol to be useful for QKD, but it serves
well to demonstrate our point. It leads to a very dramatic form of non-uniform
sampling, because P⇥(0 . . . 01 . . . 1) = 1 and P⇥(#) = 0 for all other # 2 {0, 1}lk.
If Eve attacks the first 100 rounds in X and the second 100 rounds in Z, then
she knows the raw key perfectly, without introducing any error. At the same
7 We let Eve flip a coin in order to make the attack symmetric between X and Z. This
allows for a more meaningful comparison with the attack on non-uniform sampling, as this
attack here does not exploit non-uniform sampling even if px 6= 1/2, see Sections 5.5.1
and 5.5.3.
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time, there is no communication between Alice and Bob during the protocol,
so no information about the basis choice is leaked during the protocol. Instead,
Eve (who is always assumed to know the protocol) already had this information
before the first round.
Hence, we conclude that the problems of non-uniform sampling and basis
information leak are independent. They just happen to occur simultaneously
when iterative sifting is used together with SBPE, but they can occur sepa-
rately in general. It is important to note that while non-uniform sampling can
be avoided by using fresh randomness for the sample, the basis information leak
cannot be avoided this way. Hence, iterative sifting is problematic, no matter
which parameter estimation protocol follows. We will see the independence of
the two problems more formally in Section 5.8.
5.5.4 Attack on both problems
Since the two problems are independent, it is interesting to devise an attack
that exploits both of them. Let us again consider k = n = 1 and suppose
px > 1/2 to ensure that we have non-uniform sampling. Suppose Eve begins
in the same way as in the attack on non-uniform sampling, measuring in the
X-basis. However, as in the attack on the basis-information leak, she makes her
attack adaptive by following the rule that she switches to the Z-basis when
Alice and Bob announce that they had an X-agreement. If Alice and Bob
announce a Z-agreement, Eve keeps attacking in the X-basis.
We give an expression for the error rate induced by this attack in Ap-
pendix A.3. The red curve in Figure 5.6 shows a plot of this error rate
as a function of px. As one can see, the error rate attains its minimum of
hEi ⇡ 15.8% for px ⇡ 0.57. Hence, this combined attack on both problems
performs much better than the one on non-uniform sampling alone (with a
minimal error rate of ⇠ 22.8%) and even better than the attack on the basis
information leak alone (with a minimal error rate of ⇠ 16.3%).
5.6 A secure yet eﬃcient alternative
How can these problems be avoided? As we have seen, it is the communication
in step 3 during the loop phase of iterative sifting which causes the basis
information leak. An obvious fix to this problem is to take this communication
out of the loop phase and to postpone it to the final phase, when all the
quantum communication is over. Then there is no classical communication
during the loop phase, and hence, there cannot be a termination condition
that depends on classical communication. Instead, the number of rounds in
the loop phase is set to a fixed number m 2 N. This number m then becomes a
parameter of the protocol. In this case, there is no guarantee that the quota for
the X-agreements and the Z-agreements will be met: the higher m is chosen,
the more likely it is, but there is always a chance that they have not enough
X- and Z-agreements. Thus, after Alice and Bob compared the basis choices,
they may have to abort the protocol. We have already seen the resulting
sifting protocol informally: it coincides with the sifting protocol of Lo, Chau
and Ardehali [LCA05] that we have seen in section 5.2.
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Since LCA sifting, together with SBPE, will form the raw key distribution
protocol whose security we prove in the next subsection, it is worth choosing
a notation that simplifies a formal proof. The resulting formal version of the
LCA protocol is written out in protocol 5.3. Here, we shall go through the
protocol and thereby explain the notation.
Steps 1 and 2 are the same as in iterative sifting: in every round r, they
choose bases Ar, Br and get measurement results Yr, Y 0r . The only diﬀerence is
that in LCA sifting, the two steps are repeatedm times without any additional
classical communication. In LCA sifting, the communication about the basis
choices takes place in the final phase in step 3’. They communicate the basis
choices of all the m rounds and determine the number of X- and Z-agreements.
Formally, we say that they do so by determining the comparison string C =
C1 . . . Cm, defined as
Cr :=
8><>:
x if Ar = Br = 0 ,
z if Ar = Br = 1 ,
d if Ar 6= Br .
(5.42)
Then they determine the number of X- and Z-agreements by applying the
functions X and Z to the comparison string C, defined as
X (C) := {r 2 [m] | Cr = x} , (5.43)
Z(C) := {r 2 [m] | Cr = z} . (5.44)
Alice and Bob abort if |X (C)| < n or |Z(C)| < k. In that case we say
formally that Alice and Bob output S = T = ⇥ =?, where ? is just a flag
indicating that they abort the protocol. Step 4 is the same as in protocol 5.1,
i.e. they discard disagreements and surplus at random. The sets of all X- and
Z-agreements are X (C) and Z(C), of which they choose subsets of size n and
k, respectively. To denote the set of all subsets of a certain size, we use a
notation which is common in combinatorics, namely✓X (C)
n
◆
:= {U ✓ X (C) | |U | = n} . (5.45)
Finally, steps 5 and 6 are exactly the same as in iterative sifting: they relabel
the sifted outcome strings to S and T and the sifted basis choice string to ⇥,
and then output it.
LCA sifting trivially has no basis information leak, because there is no
classical communication about the basis choices during the quantum commu-
nication. What about uniform sampling? Recall from section 5.2 that Lo,
Chau and Ardehali, instead of using SBPE, proposed a parameter estimation
where two error rates are determined, where one sample is formed by the
sifted Z-agreements and the other sample is chosen at random from the X-
agreements. We argued that it would be more eﬃcient to use SBPE instead.
In the case where SBPE is used, uniform sampling is equivalent to
P⇥(#) = P⇥(#
0) for all #,#0 2 {0, 1}lk . (5.46)
Checking condition equation (5.46) is non-trivial for LCA sifting. We will
prove it in section 5.7. In section 5.8, we will prove that this condition implies
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LCA Sifting
Parameters: n, k,m 2 N+ with m   n+ k, px, pz 2 [0, 1] with px + pz = 1.
Outputs: • Alice: l-bit string (Si)li=1 2 {0, 1}l (sifted outcomes),
• Bob: l-bit string (Ti)li=1 2 {0, 1}l (sifted outcomes),
• public: l-bit string (⇥i)li=1 2 {0, 1}lk (sifted basis choices)
The protocol
Loop phase: Steps 1 and 2 are repeated m times (round index r = 1, . . . ,m).
In round r, Alice and Bob do the following:
Step 1: Alice prepares a qubit pair in a maximally entangled state and sends
one half to Bob.
Step 2: Alice and Bob independently choose a basis Ar, Br 2 {0, 1} with
probability px and pz, respectively, where 0 stands for the X-basis
and 1 stands for the Z-basis. Then they measure their part of
the qubit pair in that basis and get an outcome Yr, Y 0r 2 {0, 1},
respectively.
Final phase: The following steps are performed in a single run:
Step 3’: Alice and Bob communicate their basis choice strings A and B
over a public authenticated channel and determine the comparison
string C as defined in equation equation (5.42). They check whether
quota condition (|X (C)|   n and |Z(C)|   k) holds, where X (C)
and Z(C) count the occurrences of x and z in C, respectively (see
equations (5.43) and (5.44)). If it holds, they proceed with Step 4.
Otherwise, they abort and output S = T = ⇥ =? (abort flag).










fully at random (where the notation in equation (5.45) is used).
Step 5: Let Ri be the i-th element of U [ V . Then Alice determines
(Si)li=1 2 {0, 1}l, Bob determines (Ti)li=1 2 {0, 1}l and together
they determine (⇥i)li=1 2 {0, 1}lk, where for every i 2 [l],
Si = YRi , Ti = Y
0
Ri , ⇥i = ARi (= BRi) .
Step 6: Alice locally outputs (Si)li=1, Bob locally outputs (Ti)li=1, and they
publicly output (⇥i)li=1.
Protocol 5.3: The Lo-Chau-Ardehali (LCA) sifting protocol.
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5.6. A SECURE YET EFFICIENT ALTERNATIVE
the security of the protocol on a formal level. As a preparation for the proof
of equation (5.46), we will now formulate a probability space model for LCA
sifting.
5.6.1 A probability space model for LCA sifting
We are looking for a probability space model for LCA sifting from which we
can deduce the probability distribution of the random variable ⇥. This means
that we look for a probability space (⌦, P ), where ⌦ is an appropriately chosen
set of histories of the protocol and P gives the probability for each history. By
“appropriately chosen”, we mean that we only need to track those parts of the
history of a protocol that are relevant for ⇥. For example, the measurement
outcomes Y , Y 0 of Alice and Bob are irrelevant for ⇥, so they will not appear
in the elements ! 2 ⌦ (c.f. the analogous discussion for iterative sifting on
page 77). This will become more clear in the following.
In every run of the LCA sifting protocol, Alice and Bob produce a com-
parison string C. The sifted basis choice string ⇥ depends on that string C,
but not on the basis choice strings A and B of Alice and Bob individually. We
can distinguish between two main cases:
(?) Alice and Bob do not have enough basis agreements and need to abort,
i.e. |X (C)| < n or |Z(C)| < k.
(X) Alice and Bob have enough basis agreements, i.e. |X (C)|   n and
|Z(C)|   k,
In the case (?), we necessarily have that ⇥ =?, so in that case, ⇥ does not
depend on anything more than the comparison string. We set
⌦? = {c 2 {x, z, d}m | |X (c)| < n or |Z(c)| < k} , (5.47)
so ⌦? consists of all comparison strings that do not meet the quota condition.
In the case (X), the protocol continues, and ⇥ does not only depend on C
but also on the choices of the subsets U and V . Thereby, only those U and V
are possible that are subsets of X (C) and Z(C). We set
⌦X =
⇢









◆      u ✓ X (c) and v ✓ Z(c)  .
(5.48)
Note that if an n-element set u is a subset of X (c), then |X (c)|   n, and
similarly for v, so we do not need to explicitly require these inequalities to
hold.
In every run of the protocol, either (?) or (X) occurs. That is,
⌦ = ⌦? ] ⌦X , (5.49)
where the + in the [ symbol means that the sets ⌦? and ⌦X are disjoint, but
otherwise the meanings of [ and ] are identical. Equations (5.47) ,(5.48) and
(5.49) define the sample space of the probability space that we are looking for.
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In order to determine the probability mass function P on ⌦, it is useful to

















(nx, nz) 2 {0, . . . ,m}⇥ {0, . . . ,m}











(nx, nz) 2 {0, . . . ,m}⇥ {0, . . . ,m}




The set ⌦?(nx,nz) is the set of all comparison strings c 2 ⌦? which have nx
X-agreements and nz Z-agreements, and analogously for triples (c, u, v) 2
⌦X(nx,nz).
Now we are going to determine the probability mass function P : ⌦! [0, 1].
Let us first determine the probability of an element ! = c that only consists
of a comparison string c 2 ⌦?. Note that in each round, the probability for
an X-agreement, Z-agreement or disagreement is given by p2x, p2z and 2pxpz,
respectively. Hence, what matters for the probability P (!) is the number of
X-, Z-agreements and disagreements of the comparison string ! = c. For a
string ! = c 2 ⌦?(nx,nz) for some (nx, nz) 2 N?, the probability is given by




Since ⌦? is the disjoint union of such sets ⌦?(nx,nz), this uniquely determines
P (!) for all ! 2 ⌦?.
We are left to determine the probability of a triple ! = (c, u, v) 2 ⌦X.
Again, the probability depends only on the number of X-, Z-agreements and
disagreements. In the probability for an ! 2 ⌦X(nx,nz) for some (nx, nz) 2 NX,
there is a factor p2nxx p2nzz (2pxpz)m nx nz as before. In addition, however, there
are two factors for the probability of the choice of u and v. For ! = (c, u, v) 2















  1. Put together, this means that for
! 2 ⌦?(nx,nz), the probability P (!) is given by












5.7. PROOF OF UNIFORM SAMPLING FOR LCA SIFTING
Hence, the probability mass function P : ⌦! [0, 1] that we are looking for is
given by






m nx nz if ! 2 ⌦?(nx,nz) for










◆ 1 if ! 2 ⌦X(nx,nz) for
some (nx, nz) 2 NX.
(5.58)
This determines the probability space (⌦, P ).
Now we determine the random variable ⇥. Recall from protocol 5.3 that
either ⇥ =? or ⇥ 2 {0, 1}lk. Therefore, the codomain ⌦⇥ is given by
⌦⇥ = {?} [ {0, 1}lk . (5.59)
We are looking for the map ⇥ : ⌦ ! ⌦⇥. We have two cases to distinguish:
the case where ! = c 2 ⌦? and the case where ! = (c, u, v) 2 ⌦X. In the
case where ! 2 ⌦?, Alice and Bob abort the protocol and output # =?, so
⇥(!) =?. In the case where ! = (c, u, v) 2 ⌦X(nx,nz), Alice and Bob output a
string # ⌘ #(u, v) which depends on the sets u and v. The value of the i-th
element #i(u, v) of #(u, v) depends on the i-th element of the set u [ v: if it
belongs to u, then #i(u, v) = 0, and if it belongs to v, then #i(u, v) = 1. Let
us denote the i-th element of u [ v by (u [ v)i. Then, the random variable ⇥
that we are looking for is given by
⇥ : ⌦ ! ⌦⇥
! 7!
(
? if ! 2 ⌦? ,





0 if (u [ v)i 2 u ,
1 if (u [ v)i 2 v .
(5.61)
This completes our probability space model for LCA sifting: we determined
a probability space (⌦, P ) and a random variable ⇥ on that space. This will
allow us to determine the distribution P⇥ in the next section.
5.7 Proof of uniform sampling for LCA sifting
Proposition 5.3 : The LCA sifting protocol (see protocol 5.3), together with
single-basis parameter estimation (protocol 5.2) samples uniformly. That is,
for the random variable ⇥ on (⌦, P ) as defined in the previous section, it holds
that
P⇥(#) = P⇥(#
0) for all #,#0 2 {0, 1}lk . (5.62)
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Proof. We first determine the probability of a sifted basis choice string # 2
{0, 1}lk. We will show that it does not depend on the choice of # 2 {0, 1}lk,








(c, u, v) 2 ⌦X
      (u [ v)i 2
(
u if #i = 0
v if #i = 1
)
. (5.65)




⇥ 1(#) \ ⌦X(nx,nz)| {z }
=:⇥ 1(nx,nz)(#)
. (5.66)
In words, the set⇥ 1(nx,nz)(#) is the set of all triples (c, u, v) with nx X-agreements
and nz Z-agreements that lead to the string #. Since the union in (5.66) is a






P (!) . (5.67)
Recall from (5.58) that the probability mass function P is constant on the
set ⌦X(nx,nz). Therefore, P is also constant on ⇥
 1
(nx,nz)
(#) with the same value,
namely










for all ! 2 ⇥ 1(nx,nz)(#) .
(5.68)










Thus, in order to show uniform sampling, it is suﬃcient to show that the size
of ⇥ 1(nx,nz)(#) is independent of the choice of # 2 {0, 1}lk. Not only are we
going to show this independence, we also determine the size as a function of
m, n, k, nx, nz (and l := n + k). More precisely, we are now going to show
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We will arrive at this equation through combinatorial arguments.
In preparation for these combinatorial arguments, we want to gain some
intuition for the set ⇥ 1(nx,nz)(#). To this end, let us consider an example with
the following parameters:
m = 10 , n = k = 2 , nx = 3 , nz = 4 . (5.71)
The string # 2 {0, 1}lk that we consider for this example shall be
# = 1001 . (5.72)
Consider an element of ⇥ 1(nx,nz)(#) for this example:
(c, u, v) = (zxzdxdxzz, {2, 7}, {1, 9}) 2 ⇥ 1(nx,nz)(#) . (5.73)
Let us convince ourselves of the fact that this is indeed an element of⇥ 1(nx,nz)(#).
The string c has 3 x-entries and 4 z-entries, and u ✓ X (c) and v ✓ Z(c) are
both true. Hence, (c, u, v) 2 ⌦X(nx,nz). Moreover, (u [ v)1 2 u, (u [ v)2 2 v,
(u [ v)3 2 v, (u [ v)4 2 u, and thus ⇥(c, u, v) = 1001. Therefore, (c, u, v) 2




r : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
cr : z x z d x d x z z
u : 2 7
v : 1 9
(5.74)
Here, we colored the rounds that are chosen according to the set u in green
and those that are chosen according to v in yellow. Let us consider another
element of ⇥ 1(nx,nz)(#), namely:
second example element
of ⇥ 1(nx,nz)(#):
r : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
cr : x z d x x d z z z
u : 4 5
v : 2 8
(5.75)
Note that the relative order of the u-elements relative to the v-elements in the
set u[v is identical in the two examples: we see the colors in the order yellow,
green, green, yellow. It has to be this way: # = 1001 requires the first and
fourth element of u [ v to be elements of v and the second and third element
to be elements of u. What diﬀers between the two examples is the relative
position of u[v in [m]. In fact, any relative order of u[v in [m] is possible for










such relative orders. This is where
the first factor in (5.70) comes from.
For each such order, there are m  l remaining rounds in which the remain-
ing X-, Z-agreements and disagreements need to happen. Let us first focus on
the remaining X-agreements. There is a total of nx X-agreements, n of which
are already chosen through the choice of u. Hence, there are nx n remaining
X-agreements that need to happen in any of the remaining m  l rounds. Let
us see in the two example elements of ⇥ 1(nx,nz)(#) above where these remaining
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X-agreements are placed. In these examples, m  l = 5 and nx n = 1. Hence,
one of the remaining five white rounds in (5.74) and (5.75) needs to have an
X-agreement, which we now color in blue:
first example element
of ⇥ 1(nx,nz)(#):
r : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
cr : z x z d x d x z z
u : 2 7




r : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
cr : x z d x x d z z z
u : 4 5
v : 2 8
(5.77)





= 5 remaining white slots that could be






remaining ways for positioning the remaining X-agreements. This
contributes the second factor in equation (5.70).
Given a relative order of u[ v in [m] and a relative order of the remaining
X-agreements in the other m  l rounds, there are m  l  (nx  n) remaining







After these three choices (relative order of u [ v in [m], remaining Z-
agreements in the remaining m   l rounds, remaining Z-agreements in the
remaining m   l   (nx   n) rounds), the pre-image of # is fixed, because the
remaining rounds need to be disagreements. Hence, choosing a pre-image of #
means making these three choices, and therefore the size of ⇥ 1(nx,nz)(#) is given
by equation (5.70). It is independent of the choice of # 2 {0, 1}lk, so by virtue
of equation (5.69), we have proved uniform sampling.












P⇥(#) with # 2 {0, 1}lk . (5.80)
Hence, in order to obtain the abort probability, we just need to finish our
calculation of P⇥(#) for # 2 {0, 1}lk. Inserting (5.70) into (5.69) yields a
product of five binomial coeﬃcients in the summand. An easy calculation
using the definition of the binomial coeﬃcient in terms of factorials and using
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This completes the proof.
5.8 Formal security proof of raw key distribu-
tion protocols
In section 5.4, we have seen that iterative sifting leads to problems, which we
call non-uniform sampling and basis information leak. In section 5.5, we have
seen that these two problems allow attack strategies for Eve which induce a
surprisingly low error rate. However, we have not formally understood yet why
these two problems lead to a false estimation of the min-entropy H"min(X|E).
In this section, we are going to show how the min-entropy estimate of a raw
key distribution protocol can be proved formally. The strategy is as follows.
First, we take LCA sifting and SBPE as an example to discuss our formal
setup in which we will prove the min-entropy bound. Then we generalize
the situation by considering any sifting protocol that satisfies two conditions.
These conditions take the form of equalities (see equalities (5.99) and (5.100)
below). They correspond precisely to the requirement that a sifting protocol
must not exhibit non-uniform sampling or a basis information leak. (Hence,
they are violated by iterative sifting but not by LCA sifting.) We show that
any sifting protocol with these two properties, together with SBPE, leads to a
correct bound on the min-entropy. This way, we can see at what point iterative
sifting breaks the security proof by observing where the two conditions are used
in the proof. At the same time, this proves the security of LCA sifting and
SBPE as a raw key distribution protocol.
Let us consider the raw key distribution protocol composed of LCA sifting
and SBPE. The diagram in figure 5.7 helps at understanding the following
discussion. After the sifting protocol, Alice and Bob share a system in the state
⇢ST⇥, where S and T denote Alice’s and Bob’s outcome string, respectively,




PST⇥(s, t,#) |sihs|⌦ |tiht|⌦ |#ih#|
1A+ ⇣P⇥(?)| ?ih? |⌦3⌘
(5.85)
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Figure 5.7: Diagram of a raw key distribution protocol. The protocol
is composed of a sifting protocol (such as LCA sifting) and the single-basis
parameter estimation protocol (SBPE). After sifting, they share a state b⇢ST⇥
with the sifted measurement outcomes S and T and the sifted basis choice
string ⇥. For SBPE, Alice and Bob use the information in ⇥ to separate the
outcomes X and X 0 in the X-basis and the outcomes Z and Z 0 in the Z-basis,
and use Z and Z 0 for parameter estimation.
If Alice and Bob do not pass the quota test, i.e. if they do not have enough
basis agreements, they abort the protocol and output the state | ?ih? |⌦3 (see
step 3’ of protocol 5.3 on page 87). If Alice and Bob pass the quota test, they
share the state
b⇢ST⇥ = ⇧sift⇢ST⇥⇧sifttr(⇧sift⇢ST⇥) , (5.86)
where
⇧sift = 1A ⌦ 1B ⌦ (1⇥   | ?ih? |) . (5.87)
We can rewrite this state as
b⇢ST⇥ = X
s,t,#2{0,1}lk
bPST⇥(s, t,#)|sihs|⌦ |tiht|⌦ |#ih#| , (5.88)
where
bPST⇥(s, t,#) = PST⇥(s, t,#)
1  P⇥(?) 8 s, t,# 2 {0, 1}
l
k . (5.89)
Note that in particular,
bP⇥(#) = ✓ l
k
◆ 1
8# 2 {0, 1}lk . (5.90)
In the next step, Alice and Bob use the information of the string ⇥ in order
to split their outcome strings into strings of measurement outcomes in the X-
basis (which we denote by X and X 0) and strings of measurement outcomes
in the Z-basis (which we denote by Z and Z 0). We can express this asX
#2{0,1}lk
⇧†# b⇢ST⇥ ⇧# = b⇢ZZ0XX0 , (5.91)
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where ⇧# permutes the l bits of both Alice and Bob such that the first k
bits are measured in Z and the last n bits are measured in X, but otherwise
unchanged in order. Then they use Z and Z 0 for SBPE. If they do not pass the
correlation test (see step 2 of protocol 5.2), Alice and Bob abort the protocol
and output X = X 0 =?. If they pass the correlation test, they end up with
the raw keys X and X 0 in the state
e⇢XX0 = ⇧†PE b⇢ZZ0XX0 ⇧PE









1A⌦ 1XX0 . (5.93)
This is the state for which we want to prove the min-entropy bound.
5.8.1 Construction of an equivalent protocol
Now we are going to modify the protocol to obtain an equivalent but easier-to-
analyze protocol. Note that for each round r of the loop phase, the measure-
ment performed in that round r commutes with all other actions performed in
the protocol, except that the preparation and the channel use needs to precede
the measurement. This means that the sifting protocol could be changed as
follows: instead of measuring one qubit in each round of the loop phase, Alice
and Bob store the qubits during the loop phase, implementing the identity
channel on them. In this modified sifting protocol, Alice and Bob still make
basis choices, compare them and discard rounds—they just do not actually
perform the measurements. The output of this modified sifting protocol is a
state ⇢AB⇥, where A and B are l-qubit registers holding the stored qubits of







AB ⌦ |#ih#| . (5.94)
Again, we distinguish the case where Alice and Bob abort the sifting pro-
tocol, in which case they output the state | ?ih? |⌦3, and the case where they
pass the quota test, in which case they get the state conditioned on ⇥ 6=?,
given by
b⇢AB⇥ = ⇧sift⇢AB⇥⇧sifttr(⇧sift⇢AB⇥) . (5.95)
In the modified protocol, if the quota test is passed, then, after the sifting
protocol, they measure all of the qubits at once with respect to ⇥, just before




bPST⇥(s, t,#) |sihs|⌦ |tiht|⌦ |#ih#| (5.96)
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Figure 5.8: Construction of an equivalent protocol. For the security
proof, we consider a modified but equivalent protocol. There, Alice and Bob
choose and communicate bases and perform sifting, but they do not measure
the qubits. Instead, they store them in quantum registers A and B. In a
subsequent step, the qubits in A and B are measured all at once according
to the bases given by ⇥. Since these measurements commute with the other
operations of the sifting protocol, the output state b⇢ST⇥ is identical to the one
in the original protocol. The rest of the protocol is identical to the original
protocol.

























The rest of the modified protocol is identical to the original protocol (see
figure 5.8).
Because of the commutation property explained above, the state b⇢ST⇥ pro-
duced in this protocol, equation (5.96), is the same as the one produced in
the original protocol, equations (5.86) and (5.88). Thus, the raw key output
⇢XX0 would be the same as in the original protocol, equation (5.92). This
means that instead of analyzing H"min(X|E) for LCA sifting with SBPE, we
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| iih i| . (5.98)
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can analyze it for this equivalent protocol. An experimental implementation
of this equivalent protocol would be diﬃcult, as reliable quantum storage is
not available yet, but since this is only a theoretical construct, we shall not
worry about that.
The modification that we have just considered can be made for any sifting
protocol: one just skips all measurements and performs them all at once after
the sifting protocol. This way, we can say that for every sifting protocol, there
is a state ⇢AB⇥ associated with the sifting protocol as in equation (5.94). In
this picture, we can formally say what it means for a sifting protocol to sample
uniformly and to have no basis information leak. In terms of the state ⇢AB⇥,
the conditions read:
P⇥(#) = P⇥(#
0) for all #,#0 2 {0, 1}lk and (5.99)
⇢AB⇥ = ⇢AB ⌦ ⇢⇥ . (5.100)
Condition (5.99) expresses uniform sampling, and it is exactly the same as
condition (5.46) that we worked with before. The only diﬀerence is that now,
we formulated it in terms of the state ⇢AB⇥ associated with the sifting protocol.
Condition (5.100) expresses the absence of a basis information leak. Formally,
it says that the public basis information register ⇥ is uncorrelated with the




AB 8#,#0 2 ⌦⇥ . (5.101)
The independence of non-uniform sampling and basis information leak becomes
obvious through the two conditions, as it is easy to see that one can find states
for protocols such that one but not the other condition is satisfied.
We have seen in section 5.4.1 that iterative sifting violates condition (5.99).
Moreover, from our discussion in section 5.4.2, we can see why iterative sifting
violates condition (5.100). In round r of the loop phase, Eve knows the basis
choices of the rounds 1, . . . , r 1. Therefore, she can modify the state that Bob
receives in round r depending on the basis choices of those previous rounds (this
is what happens in the attack described in section 5.5.1). Thus, in iterative
sifting, the registers ⇥ and B are correlated, in general. For LCA sifting, we
have proved condition (5.99) in section 5.7, and (5.100) follows trivially from
the fact that Alice and Bob never communicate information about ⇥ as long
as Eve can influence the quantum information sent through the channel.
For a protocol whose associated state ⇢AB⇥ satisfies the two conditions
(5.99) and (5.100) above, the state b⇢AB⇥ conditioned on ⇥ 6=? is given by





where bP⇥ is the uniform distribution as in the original protocol,
bP⇥(#) = ✓ l
k
◆ 1
8# 2 {0, 1}lk . (5.103)
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5.8.2 The min-entropy bound and a Gedankenexperiment
Below, we are going to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 5.4 : Consider a sifting protocol such that its associated state
⇢AB⇥ satisfies the two conditions (5.99) and (5.100). If the protocol is followed
by SBPE, then the state e⇢XX0 conditioned on passing the quota test and the
correlation test (see figure 5.8) satisfies
H"
0
min(X|E)   n(q   h(qtol + µ("))) . (5.104)
Here, E denotes Eve’s information (the channel purification system), pPEpass is
the probability that the correlation test passes, q is the preparation quality














The idea that leads to the proof of proposition 5.4 is to consider aGedanken-
experiment. It is shown as a diagram in figure 5.9. In this Gedankenexper-
iment, the measurement bases are not chosen according to ⇥. Instead, all
qubits are measured in the Z-basis. We denote the resulting l-bit strings of
Z-measurement outcomes by Alice and Bob by bold letters Z and Z0, respec-
tively. The rest of the protocol is the same: the strings Z and Z0 are split
up according to ⇥. This time, this yields strings Z and Z 0 on the one side as
before, but on the other side, instead of getting strings X and X 0, they get
strings Z and Z 0 of measurement outcomes in Z. Conditioned on passing the
correlation test of the SBPE, they get a “raw key” state e⇢ZZ0 .
The idea behind the proof of (5.4) is the following. When Alice and Bob
pass the correlation test of the SBPE, then they know that they have a high
correlation between the test bits. In the Gedankenexperiment, this means that
they also know that the Z-measurement outcomes of the key bits are likely to
be correlated. This is because all bits are measurement outcomes in the same
basis, and the test bits have been chosen at random according to ⇥. (Below,
we will make this mathematically precise.) A high correlation between Z and
Z0 means that the max-entropy H"max(Z|Z 0) is low. This allows us to use the
uncertainty relation for the smooth min- and max-entropy that we encountered
in chapter 3 to connect the Gedankenexperiment to the protocol that we are
actually analyzing. The uncertainty relation (corollary 3.32) reads
H"min(X|E)   nq  H"max(Z|Z 0) , (5.106)
where q is the preparation quality between the bases X and Z. Hence, if the
max-entropy is low, then the min-entropy is high, which is what we want to
prove.
Now we formalize the Gedankenexperiment. To this end, we consider the
probability space (⌦ZZ0⇥, PZZ0⇥) of the outcomes of the Z-measurements, to-
gether with the basis choices. The sample space is given by
⌦ZZ0⇥ = {0, 1}l ⇥ {0, 1}l ⇥ {0, 1}lk , (5.107)
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Figure 5.9: Diagram of the “Gedankenexperiment”.
and the probability distribution PZZ0⇥ is given by
PZZ0⇥ : ⌦ZZ0⇥ ! [0, 1]






















Note that we consider the case where the quota test is passed, so we consider
the state b⇢ZZ0⇥ in equation (5.108). Nonetheless, we omit the hat in the clas-
sical probability space notation here, although we are in the case conditioned
on passing the quota test.
We first introduce the random variable Ekey, the number of errors on the
key bits. Since the key bits are those bits where ⇥i = 0, it is given by




(1  #i)(z  z0) . (5.110)
The total number of errors is given by the random variable
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Finally, the number of errors on the test bits is the random variable
Etest : ⌦ZZ0⇥ ! {0, n} , (5.112)
given by
Etest = Etot   Ekey . (5.113)
To get the error rates (rather than the number of errors), we divide by the




Ekey , ⇤test =
1
k





The proof of proposition 5.4 goes in two steps:
(1) First, we make the tail probability estimate. This means to prove the
following: in the picture of the Gedankenexperiment, if Alice and Bob
pass the quota test (which means ⇤test  qtol), then the likelihood that
the key bit error rate exceeds the test bit error rate by more than some
number µ > 0,
ptail(µ) := P [⇤key   ⇤test + µ | ⇤test  qtol] . (5.115)
is exponentially bounded. We will prove this in lemmata 5.5 to 5.7 below.
(2) Given the tail probability estimate, we derive an upper bound on the
max-entropy H"max(Z|Z 0). Together with inequality (5.106), which con-
nects the Gedankenexperiment with the protocol that we actually ana-
lyze, the result follows.
To tackle the first step, let us start with some considerations. In the
Gedankenexperiment, we can say that after the sifting protocol, the total
number of errors, Etot, is already fixed. They just do not know the number.
Instead, when they perform the correlation test in the SBPE, they draw some
of the bits at random without replacement, and see how many errors they have
drawn. Eventually, we will be interested in bounding the quantity (5.115), but
for now, let us consider the probability distribution PEkey|Etot , i.e. the probabil-
ity that the key bits (which are also drawn at random from the total number
of bits) have a certain number of errors, given that the total number of errors
is fixed. If the sifting protocol really samples uniformly, then this is simply a
situation of random sampling without replacement, where the characteristic of
interest is binary (errors are already there, 1, or absent, 0). This gives rise to
the hypergeometric distribution, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 5.5 : Let b⇢AB⇥ be a state satisfying conditions (5.102) and (5.103).













where the random variables Ekey and Etot are as defined in equations (5.107)
to (5.113).
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The denominator is, by the definition of the distribution of a random variable

















⇥{0, 1}lk . (5.119)
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| j(z, z0)|PZZ0(z, z0) . (5.127)















































Inserting equation (5.131) into (5.130) yields the claim.
In the proof that we have just seen, it becomes apparent where iterative
sifting fails in the security analysis: for the derivation of equation (5.118), we
needed that the sifting protocol samples uniformly and has no basis information
leak.
Lemma 5.5 shows that we are in the hypergeometric special case. This is
an important special case which is, until today, a topic of intense research. An
important result is Serfling’s bound. For the hypergeometric case, it reads as
follows.
Lemma 5.6 (Serfling’s bound for the hypergeometric special case):
Let Ekey and Etot be random variables such that PEkey|Etot is a hypergeometric
distribution as in equation (5.116). Then, for the random variables ⇤key and
⇤tot as defined in equation (5.114) and for any ⌫ > 0, it holds that
P
⇥p
n(⇤key   ⇤tot)   ⌫




A more general form of the bound was proved by Serfling [Ser74], and we
will not repeat the proof here. The particular special case that we consider,
inequality (5.132) corresponds exactly to inequality (1.3) in [GW15]. The last
reference also discusses conjectured improvements of the bound.
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Lemma 5.7 (Tail probability estimate): For a state b⇢AB⇥ satisfying con-













, pPEpass = P [⇤test  qtol] . (5.134)
Proof. According to lemmata 5.5 and 5.6, inequality (5.132) holds for all ⌫ > 0.
The event on the left hand side of the inequality can be rewritten as follows:
p











(Etest + Ekey)   ⌫p
n
(5.136)



































we find that for every µ > 0,























Let us now get back to our original quantity of interest, ptail(µ), as in equa-
tion (5.115). According to Bayes’ theorem (see theorem 2.13), it holds that
ptail(µ) = P [⇤key   ⇤test + µ|⇤test  qtol] (5.143)
=
P [⇤test  qtol|⇤key   ⇤test + µ]P [⇤key   ⇤test + µ]
P [⇤test  qtol] (5.144)
 P [⇤key   ⇤test + µ]
P [⇤test  qtol] . (5.145)
Combining inequalities (5.142) and (5.145) and using the abbreviation of equa-
tion (5.134), the claim follows.
Now that we made the tail probability estimate, we are ready for the second
step of the proof, namely bounding H"max(Z|Z 0).
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Lemma 5.8 : Consider a sifting protocol such that in the Gedankenexperi-
ment, the state b⇢AB⇥ satisfies properties (5.102) and (5.103). If the protocol
is followed by SBPE, then for any " > 0, the resulting state e⇢ZZ0 , which is
conditioned on passing the correlation test, satisfies
H"
0















Proof. The proof that we present here is inspired by the proof in [Tom+12],
but more direct and elementary.
The state e⇢ZZ0 is a classical state, i.e. it is of the forme⇢ZZ0 =X
z,z0
PZZ0|⇤testqtol(z, z
0) |zihz|⌦ |z0ihz0| . (5.148)
Here, the probability distribution is conditioned on ⇤test  qtol because the
state e⇢ZZ0 is conditioned on passing the correlation test. For inequality (5.146),
it is suﬃcient to show that there is a state  ZZ0 in the "
0-ball of e⇢ZZ0 such that
Hmax(Z|Z 0)   nh(qtol + µ) . (5.149)





0) |zihz|⌦ |z0ihz0| (5.150)
for some probability distribution QZZ0 which is "
0-close to PZZ0|⇤testqtol . We
want to choose a probability distribution for which
⇤key  qtol + µ (5.151)
holds with certainty. Note that in terms of the random variables Z and Z 0,






Zi   Z 0i . (5.152)
According to lemma 5.7, we have that




0) < ("0)2 .
(5.153)
We construct QZZ0 by setting QZZ0(z, z
0) = 0 for all (z, z0) 2 ⇤key  qtol + µ
and by using the original distribution PZZ0|⇤testqtol , rescaled to a normalized




0 if (z, z0) 2 ⇤key  qtol + µ ,
PZZ0|⇤testqtol(z, z
0)
1  ("0)2 if (z, z
0) /2 ⇤key  qtol + µ .
(5.154)
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⇤key  qtol + µ
1  ("0)2
















⇤key  qtol + µ
0
⇤key > qtol + µ
Figure 5.10: Construction of QZZ0.
This leads to a purified distance of (c.f. equation (3.64) in chapter 3)





















1  (1  ("0)2) (5.157)
= "0 . (5.158)
Hence,  ZZ0 lies in the "
0-ball around e⇢ZZ0 and thus,
H"
0
max(Z|Z 0)e⇢  Hmax(Z|Z 0)  . (5.159)
For the distributionQZZ0 , it holds that ⇤key  qtol+µ with certainty. According
to equation (5.152), this means that the number of errors between z and z0 is
bounded, i.e.
QZZ0(z, z
0) = 0 for all (z, z0) with
nX
i=1
zi   z0i > bn(qtol + µ)c . (5.160)
This is very useful for the calculation of Hmax(Z|Z 0). To see why, let us express
Hmax(Z|Z 0)  in terms of the diagonal distribution QZZ0 . We have seen in
equation (3.88) in chapter 3 that this reads






i . : i f 0.
0| test t l , , 0
, 0
0| test t l ,
0 0 , 0
.
( , 0) e t l






ence,  ZZ0 lies in the "
0-ball around e⇢ZZ0 and thus,
H"
0
max(Z|Z 0)e⇢  Hmax(Z|Z 0)  . (5.159)
For the distributionQZZ0 , it holds that ⇤key  qtol+µ with certainty. According
to equation (5.152), this means that the number of errors between z and z0 is
bounded, i.e.
QZZ0(z, z
0) = 0 for all (z, z0) with
nX
i=1
zi   z0i > bn(qtol + µ)c . (5.160)
This is very useful for the calculation of Hmax(Z|Z 0). To see why, let us express
Hmax(Z|Z 0)  in terms of the diagonal distribution QZZ0 . We have seen in
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where

















The square on the right hand side of this equality is the (1/2)-norm of the
probability vector of Z conditioned on Z 0 = z0. Since the two-norm is bounded
by the one-norm, we get








Since the number of errors is bounded (equation (5.160)), the probability
QZ|Z0=z0(z) in inequality (5.164) vanishes for every z that disagrees with z
0
in more than bn(qtol + µ)c positions. Therefore, the sum can be restricted to
those z which have at most bn(qtol + µ)c disagreements with z0, i.e.









Sz0 = {z |
P
i zi   z0i  bn(qtol + µ)c} . (5.166)
For z 2 Sz0 , we can use the trivial bound
QZ|Z0=z0(z)  1 . (5.167)
This gives us




0)|Sz0 | . (5.168)
Determining the size of Sz0 is easy. For any fixed z0, the number of strings z



































 nh(qtol + µ) , (5.172)
where h denotes the binary entropy. The last inequality has been shown in
[Lin99], section 1.4. Combining inequality (5.172) with inequality (5.159) com-
pletes the proof.
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Proposition 5.4 now follows as a corollary.
Proof of proposition 5.4. According to the uncertainty relation, it holds that
H"
0
min(X|E)   nq  H"0max(Z|Z 0) . (5.173)
We have bounded the max-entropy in lemma 5.8, which gives us
H"
0
min(X|E)   nq   nh(qtol + µ) (5.174)
= n(q   h(qtol + µ)) . (5.175)
This completes the proof.
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Chapter 6
Privacy estimation of quantum
information
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we will extend the ideas and concepts of the previous chapter
and combine them with new ones. As a result, we will see a protocol which
resembles quantum key distribution to some extent, but which allows to es-
timate an eavesdropper’s uncertainty about quantum information rather than
the uncertainty about a classical bit string (quantified by the min-entropy).
As we have discussed in chapter 4, the min-entropy has many interesting char-
acterizations, and thus, such a protocol is interesting for multiple reasons. For
example, a simplified version of this protocol can be used for capacity tomog-
raphy of quantum channels. We will discuss this in chapter 8. Further below
in this chapter, we will see another motivation for the min-entropy estimation
protocol in this chapter, namely its potential use in a protocol for entanglement
distribution.
Devising protocols for the distribution of entanglement is not a new idea.
In fact, some of the suggested schemes for QKD in the literature contain the
distribution and distillation of entanglement as a subroutine [Deu+96]. For
example, Lo and Chau presented a QKD protocol in which Alice and Bob first
distribute and distill maximally entangled qubit pairs, before they extract the
key by measuring the distilled pairs [LC99]. Lo and Chau’s QKD protocol
needs a fault-tolerant quantum computer on Alice’s and Bob’s side, but ar-
guments by Shor and Preskill showed that the need for quantum computers
can be eliminated to obtain a QKD protocol that works without distillation of
entanglement [SP00]. Further arguments relate this protocol to quantum error
correcting codes [Ben+96b; SP00] and to the BB84 protocol [BB84; NC00].
This proved the (asymptotic) security of the BB84 protocol against the most
general attacks allowed by quantum theory, instead of attacks on individual
qubits. Entanglement distillation protocols have also been considered outside
of the QKD context, such as in work by Bennett et al. [Ben+96a; Ben+96a];
for an overview, see [DB07].
To see the connection of the results presented in this chapter with en-
tanglement distribution, let us start with a high-level summary of what we
have learned about raw key distribution, classical post-processing and quan-
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tum state merging so far. In sections 4.2 and 4.3, we have seen that if two
classical bit strings X and X 0 with an eavesdropper’s quantum side informa-
tion E are in a state ⇢XX0E of high min-entropy H"
0
min(X|E), then classical
post-processing can transform them into smaller bit strings K and K 0 that
are (almost certainly) identical, uniformly random and decoupled from the
eavesdropper. In chapter 5, we studied raw key distribution protocols in de-
tail. They are precisely designed to serve as an input source for classical
post-processing protocols. For a class of raw key distribution protocols (which
includes LCA sifting and SBPE), we proved that conditioned on passing the
quota test and the correlation test, the bound
H"
0
min(X|E)   n(q   h(qtol + µ("))) , (6.1)
holds, where µ and "0 are written out in equation (5.105) and where qtol is a
protocol parameter.
Somewhat analogously to QKD post-processing, we have seen in section 4.5
that if two quantum systems A and B with a purifying system E are in a
state ⇢ABE of high min-entropyH"
0
min(A|E), then there exists a protocol for that
state which expands entanglement between Alice and Bob using the system AB
as a resource.1 We say that it expands entanglement because state merging,
in general, needs some initial (pure) entanglement shared between Alice and
Bob, which is then transformed to more entanglement in the case of states
with a negative entanglement cost (see section 4.5). This is analogous to
QKD, which requires Alice and Bob to have some initial shared key which
they expand, in order to end up with a larger final key. Thus, in analogy
to raw key distribution protocols as an input source for QKD post-processing
protocols, it is an interesting question whether one can find a protocol that
distributes quantum systems A and B of high min-entropy H"0min(A|E) that
could serve as a source for entanglement expansion protocols. We call such a
protocol a raw ebit distribution (RED) protocol.
As the main result of this chapter, we will present such a protocol and prove
a min-entropy bound for it. It distributes n-qubit systems A and B to Alice
and Bob, respectively. As we will show in section 6.3, conditioned on passing
the tests in the protocol, the state ⇢ABE of the protocol output satisfies
H3"+5"
0




where the parameters in this inequality are analogous to the ones in the last
chapter (we will see this in more detail in section 6.3). This can be seen as a
fully quantum analogue of a raw key distribution protocol.
The proof of inequality (6.2) and the design of the protocol goes in two
steps. In section 6.2 we show that for any state ⇢ABE of n-qubit systems A
and B with quantum side information E, it holds that
H3"+5"
0
min (A|E)⇢   nq   (H"
0




1 However, remember from our discussion in section 4.5 that for practically applicable
protocols, universal state merging protocols (or other universal protocols that can distill
entanglement) are needed.
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where X and Z arise from measuring the qubits in A in the X- and Z-basis,
respectively (see proposition 6.6 below). This result reduces the estimation of
an eavesdropper’s uncertainty about quantum information A to the estimation
of the uncertainty about classical bit strings. The two main tools used for
proving inequality (6.3) are a chain rule theorem for the smooth min- and max-
entropies proved by Vitanov et al. [Vit+13], and the duality relation between
the smooth min- and the max-entropy, proved by Tomamichel et al. [TCR10].
In the second step, we construct a protocol that distributes n-qubit systems
A and B to Alice and Bob, respectively, and prove that conditioned on passing
the tests in the protocol, their state satisfies
H"
0
max(X|B)  nh(qtol + µ) , (6.4)
H"
0
max(Z|B)  nh(qtol + µ) . (6.5)
This looks very similar to what we have shown for raw key distribution proto-
cols in chapter 5. Indeed, as we will see in sections 6.3 to 6.6, we can largely
apply the same techniques that we used for raw key distribution protocols.
6.2 A privacy bound for qubits
Our goal in this section is to prove the validity of inequality (6.3). We will
first cite a series of lemmas that we will need in section 6.2.1, before we carry
out the proof in section 6.2.2.
6.2.1 A few lemmas
As mentioned above, the most important lemmas for the proof below are a
chain rule theorem and the duality relation. The chain rule that we will use is
actually just one out of a series of chain rule inequalities proved in [Vit+13].
The particular form that we use here can be found in [Tom12].
Lemma 6.1 (Chain rule for smooth max-entropy): Let ⇢ABC 2 S(HABC)
be a tripartite state, let " > 0, "0   0, "00   0. Then
H"+"
0+2"00




The duality relation between the smooth min- and max-entropy, or min-
max duality, for short, relates the smooth min-entropy of a state to the max-
entropy of a purification of the state. It was first proved for the unsmoothed
min- and max-entropy König, Renner and Schaﬀner in [KRS09]. The min-max
duality for the smooth entropies is due to Tomamichel, Colbeck and Renner
[TCR10].
Lemma 6.2 (Min-max duality): Let ⇢ABE 2 S(HABE) be a pure tripartite
state, let "   0. Then
Hmin(A|E)⇢ =  Hmax(A|B)⇢ and (6.7)
H"min(A|E)⇢ =  H"max(A|B)⇢ . (6.8)
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In section 3.4, we have seen that the min- and max-entropies are invariant
under local unitaries. The following lemma generalizes this to the case of
isometries [Tom12].
Lemma 6.3 (Invariance under isometries): Let ⇢AB 2 S(HAB) be
a bipartite state, let "   0. Then for all isometries V : HA ! HA0 and
W : HB ! HB0 , the embedded state  A0B0 = (V ⌦W )⇢AB(V † ⌦W †) satisfies
H"min(A|B)⇢ = H"min(A0|B0)  and H"max(A|B)⇢ = H"max(A0|B0)  . (6.9)
In simple terms, the following lemma states that “forgetting” side informa-
tion cannot decrease one’s uncertainty. It is a special case of a more general
theorem, called the data processing inequality [Tom12]. We only state the more
special case that we are interested in.
Lemma 6.4 : Let ⇢ABC 2 S(HABC) be a tripartite state. Then
Hmax(A|BC)  Hmax(A|B) . (6.10)
Finally, the last lemma that we add to our list of tools shows how the (un-
smoothed) max-entropy simplifies in the case where classical side information
is given.
















6.2.2 Formal statement and proof of the bound
Proposition 6.6 : Let ⇢ABE 2 S(HABE) be a pure tripartite state where
A and B are each an n-qubit system, let X = {X0,X1} and Z = {Z0,Z1} be
non-trivial projective measurements on a qubit (that is, both elements are one-
dimensional projectors). Consider the states ⇢XBE and ⇢ZBE that arise from
measuring all of the n qubits of system A with respect to X and Z and storing








PZ(z) |zihz|⌦ ⇢zBE . (6.14)
Then, for " > 0 and "0   0, it holds that
H3"+5"
0
min (A|E)⇢   nq   (H"
0
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where q is the preparation quality as in theorem 3.30,
q =   log max
i,j2{0,1}
   pXipZj   21 . (6.16)
In this case (where the Xi, Zj are one-dimensional projectors),
q =   logmax  h ix| jzi   , (6.17)
where  ix and  jz are eigenstates of Xi and Zj, respectively.
Proof. Starting from ⇢ABE, we construct a purification  AXX0BE of ⇢XBE. Fur-
ther below, we will expand the smooth max-entropy of this state using the
chain rule (lemma 6.1). Reformulating the terms in that expansion will lead
us to the desired result.




Xxi for x = (xi)ni=1 2 {0, 1}n . (6.18)
We construct  AXX0BE from ⇢ABE by performing a coherent measurement on
the A system with respect to the POVM formed by the elements (6.18). The
outcome of this measurement is stored in two copies X and X 0 of a classical
register. For x 2 {0, 1}n, let Vx be the map
Vx : HA ! HAXX0
| i 7! ⇧X(x)| i ⌦ |xiX ⌦ |xiX0 . (6.19)
We define the state  AXX0BE := V (⇢ABE), where
V : End(HABE) ! End(HAXX0BE)
⇢ABE 7!
P
x(Vx ⌦ 1BE)⇢ABE(V †x ⌦ 1BE) . (6.20)
The map V is an isometry that maps the pure state ⇢ABE to the pure state
 AXX0BE. Thus, by virtue of lemma 6.2, it holds that
H"
0
min(X|E)  =  H"0max(X|AX 0B)  . (6.21)




min(X|E)  = H"0min(X|E)⇢ . (6.22)
Combining equations equation (6.21) and equation (6.22) gives us
H"
0
min(X|E)⇢ =  H"0max(X|AX 0B)  . (6.23)
We will use equation (6.23) further below.
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0|B)  = H3"+5"0max (A|B)⇢ . (6.25)
(It will become clear further below why we choose the smoothing parameter
on the left hand side this way.) Moreover, the marginals  AX0B and  AXB only




0|B)  = H"+2"0max (AX|B)  (6.26)
Combining equations (6.24) to (6.26) yields
H"
0




Now we expand the term H"+2"0max (AX|B) using the chain rule:
H"+2"
0












where the equality follows from the fact that  AXX0BE purifies ⇢ABE. Combin-
ing (6.27) with (6.29) allows us to infer
H"
0














Reordering terms and using lemma 6.4 and the uncertainty relation for the
smooth min- and max-entropy (theorem 3.30), we get
H3"+5"
0















where q is as in (6.16). Applying the duality relation (lemma 6.2) to the left
hand side of equation (6.33), we get
H3"+5"
0
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We are left to show that Hmax(A|X)  is upper bounded by 0. We show,
more precisely, that Hmax(A|X)  = 0. This goes as follows.
























A ⌦ |xihx|X , (6.39)
where





Now we can apply lemma 6.5 to equation (6.39): By setting the system C in









where Hmax(A)⇢xA reduces to the unconditional form of the max-entropy,
Hmax(A)⇢xA = log
  p⇢xA  21 = log  tr  p⇢xA  2 . (6.43)
Since the ⇧X(x) are one-dimensional projectors, we have that
Hmax(A)⇢xA = 0 for all x 2 {0, 1}n (6.44)
and therefore Hmax(A|X)  = 0, as claimed. Thus, we have proved that
H3"+5"
0






  2 log 2
"2
, (6.45)
which is what we wanted to show.
6.3 A raw ebit distribution protocol
In the last section, we have seen that the estimation of the smooth min-entropy
H3"+5"
0
min (A|E) of a state ⇢ABE of n-qubit systems A and B can be reduced to the
estimation of H"0max(X|B) and H"0max(Z|B), where X and Z are measurement
results on A. This is very promising, because we have learned in chapter 5 how
to estimate such quantities. Using ideas that we developed there, we will now
construct a protocol that distributes qubits for which these two max-entropies
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are upper-bounded. Recall that we call such a protocol a raw ebit distribution
(RED) protocol. Just like a raw key distribution protocol, the protocol consists
of a sifting part and a parameter estimation part. We will first give a rough
overview and then explain the RED sifting protocol and the RED parameter
estimation protocol in detail.
The idea is to modify a raw key distribution protocol (like LCA sifting
and SBPE) in the following way. In the loop phase of the sifting protocol,
Alice and Bob not only measure some of the qubits in X and Z, but they also
store some of the qubits without measuring them. After the loop phase, they
determine their X-, Z- and Q-agreements, where a Q-agreement is a round in
which both of them did not measure their qubit and stored it instead. The
stored qubits form n-qubit systems A and B in a joint state ⇢AB, while the
outcome bit strings in the X- and Z-basis are each k bits long. In the parameter
estimation protocol, Alice and Bob communicate their measurement outcomes
for the X-agreements and Z-agreements, and determine the error rate for the
two blocks separately. This allows them to estimate both H"0max(X|B) and
H"
0
max(Z|B) of the state ⇢AB: the error rate on the X-agreements is used to
bound H"0max(X|B), and the error rate on the Z-agreements is used to bound
H"
0









l := 2k + n
(6.46)
The proof that the two max-entropies of the protocol output are bounded
is analogous to the proof for raw key distribution protocols that we saw in
chapter 5. We will again consider the completely unmeasured state ⇢AB⇥ that
arises in an equivalent protocol where all measurements are postponed. (In
this chapter, we denote the hypothetical unmeasured l-qubit systems by bold
letters A and B to distinguish them from the unmeasured n-qubit systems
A and B of the actual protocol output.) Here, ⇥ is a bit string of length
l = 2k + n, containing entries 0, 1 and 2, standing for an X-, Z- and Q-
agreement in the corresponding round. We will show the uniform sampling
property and the absence of a basis information leak,
P⇥(#) = P⇥(#
0) 8#,#0 2 {0, 1, 2}lk,k , (6.47)
⇢AB⇥ = ⇢AB ⌦ ⇢⇥ , (6.48)
where
{0, 1, 2}lk,k := {# 2 {0, 1, 2}l | # contains exactly k zeros and k ones} . (6.49)
The proof of uniform sampling will be analogous to the proof for LCA sifting:
we will construct a probability space model for the sifting protocol and use
similar arguments as in the proof of proposition 5.3. Just as for LCA sifting,
equation (6.48) is trivial since the protocol has no classical communication
during the quantum communication phase.
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The validity of equations equations (6.47) and (6.48) implies all that we
need. In particular, as we will illustrate in section 6.6, the analogous equations
hold for the reduced systems where the X-agreements or the Z-agreements are
discarded. Thus, if the error rate on the remaining system is low enough,
the corresponding max-entropy bound is implied by what we have shown in
section 5.8. Thus, the only actual proof that we need to carry out in is the
proof of (6.47). We will prove it in section 6.5.
6.3.1 RED sifting
The sifting protocol, which we call RED sifting, is largely analogous to LCA
sifting. We have written it out in detail below (see protocol 6.1). It also
consist of a loop phase and a final phase. As in LCA sifting, the loop phase
consists of m rounds in which Alice prepares two-qubit system in a maximally
entangled state and sends one half to Bob. The main diﬀerence is that instead
of measuring in either the X-basis or in the Z-basis, Alice and Bob measure in
the X-basis, in the Z-basis, or they simply store the unmeasured qubit. The
probabilities for measuring in the X- or the Z-basis are identical,
px = pz =: p 2 [0, 1/2] , (6.50)
and the probability for storing the qubit is given by
p := 1  2p . (6.51)
In the first step of the final phase of RED sifting, Alice and Bob com-
municate over an authenticated channel to find out in which round the other
party has measured the qubit in X, in Z or not at all. Below, we will prove
the uniform sampling property of RED sifting, analogously to chapter 5. To
this end, it is again convenient to formulate the protocol in terms of a com-
parison string C = C1 . . . Cm that Alice and Bob determine. This time, the
comparison string needs to distinguish between a few more cases. As before,
we write Cr = x if Alice and Bob had an X-agreement in round r and Cr = z
if they had a X-agreement. If they both did not measure their qubit, we say
that they had a Q-agreement, and write Cr = ;. In contrast to LCA sifting,
we need to distinguish between two diﬀerent kinds of disagreements, because
they do not have the same probability. The first kind of disagreement is the
case where one party measures in X and the other party measures in Z. In
this case, which occurs with probability 2p2, we write Cr = d. The other kind
of disagreement is the case where one party measures the qubit (in X or Z),
and the other party does not measure but store the qubit. In this case, which




x if Ar = Br = 0 ,
z if Ar = Br = 1 ,
; if Ar = Br = 2 ,
d if (Ar = 0 and Br = 1) or (Ar = 1 and Br = 0) ,
e if (Ar 2 {0, 1} and Br = 2) or (Ar = 2 and Br 2 {0, 1}) .
(6.53)
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RED Sifting
Parameters: • n, k,m 2 N+ with m   n+ 2k (define l := n+ 2k),
• p 2 [0, 1/2] (define p := 1  2p)
Outputs: • Alice: l-bit string (Si)li=1 2 {0, 1}l, n-qubit system A,
• Bob: l-bit string (Ti)li=1 2 {0, 1}l, n-qubit system B,
• public: l-bit string (⇥i)li=1 2 {0, 1, 2}lk,k
The protocol
Loop phase: Steps 1 and 2 are repeated m times (round index r = 1, . . . ,m). In
round r, Alice and Bob do the following:
Step 1: Alice prepares a qubit pair in a maximally entangled state and sends one
half to Bob.
Step 2: Alice and Bob independently choose Ar, Br 2 {0, 1, 2} with probability
p, p and p, respectively, where 0 stands for the X-basis, 1 stands for
the Z-basis and 2 stands for no measurement at all. Then they (do
not) measure their part of the qubit pair according to Ar, Br and store
the outcome Yr, Y 0r 2 {0, 1}, respectively (they store 0 in the case of no
measurement).
Final phase: The following steps are performed in a single run:
Step 3: Alice and Bob communicate their choices Ar and Br for r 2 [m] over a
public authenticated channel and determine the comparison string C as
defined in equation equation (6.53). They check whether quota condition
(|X (C)|   k and |Z(C)|   k and |Q(C)|   n) holds, where X (C),
Z(C) and Q(C) count the occurrences of x, z and ; in C, respectively
(see equations (6.54) to (6.56)). If it holds, they proceed with Step 4’.
Otherwise, they abort and output S = T = ⇥ =? (abort flag).














at random and discard the unmeasured qubits of rounds r with r /2W .
Step 5: Let Ri be the i-th element of U[V [W . Then Alice determines (Si)li=1 2
{0, 1}l, Bob determines (Ti)li=1 2 {0, 1}l and together they determine
(⇥i)li=1 2 {0, 1}lk, where for every i 2 [l],
Si = YRi , Ti = Y
0
Ri , ⇥i = ARi (= BRi) .
The n non-discarded qubits form system A and B, respectively.
Step 6: Alice locally outputs (Si)li=1, Bob locally outputs (Ti)li=1, and they pub-
licly output (⇥i)li=1.
Protocol 6.1: The RED sifting protocol.
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Then they check in which rounds they had X-, Z- and Q-agreements in order
to check the quota condition. In analogy to LCA sifting, we write this formally
as
X (C) := {r 2 [m] | Cr = x} , (6.54)
Z(C) := {r 2 [m] | Cr = z} . (6.55)
Q(C) := {r 2 [m] | Cr = ;} . (6.56)
We choose identical quota for the X- and Z-agreements and set it as a protocol
parameter k. The quota for the Q-agreements is denoted by n. Hence, the
quota condition reads
|X (C)|   k and |Z(C)|   k and |Q(C)|   n . (6.57)
If the quota condition is met, they continue with the next step; otherwise they
abort.
In the next step, Alice and Bob choose a random subset U of size k from
their X-agreements, a random subset V of size k from their Z-agreements and a
random subset W of of size n their Q-agreements. Just like in the LCA sifting
protocol, the outcome strings and the basis choice string is then constructed
from this choice: the bits that have not been chosen are discarded, and the
rest is left in order. This produces the output strings S, T and ⇥.
6.3.2 RED parameter estimation
The parameter estimation protocol is very simple. It is written out in proto-
col 6.2. It can be thought of as the joint execution of two SBPE correlation
tests, where the correlation test of RED PE is only passed if both the SBPE
correlation tests are passed. One of the SBPE correlation tests is carried out
on the sifted X-agreements, and the other one is carried out on the sifted Z-
agreements. For both correlation tests, we choose the same tolerated error
rate qtol 2 [0, 1].
6.4 A probability space model for RED sifting
In this section, we develop a probability space model for RED sifting, in anal-
ogy to the probability space model that we developed for LCA sifting in sec-
tion 5.6.1. This means that we construct a probability space (⌦, P ), where the
elements of ⌦ represent “histories” of the protocol, and a random variable
⇥ : ⌦! ⌦⇥ = {?} [ {0, 1, 2}lk,k (6.58)
that maps a history ! to the output basis choice string ⇥ for that history.
Again, we partition the set ⌦ of histories into two subsets ⌦? and ⌦X,
corresponding to those histories that do not pass the quota test and those
histories that do pass the correlation test, respectively,
⌦ = ⌦? ] ⌦X . (6.59)
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RED Parameter Estimation
Parameters: n, k 2 N, qtol 2 [0, 1].
Inputs: • Alice: l-bit string S = (Si)li=1 2 {0, 1}l, n-qubit system A,
• Bob: l-bit string T = (Ti)li=1 2 {0, 1}l, n-qubit system B,
• public: l-bit string ⇥ = (⇥i)li=1 2 {0, 1, 2}lk,k
Outputs: • Alice: n-qubit system A,
• Bob: n-qubit system B.
The protocol
Step 1: Alice and Bob communicate their test bits, i.e. the bits Si and Ti with
i for which ⇥i 2 {0, 1}, over a public authenticated channel.











Si   Ti ,
and perform the correlation test : if (⇤xtest  qtol and ⇤ztest  qtol), they
continue the protocol and move on to Step 3. Otherwise, they abort
and output an abort flag ?.
Step 3: Alice outputs the n-qubit system A, Bob outputs the n-qubit sys-
tem B.
Protocol 6.2: The RED parameter estimation protocol.
When Alice and Bob abort (that is, they do not meet the quota condition
(6.57)), a comparison string C is generated, but no subsets U , V and W are
chosen. The set of all comparison strings not meeting the quota condition is
given by
⌦? = {c 2 {x, z, ;, d, e}m | |X (c)| < k or |Z(c)| < k or |Q(c)| < n} . (6.60)
In the case where they pass the quota test, Alice and Bob choose subsets U ,
V and W , so the partition ⌦X consists of quadruples (c, u, v, w). In analogy
to (5.48), we have that
⌦X =
(


















Again, we further partition these sets into subsets of constant probability.
Note that the probability of a comparison string c depends on the number of
occurrences of x, z, ;, d and e. In addition to the counting functions X , Z
120
CHAPTER 6. PRIVACY ESTIMATION OF QUANTUM INFORMATION
and Q in equations (6.54) to (6.56),
D(C) := {r 2 [m] | Cr = d} , (6.62)
E(C) := {r 2 [m] | Cr = e} . (6.63)
This way, we can write the probability of a comparison string c as
P (c) = (p2)X (c)(p2)Z(c)(p2)Q(c)(2p2)D(c)(4pp)E(c) . (6.64)
Note that the five counting functions are not independent: for every compari-
son string c, it holds that
X (c) + Z(c) +Q(c) +D(c) + E(c) = m. (6.65)
Thus, when we determine the subsets of ⌦? and ⌦X where these functions are
constant, we only need to set four of them to a constant, and the remaining
one is eliminated by equation (6.65). We choose to eliminate D and partition








⌦X(nx,nz ,n;,ne) , (6.67)
where
⌦?(nx,nz ,n;,ne) = {c 2 ⌦? | |X (c)| = nx, . . . , |E(c)| = ne} , (6.68)
N? =
⇢
(nx, nz, n;, ne) 2 {0, . . . ,m}4
    nx + nz + n; + ne  m and(nx < k or nz < k or n; < n)
 
(6.69)
⌦X(nx,nz ,n;,ne) = {(c, u, v, w) 2 ⌦? | |X (c)| = nx, . . . , |E(c)| = ne} , (6.70)
NX =
⇢
(nx, nz, n;, ne) 2 {0, . . . ,m}4
    nx + nz + n; + ne  m andnx   k and nz   k and n;   n
 
(6.71)
For ! 2 ⌦?(nx,nz ,n;,ne) for some (nx, nz, n;, ne) 2 NX, it holds that
P (!) = (p2)nx(p2)nz(p2)n;(2p2)m nx nz n; ne(4pp)ne (6.72)
= 2m nx nz n;+nep2(m n;) nep2n;+ne (6.73)
=: f(nx, nz, n;, ne) , (6.74)
where f is just a notational abbreviation. For ! = (c, u, v, w) 2 ⌦X(nx,nz ,n;,ne),
we need to incorporate the choice probabilities for U , V and W to get the
correct probability,
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Thus, to summarize, we have
P : ⌦ ! [0, 1]
! 7!
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
f(nx, nz, n;, ne)
if ! 2 ⌦?(nx,nz ,n;,ne)
for some
(nx, nz, n;, ne) 2 N?








◆ 1 if ! 2 ⌦X(nx,nz ,n;,ne)
for some
(nx, nz, n;, ne) 2 NX
(6.76)
where
f(nx, nz, n;, ne) := 2m nx nz n;+nep2(m n;) nep2n;+ne . (6.77)
Now we are left to construct the random variable ⇥. This is perfectly analogous
to equations (5.60) and (5.61): we set
⇥ : ⌦ ! ⌦⇥
! 7!
(
? if ! 2 ⌦? ,
#(u, v, w) if ! 2 ⌦X ,
(6.78)
where
#i(u, v, w) =
8><>:
0 if (u [ v [ w)i 2 u ,
1 if (u [ v [ w)i 2 v ,
2 if (u [ v [ w)i 2 w .
(6.79)
6.5 Proof of uniform sampling for RED sifting
Now we are ready to show the uniform sampling property of RED sifting,
equation (6.47). We will use this property in the next section to conclude the
analysis of the protocol. We are going to use the notation for multinomial
coeﬃcients (see the general conventions on page 17).
Proposition 6.7 : The RED sifting protocol (see protocol 6.1), together with
RED parameter estimation (protocol 6.2) samples uniformly. That is, for the
random variable ⇥ on (⌦, P ) defined in the previous section, it holds that
P⇥(#) = P⇥(#
0) for all #,#0 2 {0, 1, 2}lk,k . (6.80)






nx, nz, n;, ne,m  nx   nz   n;   ne
◆














and where the function f is as defined in (6.77).
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Proof. We are going to employ the same ideas as in the proof of proposition 5.3.
The only diﬀerence is that we have comparison strings with five diﬀerent entries
(instead of three) and a quota condition with three quota (instead of two). This
results in slightly more complicated expressions. Apart from that, the proofs
are identical. Therefore, we assume that the reader understands the proof of
proposition 5.3 and only give a summarized version of the proof here. We
start with the calculation of P⇥(#) for # 2 {0, 1, 2}lk,k. It will turn out to be
independent of the choice of # 2 {0, 1, 2}lk,k, which implies uniform sampling.




P (!) . (6.83)
We partition the set ⇥ 1(#) into subsets with a constant number of the five








Since the probability mass function P is constant on ⇥ 1(nx,nz ,n;,ne)(#) (see equa-


















The proof of non-uniform sampling reduces to showing that the size of the
set ⇥ 1(nx,nz ,n;,ne)(#) is independent of the choice of # 2 {0, 1, 2}lk,k. The argu-
ments for this independence are perfectly analogous to the ones in the proof




where the right hand side is a multinomial coeﬃcient. It corresponds to choos-
ing the following rounds within the total m rounds: l rounds that are kept
during sifting (within which the order of the agreements is fixed, c.f. fig-
ure 5.5), nx   k discarded X-agreements, nz   k Z-agreements, n;   n dis-
carded ;-agreements, ne disagreements of type e (see equation (6.53)) and
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P⇥(#) with # 2 {0, 1, 2}lk,k . (6.91)






nx, nz, nn, ne,m  nx   nz   n;   ne
◆
f(nx, nz, n;, ne) ,
(6.92)
as claimed. Equation (6.82) is just a parametrization of the set NX.
6.6 Conclusion of the protocol’s analysis
In this section, we complete the analysis of the raw ebit distribution protocol








To analyze the RED protocol, we consider the equivalent protocol in which all
measurements are postponed to after the sifting protocol, in analogy to our
analysis in section 5.8. We denote the output state of this hypothetical sifting
protocol by ⇢AB⇥, where A and B are each an l-qubit system. In the last
section, we have shown that the state ⇢AB⇥ satisfies
P⇥(#) = P⇥(#
0) 8#,#0 2 {0, 1, 2}lk,k . (6.94)
Since there is no classical communication during the quantum communication
phase of the RED sifting protocol, it also satisfies
⇢AB⇥ = ⇢AB ⌦ ⇢⇥ . (6.95)
If we denote by ⇢AB⇥ the state conditioned on passing the quota test, then
equations (6.94) and (6.95) taken together can be written as







In the equivalent protocol, the parameter estimation of the RED protocol
can be seen as a parallel execution of two SBPE protocols, namely one for the
error rate in the X-bits and one for the error rate in the Z-bits (see figure 6.1).
In the SBPE protocol for the error rate in the X-bits, all the Z-bits are
ignored. This can be seen as Alice and Bob tracing out those positions i in
124
CHAPTER 6. PRIVACY ESTIMATION OF QUANTUM INFORMATION6.6. CONCLUSION OF THE PRO OCOL’S AN LYSIS
⇢AB ⌦ ⇢⇥
⇢AB ⌦ ⇢⇥0 ⇢AB ⌦ ⇢⇥00
SBPE for
error rate in X
SBPE for




Figure 6.1: The RED PE protocol as a parrelel execution of two
SBPE protocols.
the (qu)bit strings A, B and ⇥ where ⇥i = 1. To see what this means, let
us consider a simple example. Let k = n = 1. In this case, the strings are of
length three, that is, A = A1A2A3, B = B1B2B3 and ⇥ = ⇥1⇥2⇥3. The state
⇢AB⇥ can be written out as




|102ih102| + |120ih120|| {z }
Z-bit at position 1
+
|012ih012| + |210ih210|| {z }
Z-bit at position 2
+
|021ih021| + |201ih201|| {z }
Z-bit at position 3
⌘ (6.97)
Thus, tracing out the Z-bits, i.e. the (qu)bit i where ⇥i = 1, yields




























Equations (6.99) and (6.101) express that the SBPE determining the error
rate in X is carried out under the same requirements as the SBPE for QKD
that we saw in chapter 5, namely uniform sampling and the absence of a basis
information leak. Thus, if the correlation test in the X-basis is passed, then
the output’s max-entropy H"max(X|B) is bounded,
H"max(X|B)⇢  nh(qtol + µ) , (6.102)
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These are the same parameters as in the case of QKD (in fact, we have chosen
the parameters of the RED protocol such that this is the case).
Analogously, the parameter estimation for the error rate in the Z-basis is
performed on the state
trX(⇢AB ⌦ ⇢⇥) = ⇢AB ⌦ ⇢⇥00 , (6.104)








Thus, conditioned on passing the correlation test, we have that
H"max(Z|B)⇢  nh(qtol + µ) , (6.106)
where "0 and µ(") are as in (6.103). The bounds (6.102) and (6.106) are about
the same system in the same state. To see this, note that the output state ⇢AB
of the system undergoing the SBPE in X is obtained by tracing out the X-bits
in (6.99), i.e. the (qu)-bits with ⇥i = 0,
⇢AB = (trA1B1A2B2 + trA1B1A3B3 + trA2B2A3B3)(⇢AB) . (6.107)
As one can easily see through a comparison of equations (6.101) and (6.105),
this is the same output state as for the other SBPE (where the bits with ⇥i = 1
get traced out). Thus, the bounds (6.102) and (6.106) apply jointly. Inserting
these bounds into inequality equation (6.15) that we proved in section 6.2.1
yields the desired result of inequality (6.93).
For the sake of simplicity, our analysis here was restricted to the case
where k = n = 1, but it is not hard to see that this analysis generalizes
to arbitrary choices of n, k 2 N. For all such choices, the uniform sampling
property and the absence of a basis information leak of the RED sifting protocol
(equations (6.94) and (6.95)) imply the analogous properties of the reduced
states undergoing SBPE. The uniform sampling property (equation (6.101))
follows trivially. The product form of the state in equation (6.99) follows from
the fact that in (6.98), all the terms on the right hands side are identical. It







In the last two chapters, we developed a min-entropy estimation formalism
that was tailored for the extraction of a resource. In chapter 5, this resource
was a raw shared key, while in chapter 6, the resource were highly correlated
systems that we called raw ebits. The potential noise on the channel that
connects Alice and Bob in the protocols that extract these resources was seen
as an adversary’s interference that prevents them from the extraction of the
resource. When such an interference is detected, the protocol aborts. In this
case, our only concern was that an interaction between the transmitted system
and some environment took place. This interaction was personified as the
action of Eve, who behaves maliciously and who might employ sophisticated
strategies to prevent Alice and Bob from extracting the resource. It was an
adversarial scenario, in which Eve may adjust her actions in every round to
the given situation, rather than behaving the same way in every round. The
threat model was a very strong one: Eve was allowed to do whatever quantum
mechanics allows her to do. Our goal was to devise a test whose outcome can
rule out any interaction by Eve. However, the implications of such a test on
the particular kind of interaction that might occur was not of our interest.
The present chapter is also devoted to the estimation of the min-entropy
(and a generalization thereof), but the spirit is diﬀerent from the resource-
oriented approach that we followed before. We no longer aim at the extraction
of a resource. Instead, we develop a decoherence estimation formalism that
can be extended to the framework of generalized probabilistic theories (GPTs).
This is a very general class of probabilistic theories that contains quantum the-
ory as a special case (we will explain this in more detail in section 7.3). Such a
generalized decoherence estimation formalism could be useful for experiments
that investigate decoherence processes that might not be correctly described
by quantum theory. An interesting candidate for such a process is the postu-
lated eﬀect of gravitational decoherence. Since we have no consistent theory
of quantum gravitation, a generalized decoherence estimation formalism that
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covers a wide range of probabilistic theories might turn out to be very useful for
the investigation of gravitational decoherence. Many models for gravitational
decoherence have been proposed [Pen96; Dió89; Dio11; Dio84; Dio87; KTM14;
Sta12; AH13; Hu14; AH07; Kay98; BGL07; WBM06]. To show potential ap-
plications of our framework, we will develop a test for a proposed model for
gravitational decoherence by Diósi [Dió89] in section 7.4. Although gravita-
tional decoherence is a prime candidate for the application of our framework,
our decoherence estimation formalism is not specific to gravitational decoher-
ence and could, in principle, be applied to any process of decoherence.
We will take our inspiration from the characterization of the min-entropy
that we have seen in section 4.6. There, we have seen that the min-entropy of
a quantum state ⇢AE can be expressed as
Hmin(A|E)⇢ =   log dA maxRE!A0 F
2(| ih |AA0 ,1A ⌦RE!A0(⇢AE)) . (7.1)
Based on this expression, we define
Dec(A|E)⇢ = maxRE!A0 F
2(| ih |AA0 ,1A ⌦RE!A0(⇢AE)) . (7.2)
We call it the decoherence quantity . This might seem like a trivial redefinition
of the min-entropy, since
Hmin(A|E) =   log dADec(A|E) . (7.3)
However, the quantity (7.2) has a great advantage: as we will see in section 7.3,
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We will explain the specifics of this quantity in section 7.3. Our technical
contribution in this section is the proof that this quantity Dec(A|E) can be
estimated by performing a CHSH test [Cla+69], not only for quantum theory
but for GPTs in general. Now we continue by explaining the general idea
behind this test for the case of quantum theory.
7.1.2 Decoherence estimation through CHSH tests
The general idea behind our decoherence estimation test is to probe an un-
known decoherence process. Assume that in our lab, we have a system A0 that
interacts with another system.1 Unfortunately, we do not know much about
this interaction, so we think of it as a black box (see figure 7.1). When system
A0 enters the black box, it encounters another system and interacts with it.
These systems together evolve as a closed system. During this interaction, we
have no control over the systems and cannot monitor their evolution. After the
interaction took place, we have access to a subsystem B of the whole system
that evolved as a closed system, while the complementary subsystem E is not
under our control.
1 It will become clear below why we prefer to denote this sytem by A0 rather than by A
(see figure 7.3).
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Figure 7.1: An unknown decoherence process. System A0 undergoes
some evolution that whose details we do not understand. It interacts with
another system, and may thereby decohere. The systems together evolve as a
closed system, but after the interaction, we only see a subsystem B, while we
do not have acces to the complementary subsystem E.
In many cases of interest (such as in an elastic scattering experiment),
system B is identical to system A0. In general, however, these systems might
be completely diﬀerent. For example, one may consider the case where A0 is a
neutron that enters the black box, where it is absorbed by an atom which in
turn emits a photon B. In this case, we may be able to perform measurements
on the photon B, while having no access to the atom E with the absorbed
neutron (we may not know its location within a material). Speaking in the
language of quantum information theory, the black box implements a channel
from system A0 to a system B, and the system E is the purifying system of
the Stinespring dilation of the channel (see section 3.3).
From what we discussed so far, nothing is really diﬀerent from what we
considered in chapters 5 and 6. We only changed our language, now speaking
of physical systems interacting naturally, rather than of a malicious party
Eve with intentions and strategies. It was merely a change in spirit rather
than a change in our technical assumptions. Now we are going to introduce
an assumption that accounts for this change of spirit. In this chapter, we
assume that the black box shows no adversarial behavior. We assume that
each time the system A0 enters the black box, its output state is the same,
provided that the input state was the same in each run. We assume that
the box has no strategy but simply behaves the same way in each run of the
experiment. Technically speaking, we assume that repeating the experiment
results in an independent and identically distributed sequence of channel uses.
This assumption is usually referred to as the i.i.d. assumption. In short, we
assume that the black box implements an unknown but constant channel from
A0 to B that we can use as many times as we wish.
This assumption makes us more powerful as an experimenter. Instead of
just getting individual measurement outcomes, we can now experimentally de-
termine outcome probabilities. This allows us to perform tests on the unknown
channel that would otherwise be impossible. The general setup of our test is
shown in figure 7.2. The tested channel takes a system A0 as its input and
outputs a system B. As such, it is a single-system channel: it takes one sys-
tem as its input and outputs one system. The idea behind the test is to lift
this single-system setting to a setting with two systems. To this end, not only
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one system A0 is prepared, but a pair of systems A and A0 is prepared in a
maximally entangled state. System A then remains unchanged, while system
A0 undergoes the evolution of the channel and transforms into the output B of
the channel. In this regard, the setting is very similar to the settings that we
considered in the last two chapters. This way, we have not just one but two
systems at hand that we can use to probe the channel.
7.1. I I
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Figure 7.2: Probing an unknown decoherence process through
CHSH tests. The subsystem A0 of a maximally entangled pair AA0 of sys-
tems is used as the input for the unknown channel from A0 to B. This results
in a bipartite system AB, on which we can perform CHSH tests. Since we
make the i.i.d. assumption, we can perform measurements on the same state
many times and thus estimate the CHSH parameter  AB.
The parameter that is measured in this test is the CHSH parameter  AB
[Cla+69]. It is defined in a setting where bipartite measurements are per-
formed on a state ⇢AB, just as in our case (see figure 7.2). It assumes that
Alice and Bob, who control system A and B, can perform one out of two mea-
surements on their system, each of which has two possible outcomes. In the
most common formulation of the parameter  AB, this is described by observ-
ables (i.e. Hermitian operators) A0, A1 for Alice and B0, B1 for Bob, each of
which have the possible outcomes (i.e. eigenvalues) 1 and  1. We write their
spectral decomposition as
A0 = A1|0   A 1|0 , B0 = B1|0   A 1|0 , (7.5)
A1 = A1|1   A 1|1 , B1 = B1|1   B 1|1 , (7.6)
where for every x, y 2 {0, 1}, A1|x, A 1|x and B1|y, B 1|y are pairs of mutually
orthogonal projectors. If Alice measures with respect to Ax and Bob with
respect to By, then the expectation value hab|x, yi of the product ab of their
outcomes a and b is given by
hab|x, yi = tr (Ax ⌦ By)⇢AB  . (7.7)
In these terms, the CHSH parameter of a state ⇢AB is defined as
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where CAB is the “CHSH correlator”
CAB = (A0 ⌦ B0 + A0 ⌦ B1 + A1 ⌦ B0   A1 ⌦ B1) . (7.10)
The parameter  AB appears in the CHSH inequality [Cla+69], which famously
states that if the experiment is described by a local hidden variable theory,
then the parameter  AB as in equation (7.8) satisfies
 AB  2 . (7.11)
In quantum theory, where  AB can be written as in equation (7.9), a maxi-
mal value of  AB = 2
p
2 can be achieved. This is the famous proof of the
nonlocality of quantum mechanics. Such a proof was first presented in a sem-
inal paper by John Bell [Bel64]. The form that we presented here, which is
experimentally more accessible than Bell’s original formulation, was derived
by Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt [Cla+69]. While the term “CHSH in-
equality” is technically more correct, inequality (7.11) it is often called “Bell’s
inequality”, honoring Bell for his original idea. We shall use the terms “Bell”
and “CHSH” interchangeably. We assume that the reader has some familiar-
ity with Bell’s inequality and the nonlocality of quantum mechanics, and do
not give further background on these topics here. For a review article on the
subject, see [Bru+14].
In our test, many copies of a system AA0 in a maximally entangled state
| ih |AA0 are prepared and measured in the setting shown in figure 7.2. By
measuring many times in the four possible settings where Alice and Bob vary
their choice of the measurement x, y = 0, 1, the parameter  AB can be esti-
mated. For our purposes, we are not interested in testing whether the exper-
iment can be described by a local hidden variable theory. Therefore, in our
experiment, no measures need to be taken to close Bell test loopholes as in the
recent loophole-free Bell test [Hen+15]. We make the i.i.d. assumption and
assume no malicious behavior by the black box.
7.1.3 Implications of high CHSH values in quantum the-
ory
We measure the parameter  AB in order to learn something about the corre-
lations between the systems A, B and the purifying system E (see figure 7.3).
The intuition is as follows. If Alice and Bob measure a CHSH parameter
 AB = 2
p
2, then they know that the state ⇢AB must be a maximally entan-
gled state.2 In that case, they know that system E is necessarily decoupled
from AB, that is, ⇢ABE = ⇢AB⌦⇢E (see proposition 3.22). Thus, all the initial
entanglement between A and A0 is preserved in the system AB, and there is
no entanglement between A and E.
This principle—that a system A that is strongly entangled with B can-
not, at the same time, be entangled with another system E—is called the
monogamy of entanglement [Ter04]. The argument that we just made is for
2 This is shown using a technique called self-testing. The first results of this form were









Figure 7.3: Monogamy of entanglement and correlations. If A and
B are strongly entangled, as expressed by a high CHSH value  AB, then the
systems A and E are necessarily uncorrelated. In other words, system A cannot
be strongly correlated with both systems B and E at the same time.
the most extreme case, where A and B are maximally entangled. Such mono-
tonicity statements can also be made in a quantitative way, thereby including
a range of non-extreme cases. The question that arises in this case is how to
quantify the entanglement—or correlation—between the diﬀerent parties. In a
work by Toner and Verstraete [TV06], this is solved as follows. They consider
a tripartite quantum state ⇢ABE, together with a pair of observables for each




AE  8 , (7.12)
where  AB is as in equations (7.9) and (7.10), and where  AE is the corre-
sponding quantity for A and E,
 AE = tr(CAE⇢AE) , where (7.13)
CAE = (A0 ⌦ E0 + A0 ⌦ E1 + A1 ⌦ E0   A1 ⌦ E1) . (7.14)
Inequality (7.12) shows that if the CHSH correlation between A and B is max-
imal (with  AB = 2
p
2), then A and E are necessarily uncorrelated ( AE = 0),
and therefore reproduces the argument above. In addition to that, it provides
a bound for the intermediate cases where none of the two correlations is max-
imal. This provides a robust monotonicity statement for CHSH correlations.
Inequality (7.12) shows that high values of  AB restrict the  AE. An in-
teresting question is whether high values of  AB can also be shown to restrict
other quantities of correlation between A and E. We will show that this is
indeed the case. As one of our main results of this chapter, we will prove
that non-classical values of  AB (that is,  AB > 2) restrict the min-entropy
Hmin(A|E). Figure 7.4 shows a lower bound on Hmin(A|E) for a given value of
 AB that we will derive in section 7.2. This lower bound on the min-entropy
translates into an upper bound on the decoherence quantity Dec(A|E)⇢ as de-
fined in equation (7.2). The resulting feasible region is shown in figure 7.5 in
dark green.
This bound can be used, for example, to test existing models of gravita-
tional decoherence. For a quantum-mechanical model that describes such a
process, one can calculate the predicted value for the decoherence quantity
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Figure 7.4: Min-entropy bound for a given CHSH value  AB. A point
( AB, H"min(A|E)⇢) in this figure is colored in green if and only if there exists a
state ⇢AB such that a purification ⇢ABE of it has a min-entropy of H"min(A|E)
and if there exist measurements for Alice and Bob such that its CHSH value
is  AB. We call the set of all such points the feasible region. The part of the
feasible region with  AB   2 is drawn in figure 7.5, converted to an upper
bound on the decoherence quantity Dec(A|E).
Dec(A|E) under this model and see whether it is compatible with the experi-
mental data and the bound. This gives us a falsification tool for testing models
for unknown decoherence processes.
7.1.4 Implications of high CHSH values beyond quantum
theory
It turns out that the ideas of the last subsection can be extended beyond
quantum theory. Indeed, it has already been noted by Toner [Ton09] that
a result similar to inequality (7.12) can be found for all theories that satisfy
the no-signalling principle. The idea is as follows. The experiment may not
be correctly described by quantum theory, but there may be another theory
that predicts the correct outcome probabilities. We denote the probability of
Alice, Bob and Eve getting an outcome a, b, c when performing a measurement
indexed by x, y, z 2 {0, 1} by P [a, b, c|x, y, z]. While the experiment may not
follow the laws of quantum mechanics, we assume that it respects the no-
signalling principle. It states that the probabilities P [a, b, c|x, y, z] are such
that any party cannot influence the marginal distribution of the other parties
by choosing a particular measurement. More precisely, it says that for all a, b,
x and y, X
c
P [a, b, c|x, y, 0] =
X
c
P [a, b, c|x, y, 1] , (7.15)
and the analogous statements for the other two parties. If equation (7.15)
was violated, then Eve could influence Alice’s and Bob’s outcome probability
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by choosing either z = 0 or z = 1. This could be interpreted as signalling
a message, and the no-signalling principle states that this is impossible (for
a formal definition, see definition 7.25). Note that the no-signalling principle
holds in quantum theory.
In such a non-signalling theory, the CHSH parameters  AB and  AE can
be defined in analogy to the quantum case. According to equation (7.8), we
just need to express the expectation value hab|x, yi as a function of the AB-
marginal
P [a, b|x, y] =
X
c
P [a, b, c|x, y, z] . (7.16)
(The choice of c is irrelevant by the no-signalling principle.) It simply reads
hab|x, yi = P [1, 1|x, y] + P [ 1, 1|x, y]  P [1, 1|x, y]  P [ 1, 1|xy] , (7.17)
and the analogous can be done for the AE-marginal.
Ben Toner [Ton09] showed that for non-signalling theories, a statement
similar to inequality (7.12) can be made. He proved that
 AB +  AE  4 . (7.18)
This implies that non-classical CHSH values for Alice and Bob ( AB > 2)
restrict the CHSH value for Alice and Eve to classical values ( AE < 2). In
analogy to the quantum case of the previous subsection, we may now ask
whether it holds that in non-signalling theories, high values of  AB also restrict
some quantity analogous to the min-entropy Hmin(A|E) or the decoherence
quantity Dec(A|E) that we defined in equation (7.2).
As a main result of this chapter, we will show in section 7.3 that this is
indeed the case. In a first step, we will formulate a decoherence quantity
Dec(A|E) for GPTs. This requires a lot of eﬀort to be formalized. This can
be seen from our quantum definition of Dec(A|E) in equation (7.2), which we
shall repeat here:
Dec(A|E)⇢ = maxRE!A0 F
2(| ih |AA0 ,1A ⌦RE!A0(⇢AE)) . (7.19)
For this equation to be translated to GPTs, one needs to formalize the notion of
parties, maximally entangled states, recovery maps and the fidelity for GPTs.
We discuss how to do this in detail in section 7.3. In a second step, we show
that high values of  AB restrict the value of Dec(A|E). To do this, we will use
linear programming techniques, inspired by the proof of inequality (7.18) by
Ben Toner. The red region in figure 7.5 shows the pairs ( AB,Dec(A|E)) that
are ruled out by our bound for all non-signalling theories.
Numerically, the GPT bound in figure 7.5 may seem weak. However, this
should be seen less as a ready-to-use bound than as a proof of concept. Note
that the red region is excluded for all non-signalling theories. For a particular
candidate theory that one wants to test in an experiment, one typically wants
to add additional linear constraints in the theory that push the bound down
to experimentally more accessible values. For example, one may want to test
whether a certain decoherence process can be described in a non-signalling
134
CHAPTER 7. THEORY-INDEPENDENT DECOHERENCE
ESTIMATION
.
























Figure 7.5: Allowed values of the decoherence quantity for measured
CHSH values. This figure shows what values of the decoherence quantity are
compatible with some measured CHSH value  AB, assuming either quantum
theory or any other probabilistic theory. The dark green region consists of
all points ( AB,Dec(A|E)⇢) for which there exists a state ⇢AB and two pairs
(A0,A1) and (B0,B1) of observables with the according values, i.e. the bound is
tight. The red region shows pairs ( AB,Dec(A|E)!) that cannot be realized in
any non-signalling probabilistic theory. The curve between the light green area
and the red area is a bound on Dec(A|E)! which is valid for all non-signalling
probabilistic theories. A bound for any specific non-signalling probabilistic
theory runs below the red region.
theory with uncertainty relations. Since uncertainty relations may be formu-
lated as linear constraints, these would lead to a new linear program that can
be solved in the very same way as the linear program that produced the red
region in figure 7.5.
Thus, our decoherence estimation formalism allows us to devise tests to
measure CHSH values  AB that do not only tell us something about the tested
channel as a quantum channel. If quantum models for the decoherence process
are ruled out, the same experimental data can be used to be tested against
more general classes of probabilistic theories. By varying the constraints that
define the linear program that produces the bound, one can see what properties
of nature are compatible with the observed data.
7.1.5 Outline of the chapter
Section 7.2 is devoted to proving the min-entropy bound for given CHSH values
 AB in quantum theory. In other words, we derive the shape of the boundary
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between the dark green region and the light green region in figure 7.5. We
will also show that this bound is tight. In section 7.3, we will prove the GPT
bound, i.e. the boundary between the dark green region and the red region
in figure 7.5. In contrast to the quantum bound, this bound is unlikely to be
tight. As we will discuss in the outlook in chapter 8, we have strong indications
that this bound may be improved significantly by using alternative techniques
of optimization. Finally, in section 7.4, we give an example application of our
framework. We show how a specific model for gravitational decoherence by
Diosi [Dió89] can be tested experimentally using our framework. The bounds
on the value  AB that needs to be measured in order to rule out the model are
derived with the quantum mechanical bound. Should this bound be violated,
then our formalism can be used to test the data against other models of nature
that might describe the experiment in place of quantum theory.
7.2 Decoherence estimation through CHSH tests
in quantum theory
Our goal is to show that Alice and Bob can estimate the decoherence quantity
Dec(A|E) as defined in (7.2)—or equivalently, the min-entropy Hmin(A|E)—
by performing a Bell experiment. We pose it as a feasibility problem: is it
possible to observe certain statistics in a Bell experiment given a certain level
of decoherence? Solving this problem allows us to determine and plot the
feasible region in the space of suitably chosen parameters. Since the range of
values that the min-entropy takes depends on the dimension of Alice’s system
(denoted by dA), it is only meaningful to compare scenarios in which dA is
fixed. For simplicity, we consider the simplest non-trivial scenario in which
the subsystems held by Alice and Bob are qubits, dA = dB = 2.
We define the feasible region S as follows. A pair of real numbers (u, v),
where u 2 [ 1, 1] and v 2 [0, 2p2] belongs to S if there exists a tripartite state
⇢ABE and binary observables A0, A1 on HA and B0, B1 on HB such that
• Subsystems A and B are qubits: dimHA = dimHB = 2,
• The conditional min-entropy of A given E equals u: Hmin(A|E) = u,
• The CHSH value given by Eq. (7.9) equals v:  AB = v.
First note that a CHSH value of v  2 can be achieved using trivial measure-
ments (namely {1, 0}) acting on an arbitrary state. Therefore, for v  2 all
values of u 2 [ 1, 1] are allowed. For the remainder of the argument we implic-
itly assume that v > 2 and the following intuitive argument shows why certain
pairs (u, v) must indeed be forbidden. Consider a point u ⇡  1 and v > 2.
According to the operational meaning of the min-entropy, u ⇡  1 means that
Eve can recover the maximally entangled state with Alice with fidelity close to
unity, which clearly allows Alice and Eve to violate the CHSH inequality. On
the other hand, since v > 2 Alice also observes a CHSH violation with Bob.
This violates the monogamy relation for tripartite three-qubit states proved
in [SG01], which states that Alice can violate the CHSH inequality with at
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most one party (even if she is allowed to use diﬀerent measurements for diﬀer-
ent scenarios). This simple argument leads to the conclusion that the region
u ⇡  1 and v > 2 is forbidden. In the remainder of this section we show that
the non-trivial part of the feasible region S can be fully characterized by a
single inequality.
Theorem 7.1 : A pair of real numbers (u, v) where u 2 [ 1, 1] and v 2
(2, 2
p
2] belongs to the feasible region S if and only if
u   f(v), (7.20)
where















where the maximization is taken over
  1  cz  1  vp
2
. (7.22)
While the definition of f might seem complicated, it is straightforward to
see that f is monotonically increasing in v and evaluating f(v) numerically for
a particular value of v is straightforward since the function to be maximized
is concave. The feasible region S is plotted in figure 7.4.
The proof of theorem 7.1 is conceptually simple, but it requires a wide
array of technical tools, which we present in section 7.2.1. In sections 7.2.2
and 7.2.3 we prove the direct and converse parts of theorem 7.1, respectively.
7.2.1 Preliminaries
Definition 7.2 : Let HA, HB be Hilbert spaces of dimension d. A gener-
alized Bell basis for HA ⌦ HB is a set {| jih j|}d2j=1 of d2 pure states on
HA ⌦HB which satisfy
trA| jih j| = 1B
d
, trB| jih j| = 1A
d
for j = 1, . . . , d2 and (7.23)
d2X
j=1
| jih j| = 1A ⌦ 1B. (7.24)
A state ⇢AB 2 S(HA ⌦HB) is called Bell-diagonal if it is diagonal in some






Lemma 7.3 : Let A   0 be a positive semi-definite operator, let ⇧A be the
projector on its support and let |bi be a normalized vector. Then A   |bihb|
iﬀ
⇧A|bi = |bi and hb |A 1|bi  1. (7.26)
Note that since A might not be invertible, A 1 is only defined on the support
of A.
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Two-qubit states





1A ⌦ 1B +
X
j









where all the summations go over {x, y, z}. It is known that for every state
there exists a local unitary UA ⌦ UB which diagonalizes the correlation tensor
(i.e. ensures that Tjk = 0 for j 6= k) and since all the properties we consider
are invariant under local unitaries we can make this assumption without loss
of generality. We denote these diagonal entries Txx, Tyy and Tzz by cx, cy and





1A ⌦ 1B +
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j









Without loss of generality, we assume that |cx|   |cy|   |cz| and cx, cy   0.
As shown in Ref. [HH96] every Bell-diagonal state of two qubits (up to local





where {pj}4j=1 is a probability distribution and
| 1,2i = |00i± |11ip
2
, | 3,4i = |01i± |10ip
2
. (7.30)












cx = p1   p2 + p3   p4 ,
cy =  p1 + p2 + p3   p4 , (7.32)
cz = p1 + p2   p3   p4 .
Non-locality
Definition 7.4 : For a bipartite quantum state ⇢AB the maximum CHSH








where the maximization is taken over all Hermitian, binary observables with
eigenvalues 1 and  1.
Note that for all states  max   2 and we say that the state violates the
CHSH inequality if  max > 2. It was shown in Ref. [HHH95a] that if ⇢AB is a
state of two qubits then the value of  max is fully determined by the correlation
tensor. Adopting the convention |cx|   |cy|   |cz| we have
 max(⇢AB) =
(
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Max-entropy for Bell-diagonal states
To derive a bound on the min-entropyHmin(A|E)⇢, we will make use of the min-
max duality (lemma 6.2) and an alternative expression for the max-entropy
(that is, diﬀerent from the one in definition 3.26). Namely, as shown in




2(⇢AB, ⇡A ⌦  B) , (7.35)
where ⇡A is the maximally mixed state on A and the maximization is taken
over all states on B. We need an explicit expression for the max-entropy of a
Bell-diagonal state. Note that by assumption dA = dB = d.
Lemma 7.5 : Let ⇢AB be a Bell-diagonal state of form (7.25). Then the
conditional max-entropy equals







To prove lemma 7.5, we use the fact that the optimization problem which
appears in the definition of the max-entropy (7.35) can be written as a semidefi-
nite program (SDP) [Vit+13]. More specifically, given ⇢AB we haveHmax(A|B) =
log  , where   is the value of the following SDP for ⇢ABE being an arbitrary
purification of ⇢AB
PRIMAL : minimize µ
subject to µ1B   trA(ZAB)




DUAL : maximize tr(⇢ABEYABE)





where Pos(H) denotes the set of positive semi-definite operators acting on H.











which is precisely the statement of lemma 7.5.





pj| ji ⌦ |ji. (7.40)
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pk| kih k|⌦ 1E   ⇢ABE. (7.43)
We apply lemma 7.3 to A = ZAB ⌦ 1E and |bi = | ABEi. The projector on





and it is easy to verify that ⇧| ABEi = | ABEi. Moreover, since
(ZABE)
 1 = (ZAB) 1 ⌦ 1E , (7.45)






























































1A ⌦ 1B = 1A ⌦  B (7.50)
and the remaining ones are easily verified to be true. The value of this solution





 2 which implies that     1d Pjppj 2.
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Suﬃciency of considering Bell-diagonal states
To prove the converse part of theorem 7.1, we will use the following argu-
ment, which is similar in spirit and inspired by the symmetrization argument
presented in Ref. [Ací+07].
Lemma 7.6 : Let ⇢AB be an arbitrary state of two qubits. Then, there exists
a Bell-diagonal state  AB which satisfies
 max(⇢AB) =  max( AB) and Hmax(A|B)    Hmax(A|B)⇢. (7.51)
Proof. We present an explicit construction of  AB which meets the require-





1A ⌦ 1B +
X
j















(Uj ⌦ Uj)⇢AB(U †j ⌦ U †j ), (7.53)
where U1 = 1, U2 =  x, U3 =  y and U4 =  z. It is easy to verify that for
j 2 {x, y, z}
⇤( j ⌦ 1B) = ⇤(1A ⌦  j) = 0 (7.54)
because each Pauli operator commutes with identity and itself but anticom-
mutes with the other two unitaries. This implies that  AB = ⇤(⇢AB) is Bell-
diagonal. Moreover, one can check that the map preserves the correlation
tensor, i.e. for j 2 {x, y, z}
⇤( j ⌦  j) =  j ⌦  j, (7.55)







(Uj ⌦ Uj)⇢AB(U †j ⌦ U †j )⌦ |jihj|. (7.56)
By the data processing inequality, we have Hmax(A|B)    Hmax(A|BK)  and









where ⌧ jAB = (Uj ⌦ Uj)⇢AB(U †j ⌦ U †j ). (7.58)
Since the max-entropy is invariant under local unitaries we have
Hmax(A|B)⌧ j = Hmax(A|B)⇢ 8 j 2 {x, y, z} , (7.59)
which implies that
Hmax(A|B)    Hmax(A|BK)  = Hmax(A|B)⇢. (7.60)
This completes the proof.
141
7.2. DECOHERENCE ESTIMATION THROUGH CHSH TESTS IN
QUANTUM THEORY
The final technical lemma concerns the problem of maximizing the max-
entropy of a Bell-diagonal state of two qubits whose maximal CHSH violation
is fixed.
Lemma 7.7 : Let ⇢AB be a Bell-diagonal state of two qubits, whose maximal
CHSH violation equals   2 (2, 2p2]. Then, the max-entropy of ⇢AB satisfies
the following inequality
Hmax(A|B)   f( ) (7.61)
for function f defined in Eq. (7.21). Moreover, there exists a state which
saturates this inequality.
Proof. According to lemma 7.5 the max-entropy of a Bell-diagonal state of two
qubits equals







Here, it is convenient to express the probabilities through the correlation co-




(1 + cx   cy + cz), p2 = 1
4




(1 + cx + cy   cz), p4 = 1
4
(1  cx   cy   cz), (7.64)
which allows us to write
Hmax(A|B) =  3 + 2 log g(cx, cy, cz), (7.65)
where
g(cx, cy, cz) =
p
1 + cx   cy + cz +
p
1  cx + cy + cz (7.66)
+
p
1 + cx + cy   cz +
p
1  cx   cy   cz. (7.67)
In the space of correlation coeﬃcients the feasible set are the triples (cx, cy, cz)
for which the function g(cx, cy, cz) is well-defined (the expressions under the
roots must be non-negative). As before, we assume without loss of generality
that |cx|   |cy|   |cz| and cx, cy   0. Then, the maximal CHSH violation



























where q =  p
2
and   2 [0, ⇡/4] (which ensures cx   cy   0). Note that
cx + cy = q cos ,
cx   cy = q sin .
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It is easy to check that the allowed range of cz is
q sin   1  cz  1  q cos .
Note that we should also impose the condition |cz|  |cy| but as it turns out
the optimal solution will satisfy it even if we do not include it explicitly. To
maximize the max-entropy it is suﬃcient to maximize function g defined in
Eq. (7.66), which in the angular parametrization equals
g( , cz) =
p
1 + cz + q sin +
p
1 + cz   q sin  (7.68)
+
p
1  cz + q cos +
p
1  cz   q cos , (7.69)
over
R =  ( , cz) :   2 [0, ⇡/4], q sin   1  cz  1  q cos  . (7.70)
The maximum is achieved either in the interior (denoted by Rint) or at the
boundary. Let us start by ruling out the first option. Function g is diﬀeren-










































1  cz   q cos  . (7.74)
To prove that there is no maximum in the interior, it suﬃces to show that
there is no ( , cz) 2 Rint such that both derivatives vanish @g@cz = @g@  = 0. To
do this we consider the following linear combination











1 + cz + q sin 
+
sin   cos p
1 + cz   q sin  +
 2 sin p
1  cz + q cos  (7.76)
and show that s( , cz) = 0 has no solution in Rint. Since the last term of
s( , cz) is negative, a necessary condition for s( , cz) = 0 is that the sum of
the first two terms is non-negative, which is equivalent to
sin + cos p
1 + cz + q sin 
  cos   sin p
1 + cz   q sin  .
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which contradicts the second inequality in the definition ofRint as shown below.
cz   q
2 cos 
  1 and 1  q cos  > cz (7.77)
=) 1  q cos  > q
2 cos 






It is easy to check that the left-hand side of the final inequality is always at
least
p
2, while the right hand side is always at most
p
2. This proves that the
final (strict) inequality is always false, which implies that s( , cz) = 0 has no
solutions in Rint and that g( , cz) has no maximum in Rint.
The boundaries cz = q sin    1 and cz = 1   q cos  correspond to one of
the expression under the roots being zero. Since the square root function has
infinite slope at 0, such solutions cannot be optimal. Therefore, the maximum
must be achieved at the boundary   = 0. Combining Equations (7.65) and
(7.68) and setting   = 0 leads directly to the statement of the lemma.
To show that the solution of the optimization problem satisfies |cz|  |cy|, it
is suﬃcient to show that for   = 0 and cz =  cy =  q/2 the partial derivative
@g/@cz is strictly positive.
7.2.2 The direct part
Here, we show (by an explicit construction) that points described by v 2
(2, 2
p
2] and f(v)  u  1 are allowed. lemma 7.7 shows that for v 2 (2, 2p2]
there exists a Bell-diagonal state of two qubits whose max-entropy equals
Hmax(A|B) =  f(v). (7.79)
By duality (lemma 6.2), if ⇢ABE is an arbitrary purification, the conditional
min-entropy equals
Hmin(A|E) = f(v). (7.80)
In this example u = f(v), which corresponds to a point lying precisely on the
boundary defined in theorem 7.1. In order to obtain higher values of u (all the
way up to 1), it suﬃces to apply noise of appropriate strength to subsystem
E.
7.2.3 The converse part
Here, we show that every feasible point (u, v) must satisfy u   f(v). Consider
a state ⇢ABE for which Hmin(A|E)⇢ = u and which for some measurements
achieves the CHSH value of v. Clearly,  max(⇢AB)   v and by lemma 6.2
Hmax(A|B)⇢    u. Applying the symmetrization argument (lemma 7.6) gives
rise to a Bell-diagonal state  AB such that Hmax(A|B)     u and  max( AB)  







u    Hmax(A|B)    f
 
 max( AB)
    f(v), (7.82)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that f is monotonically increas-
ing.
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7.3 Decoherence estimation through CHSH tests
in GPTs
In this section, we are going to develop a framework for decoherence analysis
in analogy to the last section, but without assuming that nature is correctly
described by quantum theory. Instead, we will work in a framework that makes
only minimal assumptions about the probabilistic structure of measurements.
This allows to make statements in cases where quantum theory might not be
a correct description of nature.
In section 7.3.1, we define a framework for probabilistic theories that has
become a standard one in the literature. Besides defining the core structure
in, we explain how we extend this framework to make it suitable for analyzing
tripartite states, in a way that allows us to make a decoherence analysis that
is analogous to the quantum case.
In section 7.3.2, we will define a decoherence quantity Dec(A|E)! for GPTs
as an analogue of the quantum min-entropyHmin(A|E)⇢. This will be our quan-
tity of interest for the decoherence analysis for GPTs. We will first motivate
an expression for Dec(A|E)!, analogous to equation (7.2) for quantum theory.
This expression will require us to define what a maximally entangled state in
a GPT is.
Section 7.3.3 is devoted to finding a bound on our decoherence quantity in
terms of the CHSH winning probability for Alice and Bob (which is a quantity
directly related to the CHSH parameter  AB). This bound allows us to in-
fer non-trivial statements about decoherence from measured data when, apart
from the iid assumption, we assume only very little about the behavior of na-
ture. We approach our bound by first bounding our fidelity-based decoherence
quantity by a trace distance-based quantity. We will then bound this trace
distance-based quantity in terms of the CHSH winning probability for Alice
and Bob by a quantity that can be expressed as a linear program.
Finally, in section 7.3.4, we show how our bound can be expressed as a linear
program and present the numerical results. This is followed by a discussion of
the physical interpretation of our numerical findings.
7.3.1 The framework
A basic framework for GPTs
Frameworks for probabilistic theories in which quantum theory and classical
theory can be formulated as special cases have already been considered some
decades ago [Mac93; Edw70; DL70]. After some period of oblivion, a seminal
paper by Hardy [Har01] caused a revival in the interest in such frameworks (see,
for example, [MM11a; Mas+12; CDP11; DB11; Udu12; PW13] and references
therein). Today, they are generally referred to as frameworks for generalized
probabilistic theories [Bar07].
We formalize our decoherence analysis for GPTs in the abstract state space
framework [BW09; Bar+08; BGW09; BW11]. It is one rigorous formalization
of what a generalized probabilistic theory is, amongst a few equivalent or
closely related ones that can be found in the literature (see the references cited
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above). We prefer it for its concise and precise formulation. For the sake of
brevity, we will not go far beyond the mere mathematical definitions related
to abstract state spaces here. For a detailed introduction to abstract state
spaces, see [Pfi12].
Definition 7.8 : An abstract state space is a triple (V, V +, u), where V is
a finite- dimensional real vector space, V + is a cone3 in V which is closed4 and
generating5 and u 2 V ⇤ is a linear functional6 on V such that u(!) > 0 for all
! 2 V + \ {0}. The functional u is called the unit eﬀect.
Definition 7.9 : For an abstract state space (V, V +, u), we define the following
induced structure (see figure 7.6):
The normalized states are the elements of the set7
⌦ := {! 2 V + | u(!) = 1} . (7.83)
The subnormalized states are the elements of the set
⌦ := {! 2 V + | u(!)  1} . (7.84)
The eﬀects are the elements of the set
E := {e 2 V ⇤ | 0  e(!)  1 8! 2 ⌦} . (7.85)
The measurements are the elements of the set
M :=
(






An eﬀect represents a measurement outcome. If a system in a state ! is
measured with respect to a measurement M = {e1, . . . , en}, then ek(!) is the
probability that the measurement yields the outcome associated with ek.
Example 7.10 (Quantum theory): The probabilistic structure of mea-
surements on a (finite-dimensional) quantum system can be formulated as an
abstract state space. For a quantum system with an associated Hilbert space
H, consider the abstract state space
(V, V +, u) = (Herm(H),Pos(H), tr) , (7.87)
3 A subset V + ✓ V is a cone in V if
(C1) V + + V + ✓ V +,
(C2) ↵V + ✓ V + for all ↵   0,
(C3) V + \ ( V +) = {0},
4We assume the standard topology on V , i.e. the only linear Hausdorﬀ topology on V .
5 A cone V + ✓ V is generating if V +   V + = V .
6 For a finite-dimensional vector space V , we denote by V ⇤ the dual space of V , i.e. the
vector space of linear functionals on V .
7 Unfortunately, using the letter ⌦ here produces a notation clash: we have already used
this symbol to denote sample spaces of probability spaces (see chapter 2). However, in both
cases, the use of the letter ⌦ is a strongly established standard that we want to comply with.
In this chapter, ⌦ will always refer to the set of states of an abstract state space, so there
should not be any confusion.
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Figure 7.6: Visualization of an abstract state space. The set V + is
a cone in a vector space V , here shown as a cone with a square base. The
normalized states ⌦ are given by the intersection of V + with the plane on
which the functional u takes the value 1. The set ⌦ consists of those elements
of V + on which the functional u takes values between 0 and 1.
where V = Herm(H) is the real vector space of Hermitian operators on H,
V + = Pos(H) is the cone of positive operators on H and u = tr is the trace
on H. According to definition 7.9, this yields the states
⌦ = {⇢ 2 Pos(H) | tr(⇢) = 1} , (7.88)
which are precisely the density operators on H. Analogously, ⌦ are the
subnormalized density operators. The eﬀects are the functionals induced by
POVM elements via the trace,
E = {tr(P · ) | P 2 Pos(H), P  1H}k, . (7.89)




{tr(Pk · ) | Pk 2 {Pk}k} | {Pk}k is a POVM
o
. (7.90)
This precisely reproduces the structure of measurement statistics in quantum
theory. For further details, see [Pfi12]. ⌅
By our definition, E is the set of all linear functionals e such that 0 
e(!)  1 for all ! 2 ⌦. The underlying assumption that every such linear
functional represents a physical measurement outcome has been called the
no-restriction hypothesis [Udu12]. A priori, there seems to be no immediate
physical reason for this assumption, and some authors have argued about how
to weaken this assumption [JL13]. For our purposes here, it is not relevant
whether the no-restriction hypothesis holds, and weakening the assumption
complicates the definitions. Thus, we assume it for simplicity.
In section 7.3.2, we will define a decoherence quantity Dec(A|E)! analo-
gous to the corresponding quantity in quantum theory, expression (7.2). It
involves the fidelity as a measure of closeness of quantum states. Therefore, it
is desirable to have a generalization of the fidelity to states in abstract state
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spaces. Looking at the expression definition 3.14, there seems to be no obvi-
ous generalization. However, as we have seen in proposition 3.16, the fidelity
can be expressed as the classical fidelity of the probability distribution over the
outcomes of a measurement, minimized over all measurements. This motivates
us to define the fidelity for abstract state spaces as follows.
Definition 7.11 : Let (V, V +, u) be an abstract state space with normalized
states ⌦ and measurements M. For states !, ⌧ 2 ⌦, we define the fidelity of
! and ⌧ as
F (!, ⌧) := inf
M2M







The quantity b(!, ⌧ |M) is the Bhattacharyya coeﬃcient (or sometimes
called the classical fidelity) of the probability distributions that the measure-
ment M induces on the states ! and ⌧ .
The fidelity as defined in definition 7.11 precisely reduces to the quantum
fidelity in the case where the abstract state space is a quantum state space.
In addition to the fidelity, in section 7.3.3 we will also consider a generaliza-
tion of the quantum trace distance D(⇢,  ) = 12tr|⇢   | in order to formulate
a bound on Dec(A|E)!. Again, proposition 3.16 tells us how to generalize it
to abstract state spaces, motivating the following definition.
Definition 7.12 : Let (V, V +, u) be an abstract state space with normalized
states ⌦ and measurements M. For states !, ⌧ 2 ⌦, the trace distance
between ! and ⌧ is given by
D(!, ⌧) := sup
M2M






The quantity d(!, ⌧ |M) is the total variation distance (or sometimes called
the classical trace distance) between the probability distributions that the
measurement M induces on the states ! and ⌧ .
Note that the fidelity and the trace distance take values between 0 and 1 for
all states. For squares of the quantities F , b, D and d, we will write the square
sign right after the letter, e.g. we will write F 2(!, ⌧) instead of (F (!, ⌧))2.
A tripartite framework for GPTs
In section 7.3.2, we will consider a tripartite situation for the decoherence
analysis. This requires us to model a tripartite scenario mathematically since
such a structure is not induced by an abstract state space (V, V +, u) alone.
We need to specify it as additional structure. Our goal here is to do this with
the weakest possible assumptions, resulting in a very general validity of the
bounds we derive.
Instead of assuming individual state spaces for every party, we only con-
sider their overall combined state space, modeled by an abstract state space
(V, V +, u) and all its induced structure as in definitions 7.8 and 7.9. This has
the advantage that we do not have to make assumptions about how individual
state spaces combine to multipartite state spaces, keeping our assumptions
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weak. For our purposes, the only structure that we need to add to an abstract
state space (V, V +, u) to make it suitable for the description of a tripartite
scenario are the local transformations that each individual party can perform.
The local measurements of the three parties are then induced by these local
transformations.
We consider three parties, which we call Alice (A), Bob (B) and Eve (E) as
before. We begin our considerations by assuming that there are three sets T A,
T B and T E, containing all the transformations that Alice, Bob and Eve can
perform, respectively. By a transformation, we mean a linear map T : V ! V
which maps states to subnormalized states, i.e. T (⌦) ✓ ⌦ (or, equivalently,
T (V +) ✓ V + and (u   T )(!)  u(!) for all ! 2 V +). We can consider
the case where several transformations are applied because compositions of
transformations are transformations again: If T , T 0 are linear maps V ! V
which map ⌦ inside ⌦, then the same is true for the composition T   T 0 (we
denote the composition of maps by a   symbol).
We assume that the three parties act individually at spatially separated
locations. Relativistic considerations lead to the consistency requirement that
transformations performed by diﬀerent parties must commute, e.g. if Alice
performs a transformation TA 2 T A and Bob performs a transformation TB 2
T B, then the total transformation must satisfy TA   TB = TB   TA.
For our purposes, we do not need to specify the sets T A, T B and T E
any further; the only requirement is that transformations of distinct parties
commute. The sets T A, T B and T E define the systems A, B and E, i.e. we
define the individual parties via the transformations that they can perform.
This leads us to the following definition.
Definition 7.13 : A tripartite scenario is a quadruplet
SABE = ((V, V
+, u), T A, T B, T E) , (7.93)
where (V, V +, u) is an abstract state space, and where
T A, T B, T E ✓
 
T : V ! V linear    T (⌦) ✓ ⌦ (7.94)
are such that for all P, P 0 2 {A,B,E} with P 6= P 0, it holds that TP   TP 0 =
TP 0   TP for all TP 2 T P and for all TP 0 2 T P 0 . We call the elements of T A,
T B and T E the local transformations of A, B and E, respectively.
It is absolutely natural to define tripartite scenarios via commuting trans-
formations rather than via a tensor product structure. In quantum theory,
the two approaches are equivalent in finite dimensions (we will talk about
this below). In more general infinite-dimensional cases, where it is not known
whether the two approaches are equivalent, things are usually formalized in a
commutative way rather than via tensor products (see [SW87], for example).
Knowing about the equivalence in finite dimensions, we will formulate some
quantum examples in the tensor product structure below.
Example 7.14 (A tripartite quantum scenario): One can formulate
a tripartite situation in quantum theory as a tripartite scenario. Based on
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example 7.10, consider the tripartite scenario
((Herm(H),Pos(H), tr), T A, T B, T E) , where (7.95)
H = HA ⌦HB ⌦HE , (7.96)
T A = {RA ⌦ 1B ⌦ 1E | RA is a trace non-increasing CPM on Herm(HA)} ,
(7.97)
T B = {1A ⌦RB ⌦ 1E | RB is a trace non-increasing CPM on Herm(HB)} ,
(7.98)
T E = {1A ⌦ 1B ⌦RE | RE is a trace non-increasing CPM on Herm(HE)} ,
(7.99)
where CPM stands for completely positive map. Having tensor product form,
the local transformations of diﬀerent parties commute. ⌅
For our purposes, definition 7.13 is all the structure one needs to specify.
The local measurements are induced by the local transformations. We for-
malize this via the notion of a local instrument [DL70]. To get an intuition
for what an instrument is, consider a Stern-Gerlach experiment. A spin-1/2
particle enters a magnet and undergoes one of two transformations: It either
gets deflected upwards or downwards. Which of the two transformations it
undergoes is determined probabilistically. Then it hits a screen, which reveals
which of the two transformations the particle has undergone. This way, a
measurement has been performed in two stages: a probabilistic application of
a transformation and a detection. The sum of the probabilities of detecting
the particle at the top or the bottom of the screen is one. If the state of the
particle is described by a state ! 2 ⌦ of an abstract state space, we may model
this by a set of two transformations {Tup, Tdown}. Such a set is an instrument.
The norm u(Tup(!)) is the probability that the particle is deflected upwards,
and likewise for u(Tdown(!)). Thus, u can be seen to play the role of the screen,
detecting the particle. The requirement that the particle must undergo one
of the two deflections reads u   Tup + u   Tdown = u. The transformation Tup
is the analogue of the transformation ⇢ 7! Pup⇢Pup in quantum theory, where
Pup is the projector onto the spin-up state. Since u is given by the trace in
quantum theory, the probability for the upward-deflection to occur is given by
tr(Pup⇢Pup) = tr(Pup⇢), which is precisely the Born rule.
A local instrument is such a set of transformations where all the transforma-
tions are the local transformations of one party. This motivates the following
definition.
Definition 7.15 (Local instruments): For a tripartite scenario
SABE = ((V, V
+, u), T A, T B, T E) (7.100)




IP ✓ T P finite
      X
TP2IP
u   TP = u
)
for P 2 {A,B,E} . (7.101)
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Example 7.16 (Local instruments in a tripartite quantum scenario):
Considering the tripartite scenario of example 7.14, we get that the local in-
struments are given by
IP =
(
IP ✓ T P
      X
TP2IP
TP is a TPCPM
)
for P 2 {A,B,E} . ⌅
Remark 7.17 (Local measurements): The definition of local instruments
gives us a notion of local measurements as well. Consider a tripartite sce-
nario SABE = ((V, V +, u), T A, T B, T E) with its set of measurements M. It is
easily verified that for a local transformation TA 2 T A, the map u   TA is an
eﬀect (as defined in definition 7.9). Likewise, for a local instrument IA 2 IA,
the set {u TA | TA 2 IA} is a measurement. We interpret it as a measurement
performed by Alice. We can also consider composite measurements where sev-
eral parties locally perform measurements. For local instruments IA 2 IA and
IB 2 IB, for example, the set {u   TA   TB | TA 2 IA, TB 2 IB} is a measure-
ment. We interpret it as a composite measurement where Alice and Bob each
perform local measurements, described by IA and IB. The analogous holds for
other parties and combinations thereof.
Example 7.18 (Local measurements in a tripartite quantum sce-
nario): Based on examples 7.14 and 7.16, we can say how local measurements
look like in a tripartite quantum scenario. A local eﬀect of Alice is of the form
⇢ABE 7! tr(RA ⌦ 1B ⌦ 1E(⇢ABE)) (7.102)
for a trace non-increasing CPM RA on Herm(HA). However, for every such
CPM, there is a POVM element PA on HA such that8
tr((PA ⌦ 1B ⌦ 1E)⇢ABE) = tr(RA ⌦ 1B ⌦ 1E(⇢ABE)) . (7.103)
This recovers the Born rule. Analogously, a composite measurement where
Alice and Bob each perform local measurements consists of local eﬀects of the
form
⇢ABE 7! tr(RA ⌦RB ⌦ 1E(⇢ABE)) = tr((PA ⌦ PB ⌦ 1E)⇢ABE) (7.104)
for POVM elements PA, PB on HA, HB. Thus, in our tripartite quantum ex-
ample, local measurements reduce to POVM measurements of product form. ⌅
In examples 7.14, 7.16 and 7.18, instead of choosing a tensor factorization
for H and setting the local transformations to be acting non-trivially on one
tensor factor, we could have chosen sets of transformations that merely com-
mute, without a tensor product structure. The question of whether the result-
ing measurement statistics in that case would be diﬀerent from the case with
the tensor factor structure is known as Tsirelson’s problem [SW08; Doh+08].
More precisely, the question is the following. Let H be a Hilbert space, let
⇢ be a density operator on H, let {Pk}k, {Ql}l be POVMs on H such that













kFk. (We omitted the other tensor factors for
brevity.)
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PkQl = QlPk for all k, l. Tsirelson’s problem is: Does there necessarily exist
Hilbert spaces HA, HB, a density operator   on HA⌦HB and POVMs {Rk}k
on HA and {Sl}l on HB such that tr(PkQl⇢) = tr((Rk ⌦ Sl) ) for all k, l? In
the case where H is finite-dimensional, the answer is known to be aﬃrmative.
For infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, the answer is still unknown.
Thus, for finite-dimensional quantum systems, we can restrict ourselves
to the case with the tensor product structure without loss of generality. For
abstract state spaces, however, an analogous restriction might cause a loss of
generality. The advantage of our weak definition of a tripartite scenario is that
we do not need to know the answer to an equivalent of Tsirelson’s problem for
generalized probabilistic theories. The downside is that it makes defining an
equivalent of the min-entropy more diﬃcult. We will deal with this issue in
the next subsection.
Notation : From now on, whenever we speak of a tripartite scenario SABE,
we implicitly assume that all its parts and induced structures are denoted as
in definitions 7.8, 7.9, 7.13 and 7.15 without restating it, i.e. instead of writing
“Let SABE = ((V, V +, u), T A, T B, T E) be a tripartite scenario, let ⌦ be its
set of normalized states, . . . ”, we will only write “Let SABE be a tripartite
scenario”.
7.3.2 A decoherence quantity for GPTs
Motivation of an expression that quantifies decoherence
We are now going to motivate an expression for the central quantity Dec(A|E)!
for our decoherence analysis for GPTs. We take our inspiration from equa-
tion (7.2) for the quantum version of the quantity, which we repeat here for
the reader’s convenience:
Dec(A|E)⇢ = maxRE!A0 F
2(| ih |AA0 ,1A ⌦RE!A0(⇢AE)) . (7.105)
There are two issues that prevent us from directly translating expression
(7.105) into our framework. The first issue is that in section 7.3.1, to keep
our framework as general as possible, we have defined a tripartite scenario
with an overall state space (V, V +, u) with tripartite states ⌦. We do not have
notions of individual state spaces at hand. Thus, we do not have an analogue
of a reduced state ⇢AE or of a transformation RE!A0 from one state space to
another.
The second issue is that we do not know what the analogue of a maximally
entangled state  AA0 in our framework is. We resolve the first issue here,
arriving at an expression for Dec(A|E)!. In the next subsection we will then
define what a maximally entangled state is in our framework.
Expression (7.105), which involves the state ⇢AE and TPCPMs RE!A0 ,
can be transformed to an expression in which both the state and the TPCPMs
are purified (see figure 7.7). This expression will be our motivation for the
expression for Dec(A|E)!. The maximization over TPCPMs from E to A0 is
replaced by a maximization over unitaries from EE 00 to A0A00, where E 00 and A00
are ancilla systems extending system E and A0, respectively. This is precisely
the purification (or Stinespring dilation) of a channel. Since systems EE 00 and
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A0A00 have the same dimension, we can identify their Hilbert spaces and regard
the resulting Hilbert space as the Hilbert space of a system Etot. This system
involves all subsystems that the third party needs to control in order to bring
itself as close as possible to maximal entanglement with Alice. Since UEtot is a
transformation on system Etot alone, we can translate it into our generalized
framework.
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FIG. III.2: Purification of equation (I.14). Part (a) shows the system and maps involved in expression (I.14) for the
quantum min-entropy. In expression (III.20), we purify this situation, as shown in (b), to arrive at a situation with three
parties A, B and Etot, and with a map UEtot which acts on one system Etot alone rather than mapping from one system to
another.
The state ⇢AE is replaced by a purification ⇢ABE . We choose the purifying system B to be the channel’s output
system, which gives us the overall picture of our decoherence analysis as shown in Figure III.3.
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FIG. III.3: Overall picture of our decoherence analysis for GPTs. Since the purifying system B in expression (III.20)
is not specified, we can choose it such that it fits our situation for the decoherence analysis.
The following gives a precise formulation of the purification of expression (I.14). It can be proved using purification
and Stinespring dilation. Let HA, HE be finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces of dimensions dA, dE , respectively, let
⇢AE 2 S(HA⌦HE). Then, for any purification ⇢ABE 2 S(HA⌦HB ⌦HE) of ⇢AE , any Hilbert spaces HA0 , HA00 and
FI . III.2: urification of equation (I.14). art (a) sho s the syste and aps involved in expression (I.14) for the
quantu in-entropy. In expression (III.20), e purify this situation, as sho n in (b), to arrive at a situation ith three
parties , and tot, and ith a ap Etot hich acts on one syste tot alone rather than apping fro one syste to
another.
he state ⇢AE is replaced by a purification ⇢ABE . e choose the purifying syste to be the channel’s output









FIG. III.3: Overall picture of our decoherence analysis for GPTs. Since the purifying system B in expression (III.20)
is not specified, we can choose it such that it fits our situation for the decoherence analysis.
The following gives a precise formulation of the purification of expression (I.14). It can be proved using purification
and Stinespring dilation. Let HA, HE be finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces of dimensions dA, dE , respectively, let
⇢AE 2 S(HA⌦HE). Then, for any purification ⇢ABE 2 S(HA⌦HB ⌦HE) of ⇢AE , any Hilbert spaces HA0 , HA00 and
I . III. : ll i f l i f . i t rif i s st i r ssi (III. )
is t s ifi , s it s t t it fits r sit ti f r t r l sis.
f ll i i i f l i f ifi i f i I. . I i ifi i
i i il i . , fi i - i i l il f i i , , i l , l
. , f ifi i f , il 0 , 00
Figure 7.7: Purification of equation (7.105). Part (a) shows the system
and maps i volved in expression (7.105) for the quantum min-en ropy. In
expression (7.106), we purify this situation, as shown in (b), o arrive at
situation with three parties A, B and Etot, and with a map UEtot which acts
on one system Etot alone rather than mapping from one system to another.
The state ⇢AE is replaced by a purification ⇢ABE. We choose the purifying
system B to be the channel’s output system, which gives us the overall picture
of our decoherence analysis as shown in figure 7.8.
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Figure 7.8: Overall picture of our decoherence analysis or GPTs.
Since the purifying system B in expression (7.106) is ot specified, we can
choose i such that it fits our situation for the decoherence analys s.
The following lemma giv s a precise formulation of th purificatio of ex-
pression (7.105). It n be proved using purification and Stinespring dilat on.
Lemma 7.19 : LetHA, HE be finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces of dimensions
dA, dE, respectively, let ⇢AE 2 S(HA⌦HE). Then, for any purification ⇢ABE 2
S(HA⌦HB⌦HE) of ⇢AE, any Hilbert spaces HA0 , HA00 and HE00 of dimension
dA0 = dA, dA00 = dAdE and dE00 = d2A, respectively, any maximally entangled
state  AA0 2  AA0 and any pure state |0ih0|E00 2 S(HE00), it holds that
Hmin(A|E)⇢




F 2( AA0 ⌦  BA00 , (1AB ⌦ UEtot)⇢ABEtot(1AB ⌦ U †Etot)) ,
(7.106)
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where ⇢ABEtot = ⇢ABE ⌦ |0ih0|E00 and where the first maximization ranges over
unitaries
UEtot : HE ⌦HE00 ! HA0 ⌦HA00 , where HA0 ⌦HA00 ' HE ⌦HE00 =: HEtot
(7.107)
and the second maximization ranges over pure states  BA00 2 S(HB ⌦HA00).
Now we translate expression (7.106) into our generalized framework. We
interpret the system Etot as the system controlled by Eve, and therefore rename
Etot ! E.
• We replace the maximization over all unitaries UEtot acting on system
Etot by a supremum9 over all local transformations TE 2 T E.10
• We generalize the quantum fidelity to the fidelity in abstract state spaces
as defined in definition 7.11.
• We replace the state ⇢ABEtot = ⇢ABE ⌦ |0ih0|E00 by a state ! 2 ⌦.
• If we look at the state  AA0 ⌦  BA00 , we see that it is a state of maximal
entanglement between Alice (A) and Eve (A0A00) in the sense that by
performing measurements with elements of the form PA⌦PA0⌦1B⌦1A00 ,
they can get any statistics that two parties A and A0 would be able to
get by performing local measurements on the maximally entangled state
 AA0 . We translate this into our framework by assuming that there is
a set  AE of “states with maximal correlation between Alice and Eve”.
Instead of minimizing over states  AA0 ⌦  BA00 , we then minimize over
the set  AE.
We postpone the discussion of how such a set  AE looks like. We will give
a definition of such a set in the next subsection. For now, we write down
an expression for our decoherence quantity Dec(A|E)! that depends on the






F 2( , TE(!)) . (7.108)
We interpret the decoherence to be high when this quantity is high and vice
versa, which is the opposite of Hmin(A|E)⇢. Before we can define Dec(A|E)!,
however, we need to specify what a maximally entangled state in a GPT is.
9 We do not assume enough about T E to guarantee that the maximum is achieved, so
we replace it by a supremum.
10 One might raise the objection that in the quantum case, example 7.14, the unitaries
only correspond to those elements of T E which bijectively map the space of density operators
onto itself. It would be possible to include this restriction, but we decide not to do so, for
two reason: We want to keep things simple, and we want to avoid the assumption that
actions that the third party can perform can be purified as in the quantum case.
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Definition of maximal correlation in GPTs
The expression (7.108) for our decoherence quantity Dec(A|E)! contains a
maximization over a set  AE ✓ ⌦ which we interpret to be the set of states
with maximal correlation between Alice and Eve. We now define this set.
Definition 7.20 : For a tripartite scenario SABE, we define the set  AE of









there is a binary local instrument IE = {T 0E, T 1E} 2 IE




Definition 7.20 can be read as follows. The superscripts 0 and 1 of the
elements of the instruments IA and IE stand for measurement outcomes, so
(u T 0A T 0E)( ) or (u T 1A T 1E)( ) is the probability that Alice and Eve both get
outcome 0 or both get outcome 1, respectively, when they measure with respect
to IA, IE, respectively. Thus, the sum of these probabilities is the probability
that Alice’s and Eve’s measurement outcomes are perfectly correlated. This
means that for a state  2  AE, it holds that for every binary measurement
of Alice, there is a binary measurement for Eve such that their measurement
outcomes are perfectly correlated.
A closer look at some subtleties is advisable here, both to avoid confusion
and to see the advantages of the weak assumptions that define our framework.
With reference to example 7.18, one may point out that the set8>><>>:  2 S(HA ⌦HB ⌦HE)
        
For every binary POVM {P 0A, P 1A} onHA, there
is a binary POVM {P 0E, P 1E} on HE such that
tr((P 0A ⌦ 1B ⌦ P 0E) ) + tr((P 1A ⌦ 1B ⌦ P 1E) ) = 1 .
9>>=>>;
(7.110)
is empty. This may seem to make our definition of  AE incompatible with
quantum theory. Note, however, that the set8>>>><>>>>:  2 S(HA ⌦HB ⌦HE)
          
For every binary projective measurement
{P 0A, P 1A} on HA, there is a binary projective
measurement {P 0E, P 1E} on HE such that
tr((P 0A ⌦ 1B ⌦ P 0E) ) + tr((P 1A ⌦ 1B ⌦ P 1E) ) = 1 .
9>>>>=>>>>;
(7.111)
is not empty as long as dimHE   dimHA. If, as above, HE = HA0 ⌦ HA00
with HA0 ' HA, then this set contains all the states of the form  AA0 ⌦  BA00
with  AA0 2  AA0 as in (7.106). The advantage of our weak definition of the
local transformations is that it does not force to see T A as the analogue of
the set of all CPMs of the form RA ⌦ 1B ⌦ 1E, but that it can be considered
to be the analogue of all such CPMs which induce a functional of the form
  7! tr(P ), where P is a projector. example 7.18 can be modified accordingly
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(see example 7.22 below). This makes our definition of  AE compatible with
quantum theory.
With definition 7.20 at hand, we are finally ready to define the decoherence
quantity.
Definition 7.21 : Let SABE be a tripartite scenario, let ! 2 ⌦. We define





F 2( , TE(!)) (7.112)
Example 7.22 : We consider a special case of a tripartite scenario in quantum
theory. Consider
((Herm(H),Pos(H), tr), T A, T B, T E) , where (7.113)
H = HA ⌦HB ⌦HE (7.114)
T A =
8><>:RA ⌦ 1B ⌦ 1E
       
RA is a trace non-increasing CPM on
Herm(HA) such that there is a projector PA




and analogously for T B and T E. In addition, we assume for simplicity that
HA ' HE. In this case,
 AE =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
  2 S(HA ⌦HB ⌦HE)
               
For every binary projective measure-
ment {P 0A, P 1A} on HA, there is a bi-
nary projective measurement {P 0E, P 1E}
on HE such that
tr((P 0A ⌦ 1B ⌦ P 0E) )
+ tr((P 1A ⌦ 1B ⌦ P 1E) ) = 1 .
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
(7.116)
= { AE ⌦  B |  AE 2  AE ,  B 2 S(HB)} , (7.117)
where  AE is the set of maximally entangled states on S(HA ⌦ HE). For a
pure state ⇢ABE 2 S(HA ⌦HB ⌦HE), this gives us
Dec(A|E)⇢ = maxRE max AE max B F
2( AE ⌦ ⇢B,1A ⌦ 1B ⌦RE(⇢ABE)) (7.118)
= max
RE





Hence, Hmin(A|E)⇢ =   log dADec(A|E)⇢. ⌅
7.3.3 Bounds on the decoherence quantity for GPTs
The goal of this subsection is to derive an upper bound on Dec(A|E)! in terms
of the CHSH winning probability pCHSHAB of Alice and Bob. This probability is
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It corresponds to a game in which Alice and Bob are given question x, y 2 {0, 1}
and try to give answers a, b 2 {0, 1} such that a   b = xy. We assume that
this connection is clear to the reader. For further information, see [Bru+14].
We formulate the bound as a minimization problem which we solve and in-
terpret in section 7.3.4. In the following, we derive a lower bound on  logDec(A|E)!.
We make the convention that   log 0 =1, where 1 is a symbol for which we
accept the inequality 1   r for every real number r. This lower bound on
  logDec(A|E)! then gives us an upper bound on Dec(A|E)!. In a first step,
we bound the fidelity-based quantity   logDec(A|E)! by a trace distance-
based quantity. This has the advantage that the resulting optimization prob-
lem which gives us the bound can be solved using linear programming.
Proposition 7.23 : Let SABE be a tripartite scenario, let ! 2 ⌦. Then




D2( , TE(!)) . (7.122)
The following lemma is useful for the proof of proposition 7.23 below.
Lemma 7.24 : For all x 2 (0, 1], it holds that   log(x2)   2(1  x).
Proof. We have that   log(x2) =  2 log(x), so the claim is equivalent to
(x  1)  log(x)   0 for all x 2 (0, 1] . (7.123)
The functions F (x) = log(x) and G(x) = x 1 are diﬀerentiable on R>0. Thus,
by the fundamental theorem of calculus, it holds that for all x 2 R>0,
F (x) = F (1) +
Z x
1
f(y)dy , G(x) = G(1) +
Z x
1








so for all x 2 (0, 1], we have that










<0 for all y2(0,1]
dy   0 . (7.128)
This proves the claim.
Proof of proposition 7.23. Since the right hand side of (7.122) is a finite real
number, the inequality trivially holds if Dec(A|E)! = 0 by the above con-
vention. Thus, we assume in the following that Dec(A|E)! > 0. We have
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that











F ( , TE(!))
◆2
(7.130)





F ( , TE(!)) 2 (0, 1] , (7.131)
we get that




















2(1  b( , TE(!)|M)) . (7.134)
For the Bhattacharyya coeﬃcient b and the total variation distance d, it has
been shown [Kra55] that for any two probability distributions distributions, it
holds that 2(1  b)   d2. Since this is true in particular for the two probability
distributions that the measurement M induces on the states  and TE(!), we
get that











D2( , TE(!)) , (7.136)
as claimed.
The idea that the fidelity and the trace distance are related is not new. In
quantum theory, the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequalities (FvdG) relate the two
quantities [FG99]. Inequality (7.122) is not completely analogous to the FvdG
inequalities: It makes use of the logarithm in (7.122), which allows to apply
classical relations that lead to a stronger bound than with the application of
the FvdG inequalities.
For the bounds that we are going to derive, the notion of a non-signalling
distribution is central. Our bounds are essentially minimizations of functions
over sets of non-signalling distributions P [a, b, c|x, y, z]! and P [a, c|x, z] with
certain additional properties.
Definition 7.25 : A set of numbers P [a, b, c|x, y, z]! 2 [0, 1], indexed by
numbers a, b, c 2 {0, 1} which we call outcomes, and numbers x, y, z 2 {0, 1}
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which we call settings, is a non-signalling distribution if
normalization:X
a,b,c
P [a, b, c|x, y, z]! = 1 for all x, y, z 2 {0, 1} , (7.137)
no-signalling:X
a
P [a, b, c|0, y, z]! =
X
a
P [a, b, c|1, y, z]! 8 b, c, y, z 2 {0, 1} , (7.138)X
b
P [a, b, c|x, 0, z]! =
X
b
P [a, b, c|x, 1, z]! 8 a, b, x, y 2 {0, 1} , (7.139)X
b
P [a, b, c|x, y, 0]! =
X
b
P [a, b, c|x, y, 1]! 8 a, b, x, y 2 {0, 1} . (7.140)
Similarly, a set of numbers P [a, c|x, z] 2 [0, 1], indexed by outcomes a, c 2








P [a, c|0, z] =
X
a
P [a, c|1, z] 8 c, z 2 {0, 1} ,
(7.142)X
c
P [a, c|x, 0] =
X
c
P [a, c|x, 1] 8 a, x 2 {0, 1} .
(7.143)
The interpretation of equations (7.138) to (7.140) is that it is impossible for
each of the three parties to signal to the other two parties by influencing their
measurement statistics with the choice of the measurement setting. These
one-party no-signalling constraints imply all the multi-party no-signalling con-
straints, saying that no collection of parties can signal to the remaining parties
[Bar+05], so we do not need to require these constraints separately.
Now we are going to formulate the bound on   logDec(A|E)! in terms of
the CHSH winning probability of Alice and Bob. Assume that Alice, Bob and
Eve are in a situation described by a tripartite scenario SABE. Suppose that
Alice and Bob have estimated that for the state ! 2 ⌦ that they are analyzing,
their CHSH winning probability is at least   for some   2 [0, 1]. Formulated
in our tripartite scenario language, this means that they have found out that
for local instruments
I0A = {T 0|0A , T 1|0A } 2 IA, I0B = {T 0|0B , T 1|0B } 2 IB, (7.144)










u   T a|xA   T b|yB
⌘
(!)     . (7.146)
In that case, what can Alice and Bob infer about   logDec(A|E)!? We have
seen in proposition 7.23 that this quantity is lower bounded by the infimum
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over the squared trace distance. Alice’s and Bob’s estimate on their CHSH
winning probability can be translated into a bound on this quantity. This is
shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 7.26 : Let SABE be a tripartite scenario, let ! 2 ⌦ be a state.
If the CHSH winning probability of Alice and Bob is at least  , i.e. if there are
local instruments I0A, I1A, I0B and I1B as in (7.144) and (7.145) and a   2 [0, 1]














     P [a, c|x, z]  X
b
P [a, b, c|x, y, z]!
      ,
where D!( ) is the set of non-signalling distributions for Alice, Bob and Eve
such that Alice and Bob have a CHSH winning probability of at least  , i.e.
D!( ) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
P [a, b, c|x, y, z]!
            















and where D is the set of non-signalling distributions for Alice and Eve such
that their measurement outcomes are perfectly correlated when they choose
the same measurement setting, i.e.
D =
⇢
P [a, c|x, z] 
     P [a, c|x, z] is a non-signalling distribu-tion such that P [a = c|x = z] = 1.
 
. (7.149)
Proposition 7.26 reduces our problem of lower bounding the decoherence
quantity for GPTs to an optimization over non-signalling distributions. This
allows us to use linear programming techniques, which in similar ways have
been used in [Ton09] to answer questions about non-signalling distributions.
We need the following lemma for the proof of proposition 7.26 below.
Lemma 7.27 : Let SABE be a tripartite scenario, let !, 2 ⌦. Then, for all











     (u   TA   UE)( )  X
TB2IB
(u   TA   TB   UE   TE)(!)
      .
(7.150)
Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that for all !, 2 ⌦, for all TE 2 T E and for all
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(IA, IB, IE) 2 IA ⇥ IB ⇥ IE,





     (u   TA   UE)( )  X
TB2IB
(u   TA   TB   UE   TE)(!)
      .
(7.151)
This is what we are going to show now. Let !, 2 ⌦, let TE 2 T E, let
(IA, IB, IE) 2 IA ⇥ IB ⇥ IE. Then
D( , TE(!)) = sup
M2M






|e( )  e(TE(!))| . (7.152)
If instead of taking the supremum over M, we only evaluate the expression
for a particular element of M, we get a lower bound on (7.152). We choose
the element (c.f. remark 7.17)
{u   TA   UE | TA 2 IA, UE 2 IE} 2M . (7.153)
Hence,





|(u   TA   UE)( )  (u   TA   UE   TE)(!)| . (7.154)
By the definition of a local instrument, u =
P
TB2IB u   TB. Thus,





     (u   TA   UE)( )  X
TB2IB









     (u   TA   UE)( )  X
TB2IB
(u   TA   TB   UE   TE)(!)
      ,
(7.156)
where in the last equality, we made use of the fact that transformations of
diﬀerent parties commute.
Proof of proposition 7.26. It is suﬃcient to show that for every  2  AE, the












     P [a, c|x, z]  X
b
P [a, b, c|x, y, z]!
      . (7.157)
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      (u   T a|xA   UE)( ) 
X
b2{0,1}
(u   T a|xA   T b|yB   UE   TE)(!)
       .
(7.158)
Let  2  AE, let I0E = {U0|0E , U1|0E }, I1E = {U0|1E , U1|1E } 2 IE be local instru-
ments for Eve such that
(u   T 0|0A   U0|0E )( ) + (u   T 1|0A   U1|0E )( ) = 1 , (7.159)
(u   T 0|1A   U0|1E )( ) + (u   T 1|1A   U1|1E )( ) = 1 , (7.160)
which exist according to the definition of  AE (definition 7.20). It holds that










      (u   T a|xA   U c|zE )( ) 
X
b2{0,1}










      P [a, c|x, z]  
X
b2{0,1}
P [a, b, c|x, y, z]!
       , (7.162)
where
P [a, c|x, z] = (u   T a|xA   U c|zE )( ) , (7.163)













      P [a, c|x, z]  
X
b2{0,1}
P [a, b, c|x, y, z]!
       . (7.165)
P [a, c|x, z] forms a non-signalling distribution: For the normalization, note
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that for all x, z 2 {0, 1}, we have that
X
a,c
P [a, c|x, z] =
X
a,c

















u   U c|zE
!
( ) (7.168)
= u( ) (7.169)
= 1 . (7.170)
For the no-signalling condition, note that for all c, z 2 {0, 1}, it holds that
X
a
P [a, c|0, z] =
  X
a

















P [a, c|1, z] , (7.174)
and that for all a, x 2 {0, 1}, it holds that
X
c
P [a, c|x, 0] =
X
c

























P [a, c|x, 1] , (7.180)
where in the second equality, we made use of the fact that local transformations
of diﬀerent parties commute. Analogously, for every TE 2 T E, P [a, b, c|x, y, z]!
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 T a|xA   T b|yB )(!) (7.182)
    , (7.183)
where the inequality is one of the assumptions of the proposition. Furthermore,
P [a, c|x, 1] satisfies
P [0, 0|0, 0] + P [1, 1|0, 0] = (u   T 0|0A   U0|0E )( ) + (u   T 1|0A   U1|0E )( ) = 1 ,
(7.184)
P [0, 0|1, 1] + P [1, 1|1, 1] = (u   T 0|1A   T 0|1)( ) + (u   T 1|1A   U1|1E )( ) = 1
(7.185)
(where we made use of (7.159) and (7.160)), which we may abbreviate as P [a =
c|x = z] = 1. Thus, for every TE 2 T E, we have that P [a, b, c|x, y, z]! 2










P [a,c|x,z] 2D ( AE , )
X
a,c2{0,1}
      P [a, c|x, z]  
X
b2{0,1}
P [a, b, c|x, y, z]!
       .
(7.186)
Since P [a, b, c|x, y, z]! satisfies the no-signalling property, the right hand side
of (7.186) is independent of y, so the minimization only needs to be performed
over x and z. Moreover, the infimum over the sets D!( ) and D is a minimum
because it is the infimum of a continuous function over a convex polytope,
which is always attained (see section 7.3.4 for more details). This completes
the proof.
Corollary 7.28 (The bound): Let SABE be a tripartite scenario, let ! 2 ⌦
be a state. If the CHSH winning probability of Alice and Bob is at least   (in
the above sense), then










     P [a, c|x, z]  X
b
P [a, b, c|x, y, z]!
      , (7.188)
Proof. This is a direct consequence of propositions 7.23 and 7.26.
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7.3.4 Evaluation of the bound and results
Formulation of the bound as a linear program
In this subsection, we evaluate the bound (7.187). To this end, we rewrite
(7.188) in terms of linear programs.
Linear Program : The bound  ( ), which is a function   : [0, 1] ! [0, 1], is
given as follows. For all   2 [0, 1], the value  ( ) is the solution of the linear
program
minimize  ( )
subject to P [a, b, c|x, y, z]! 2 D!( )
P [a, c|x, z] 2 D 
 ( )  Pa,c  xzac 8x, z 2 {0, 1}
 xzac   12(P [a, c|x, z]  
P
b P [a, b, c|x, 0, z]!)
    xzac 8a, c, x, z 2 {0, 1}
(7.189)
This is a linear program in 97 variables: 
P [a, b, c|x, y, z]!
 
a,b,c,x,y,z2{0,1} 64 variables 
P [a, c|x, z] 
 
a,c,x,z2{0,1} + 16 variables 
 xzac
 
a,c,x,z2{0,1} + 16 variables
 ( ) + 1 variable
= 97 variables
We have already written out the constraints for these 97 variables as inequal-
ities. The third and fourth line are already written as such in the program
description, and for the first two lines, we refer to the following:
constraint (in)equalities
P [a, b, c|x, y, z]! 2 D!( ) (7.137) to (7.140) and inequality in (7.148)
P [a, c|x, z] 2 D ( ) (7.141) to (7.143) and equation in (7.149)
The inequalities define a convex polytope over which the convex function  ( )
is minimized, so the minimum is attained. It is straightforward to bring these
inequalities into the standard form of linear programming. We solved the
resulting linear program using standard linear programming routines in Math-
ematica and Octave.
Solution of the linear program and discussion of the results
We plot the result in figure 7.9. The bound 2  2( ) is non-trivial for values
  2 (3/4, 1]. This is a very satisfactory result as one cannot expect the bound
to be non-trivial for   2 [0, 3/4]: A CHSH winning probability of at least
  2 [0, 3/4] for Alice and Bob is always compatible with Dec(A|E)! = 1.
To see this, note that the requirement for a state to yield a CHSH winning
probability for Alice and Bob of at least   2 [0, 3/4] is trivial: Alice and
Bob can choose trivial measurements that always yields 1 as an outcome,
independently of the state. More precisely, in our tripartite scenario language,
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D. Evaluation of the bound and results
1. Formulation of the bound as a linear program
In this subsection, we evaluate the bound (III.88). To this end, we rewrite (III.89) in terms of linear programs.
Linear Program: The bound  ( ), which is a function   : [0, 1] ! [0, 1], is given as follows. For all   2 [0, 1], the
value  ( ) is the solution of the linear program
minimize  ( )
subject to Pr[a, b, c|x, y, z]  2 D ( )
Pr[a, c|x, z]  2 D 
 ( )  Pa,c  xzac 8x, z 2 {0, 1}
 xzac   12 (Pr[a, c|x, z]   
P
b Pr[a, b, c|x, 0, z] )     xzac 8a, c, x, z 2 {0, 1}
(III.90)
This is a linear program in 97 variables: 





a,c,x,z {0,1} + 16 variables 
 xzac
 
a,c,x,z {0,1} + 16 variables
 ( ) + 1 variable
= 97 variables
We have already written out the constraints for these 97 variables as (in)equalities. The third and fourth line are
already written as such in the program description, and for the first two lines, we refer to the following:
constraint (in)equalities
Pr[a, b, c|x, y, z]  2 D ( ) (III.47) to (III.50) and inequality in (III.58)
Pr[a, c|x, z]  2 D ( ) (III.51) to (III.53) and equation in (III.59)
The inequalities define a convex polytope over which the convex function  ( ) is minimized, so the minimum is
attained. It is straightforward to bring these inequalities into the standard form of linear programming. We solved
the resulting linear program using standard linear programming routines in Mathematica and Octave.











FIG. III.4: Plot of the result. The bound 2  
2( ) is non-trivial precisely when the CHSH winning probability for Alice and
Bob is non-classical, i.e.   > 3/4.
We plot the result in Figure III.4. The bound 2  
2( ) is non-trivial for values   2 (3/4, 1]. This is a very satisfactory
result as one cannot expect the bound to be non-trivial for   2 [0, 3/4]: A CHSH winning probability of at least
  2 [0, 3/4] for Alice and Bob is always compatible with Dec(A|E)  = 1. To see this, note that the requirement
for a state to yield a CHSH winning probability for Alice and Bob of at least   2 [0, 3/4] is trivial: Alice and Bob
can choose trivial measurements that always yields 1 as an outcome, independently of the state. More precisely, in
Figure 7.9: Plot of the result. The bound 2  2( ) is non-trivial precisely
when the CHSH winning probability for Alice and Bob is non-classical, i.e.
  > 3/4.
we can express this as follows. Certainly, there are tripartite scenarios in which
the identity map 1V and the zero map 0V are in T A, T B and T E.11 For such









u   T a|xA   T b|yB
⌘





A }, {T 0|1A , T 1|1A } 2 IA,
{T 0|0B , T 1|0B }, {T 0|1B , T 1|1B } 2 IB
(7.190)






















B = 0V ,






B = 1V .
(7.191)
This means that the requirement that the CHSH winning probability for Alice
and Bob is at least   2 [0, 3/4] does not exclude the case ! 2  AE. In that
case, Dec(A|E)! = supTE2T E sup 2 AE F 2( , TE(!)) = 1.
7.4 An example test for gravitational decoher-
ence
In sections 7.2 and 7.3, we have derived bounds on the decoherence quantity
in terms of the CHSH parameter  AB for quantum theory and for more gen-
eral probabilistic theories. In this section, we will apply the quantum bound
derived in section 7.2 to derive a test for a particular model for gravitational
11Every tripartite scenario can be turned into such by adding 1V and 0V to the sets
of local transformations. In fact, it would be physical to assume that each set of local
transformations contains 1V and 0V .
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decoherence. By what we explained in section 7.1, the CHSH parameter  AB
that is measured in this test can then be tested against non-quantum theories
as well. For example, it can be tested against the weak bound that we derived
in the last section, or it can be tested against more specific non-quantum the-
ories by adding additional constraints to the linear program that derives the
bound. For the numerical calculations in this section, we use the quantum
bound of section 7.2.
As we mentioned in section 7.1, gravitational decoherence is a prime candi-
date for the application of our generalized decoherence estimation formalism.
This is because we have no consistent theory of quantum gravity. It seems that
correct descriptions of experiments involving gravitational eﬀects are likely to
fall outside the regime of quantum theory. Therefore, it is useful to have ex-
perimental tests at hand whose outcomes can be interpreted without relying
on quantum mechanics.
Candidate systems for the observation of gravitational decoherence are not
easy to find. On the one hand, the system needs to be massive enough to
exhibit detectable gravitational eﬀects. At the same time, however, they should
be small enough to interact coherently with other systems over a time period
that is long enough for an experiment. If these two conditions are satisfied
simultaneously, we may hope to see a gravitationally induced decoherence of
a system that is originally in a coherent superposition. Such systems are, in
some sense, neither macroscopic nor microscopic, and some people refer to
such systems as mesoscopic systems.
A particularly promising candidate for such a mesoscopic system that may
be used for probing gravitational decoherence is an optomechanical cavity. This
is an optical cavity where one of the bounding mirrors is movable, forming
a mechanical oscillator (see the lower part of figure 7.10). The physics of
optomechanical cavities is an open research field, and diﬀerent models for
potentially occurring eﬀects of gravitational decoherence exist [Pen96; Dió89;
Dio11; Dio84; Dio87; KTM14; Sta12; AH13; Hu14; AH07; Kay98; BGL07;
WBM06].
Here, we derive a test for Diosi’s model of gravitational decoherence [Dió89].
For the explanations in this section to be understood, some basic familiarity
with optomechanics is useful, but not strictly required.
7.4.1 An optomechanical setting and its model for grav-
itational decoherence
The objective here is to create two entangled photonic qubits in which one
photon is prepared in an opto-mechanical system that is itself subject to grav-
itational decoherence—if there is any—and the other photon is prepared in an
identical cavity except the mirrors are fixed and cannot move. This model is a
modification of the model first proposed by Bouwmeester [Mar+03] in which
an itinerant single photon pulse is injected into a cavity rather than created
intra-cavity as here. Our modification avoids the problem that the time over
which the photons interact with the mechanical element is stochastic and de-
termined by the random times at which the photons enter and exit the cavity
through an end mirror. In the new scheme, the cavities are assumed to have
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almost perfect mirrors — very narrow line width (see for example[Kes+12]).
The intracavity single photon Raman source is described in Nisbet-Jones,
et al. [NJ+11]. In this scheme (see Fig. 7.10) a control pulse can quickly and
eﬃciently prepare a cavity mode in a single photon state by driving a Raman
transition between two hyperfine levels we label as |gi, |ei. In our scheme
there are two optical cavities otherwise identical except in one of the cavities
a mechanical element can respond to the radiation pressure force of light.
We will assume that we can prepare the atomic sources in an arbitrary
entangled state |g, ei + |e, gi, for example, using the trapped ion schemes of
Monroe [DM10]. In addition we will assume that we can make arbitrary rota-
tions in the g, e subspace of each source and also make fast eﬃcient single shot
readout of the state of each source, for example using fluorescence shelving.
This means we can readout the atomic qubit in each cavity in any basis.





This is a rotation in the state space {|gi|0i, |ei|1i}. We can thus prepare
arbitrary states of the form cos#/2|gi|0i+sin#/2|ei|1i, where # is determined
by the pulse area. We will refer to the case of # = ⇡ as a ⇡-pulse. Note that
if the source is in the excited state |ei and the cavity is in the vacuum, no
photon is excited.
Starting with the cavities in the vacuum state the protocol proceeds as
follows:
1. Prepare the source atoms in the state |g, ei+ |e, gi,
2. Apply the write laser with a ⇡-pulse,
3. Free evolution of the OM systems for a time T ,
4. Apply the write laser with a ⇡-pulse,
5. Readout the atomic state in each cavity.
At the end of Step 2, the state of the sources and the cavities is | 2i =
|e, ei ⌦ (|1, 0i + |0, 1i) where |n,mi = |ni ⌦ |mi with each factor being a
photon number eigenstate.
Gravitational decoherence.
We will use Diosi’s theory of gravitational decoherence[Dió89]. This is equiva-
lent to the decoherence model introduced in Kafri et al. [KTM14]. One mirror
of the opto-mechanical cavity is free to move in a harmonic potential with fre-
quency !m. The master equation for a massive particle moving in a harmonic
potential, including gravitational decoherence is
d⇢
dt
















Raman single photon source
E(t)
b, b†
Figure 7.10: Two cavities each contain a Raman single photon source con-
trolled by an external laser ‘write field’ E(t). The Raman sources are first
prepared in an entangled state. Only one cavity contains a mechanical ele-
ment coupled by radiation rouser to the cavity field.
with xˆ, pˆ the usual canonical position and momentum operators. The gravita-







with G the Newton gravitational constant and   the density of the mechanical
element. As one might expect ⇤grav is quite small, of the order of 10 8 s 1 for
suspended mirrors (as in LIGO) with !m ⇠ 1.
Form a phenomenological perspective the eﬀect of gravitational decoher-
ence is analogous to a Browning heating eﬀect. To see this we note that the




Indeed, one could simulate this eﬀect by adding a stochastic driving force to





where I(t) satisfies an Ito stochastic diﬀerential equation,
dI(t) =
p
4⇤grav dW (t) (7.198)
where dW (t) is the Weiner increment. Averaging over all histories of the
stochastic driving force gives the final term in Eq. 7.193.
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In the absence of mechanical dissipation, there is no steady state. In reality
the mechanical quality factor, Q = !m/ m, is finite leading to a steady state




This of course assumes that there is no additional mechanical heating (reg-
ular thermodynamic kind): hardly a realistic assumption. This adds a large
(comparatively) additional term to ⇤grav so that we find (for kBT >> ~!m),
⇤grav ! ⇤grav + ⇤heat , where ⇤heat = kBT~Q . (7.200)
Given the incredibly large quality factor of Q = 1010, one would need to cool
the mechanical element to nano-Kelvin for the thermodynamical heating to be
of the order of the gravitational heating.
Optomechanical probe of gravitational decoherence.
The optomechanical Hamiltonian in cavity-one is
Hom = ~!mb†b+ ~g0(b+ b†) (7.201)
g0 is the single photon optomechanical coupling rate. Typically g0 ⇠ 1 s 1 for
the sorts of cavities we are considering here. This is about the same order of
magnitude as !m. In new field OM cavity technologies, g0 can be as high as
103 s 1 however in such cases the mechanical frequency is also typically much
higher ⇠ tens of MHz. The interaction time is T which is short compared to
the cavity decay time (which we neglect). We will assume that the mechanics
starts in a thermal state, the steady state of the system subject to gravitational








where n¯ = hb†biss is the steady state mean phonon number given in Eq. 7.199.
It is simplest to work in an interaction picture defined by the mechanical
free dynamics,
Hom,I = ~g0(be i!mt + b†ei!mt) (7.203)







(e i!mt   1) (7.205)




(|1, 0ih1, 0|+ |0, 1ih0, 1|+ |1, 0ih0, 1|+ |0, 1ih1, 0|)⌦ ⇢m (7.206)
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where ⇢m is the state of the mechanical element at the start of the protocol, a
thermal state. We can ignore the state of the atomic sources at this stage as
they do not participate in the OM interaction.






|1, 0ih1, 0|⇢m + |0, 1ih0, 1|U(t)⇢mU †(t)
+|1, 0ih0, 1|⇢mU †(t) + |0, 1ih1, 0|U(t)⇢m
⌘
(7.207)

































Continuing with the protocol from Step 4, now results in the state of the
atom-field system






The suppression of coherence due to the thermal state of the mechanics has
been transferred to a reduction of entanglement in the atomic sources. A
readout of the atomic sources will reveal this through either state tomography
or via a reduction in a CHSH correlation for a Bell-type experiment.
The function R(t) is a periodic function of time. At each period of the
motion it returns to its initial value of zero and the cavity field state would
return to the fully entangled state it was in after Step 2. If we chose T = 2⇡/!m
then the protocol will return the atomic system to the same entangled state in
which it began. This is because we have ignored the heating of the mechanics
over the period T so the only way decoherence enters is through the initial
thermal excitation of the mechanics. In eﬀect the protocol is a thermometer.
We thus see that for maximum eﬀect we need to ensure g0   !m. On the other
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hand, gravitational heating requires a small value of !m and typically such OM
systems have g0/!m ⌧ 1. Perhaps technical advances will enable OM systems
with long mechanical periods and large single photon coupling. Of course this
will also require sub hertz cavity line widths. In the (exceptionally) optimistic
case we can take T ⇠ 1 nK, !m ⇠ 1 s 1,  m ⇠ 10 10 s 1 so that Q ⇠ 1010.
7.4.2 An experimental test of the model
In section 7.4.1 above, an optomechanical setting has been described. Making
some assumptions about how gravitational decoherence influences the optome-
chanical system, a model has been given that describes how the state of the
optomechanical system changes over time. In this section, we consider this
model for the state of the optomechanical system as given and analyze it using
our decoherence test formalism. We calculate the amount of decoherence that
would be introduced to the optomechanical system if the model was correct.
We compare this to the amount of decoherence that one would observe if there
was no such gravitational decoherence, determining the diﬀerence between the
two predictions. We devise an experiment that aims at estimating the actual
amount of decoherence at a point in time when this diﬀerence is maximal.
This turns the optomechanical experiment into a test that allows to falsify the
above model for gravitational decoherence if it was wrong. This shows that
the decoherence testing formalism presented in this work can be applied in sit-
uations where the physical process is unknown. It allows to subject proposed
models of the process to a consistency check.
We first present the predicted values of Dec(A|E)⇢ of the optomechanical
system for the two cases where gravitational decoherence is present or absent,
respectively, for some example parameters of the experiment. We then calcu-
late the CHSH value  AB that one would have to measure in order to falsify
the model for gravitational decoherence.
The main quantity of interest in our analysis is the decoherence quantity
Dec(A|E)⇢ for the state ⇢AB = ⇢f (t) described in equation (7.208). This can



























If the above model is correct and gravitational decoherence occurs, both the
gravitational interaction and the mechanical heating contribute to the average
vibrational quantum number, i.e. we have














































If gravitational decoherence is absent, then only the mechanical heating con-
tributes to the average vibrational quantum number, i.e. we have


































Figure 7.11 shows how the decoherence quantity in equation (7.220) as a func-
tion of time varies for diﬀerent materials of the mechanical element and dif-
ferent temperatures, compared to the case where there is no gravitational
decoherence as in equation (7.224).
In order to rule out the model for gravitational decoherence, one needs to
measure a CHSH value  AB which is incompatible with the value of Dec(A|E)⇢
given in (7.220). The minimal value  fals of  AB that needs to be measured
for this falsification can be calculated using theorem 7.1: Using MATLAB, we
numerically evaluated the quantum bound on Dec(A|E)⇢, which is given as a
point-wise maximization problem in theorem 7.1. We inverted the resulting
set of data points and interpolated a function from the resulting data using
Mathematica. The resulting function takes a value of Dec(A|E)⇢ as its input
and outputs the minimal  AB that needs to be exceeded in a measurement in
order to rule out the given value of Dec(A|E)⇢. Thus, applying this function
to the curves of the Dec(A|E)⇢ values of the gravitational decoherence model
in Figure 7.11 yields the curves for  fals. The results are plotted in figure 7.12
for the same materials and temperatures as above.
In order to determine whether it is promising to measure a value of  AB
that lies above  fals, we need to determine the value  mech of  AB which is
predicted in the case where gravitational decoherence is absent, i.e. where we
only have mechanical heating. We can do that exactly: Equation (7.208) gives
us an expression for the state, which we consider for the value of R given in
the case of mechanical heating only, n = nmech. Then we calculate the value of
 mech for the case where the measurements are taken to be the standard CHSH
measurements
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where  x,  z are the Pauli x- and z-operator, respectively. The resulting curves
are shown in figure 7.12 as solid curves. It turns out that for the relevant time
interval (where  mech is larger than either of the  fals), the curve of  mech for
the standard CHSH measurements is almost identical to the curve one would
get for the optimal measurements for each time t. The latter can be calculated
using a formula presented in [HHH95b]. This is an experimentally desirable
fact: Using a fixed measurement independent of the measurement time is
almost optimal.
The most promising measurement time for a falsification of the gravita-
tional decoherence model is given by the time when  mech (that one may hope
to actually measure) is high but  fals (which one needs to exceed) is low. Thus,
the optimal measurement time can be calculated as the time tmax that maxi-
mizes the gap function
g(t) :=  mech(t)   fals(t) . (7.225)
This gap function is depends on the density   of the mechanical element and
its temperature T . One can see that temperatures that look promising for a
falsification measurement when looking at the Dec(A|E)⇢ values in Figure 7.11
turn out to be too warm when looking at the experimentally relevant analysis
of the  AB values in figure 7.12. As an example, we have calculated the optimal
measurement times for T = 1 nK for the densities of aluminum and rhenium.
They are visualized in figure 7.13. If there is no gravitational decoherence, one
needs to measure values of  AB that are ⇠ 0.1 close (aluminum) or ⇠ 0.2 close
(rhenium) to the value that one can maximally measure using the standard
CHSH measurements, in order to exclude gravitational decoherence.
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T = 1 nK








T = 5 nK








T = 10 nK








T = 50 nK
Grav. dec. included, density   = 2, 102⇥ 104 kgm 3 (rhenium)
Grav. dec. included, density   = 2, 7⇥ 103 kgm 3 (aluminum)
Grav. dec. neglected, (material-independent mechanical heating only)
Figure 7.11: Predicted values of the decoherence quantity in the
optomechanical experiment. The decoherence quantity Dec(A|E)⇢ as in
Equation (7.220) is plotted as a function of time for diﬀerent temperatures
and two diﬀerent materials of the mechanical element. In addition, Dec(A|E)⇢
is plotted for the case where there is no gravitational decoherence, Equation
(7.224). The calculations have been made for the experimental parameters
g0 = 1 s 1, !m = 1 s 1 and  m = 10 10 s 1.
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T = 1 nK





T = 5 nK






T = 10 nK





T = 50 nK
 heat(t)
 fals(t), density   = 2, 7⇥ 103 kgm 3 (aluminum)
 fals(t), density   = 2, 102⇥ 104 kgm 3 (rhenium)
Figure 7.12: Minimal CHSH values for the falsification of the gravi-
tational decoherence model. The quantity  fals, which is the minimal value
that needs to be exceeded in the measurement of the CHSH value  AB in or-
der to rule out the gravitational decoherence model, is plotted as a function of
time for the same materials and temperatures as above. In addition, the value
 mech is plotted, which is the CHSH value that can actually be measured using
the standard CHSH measurement in the case where gravitational decoherence
is absent and only mechanical heating contributes to the decoherence.
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Figure 1.1: Minimal CHSH values for the falsification of the gravitational decoherence model. The quantity
 fals, which is the minimal value that needs to be exceeded in the measurement of the CHSH value   in order to rule
out the gravitational decoherence model, is plotted as a function of time for the same materials and temperatures as
above. In addition, the value  mech is plotted, which is the CHSH value that can actually be measured using the standard
CHSH measurement in the case where gravitational decoherence is absent and only mechanical heating contributes to the
decoherence.
1
Figure 7.13: Optimal measurement imes for ruling out the gravi-
tat onal deco erence model. Th three plots are id tical to the ones in
the leftmost box in figure 7.12, i.e. for T = 1 nK. In addition, the time tmax
at which the gap g(t) between  mech and  fals is maximal is indicated for the
two cases where the material of the mechanical element has the density of
aluminum or rhenium.
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In this thesis, we have seen a series of results on the estimation of the min-
entropy and a generalization thereof as an operational quantification of de-
coherence. In chapter 5, we analyzed in detail the min-entropy estimate in
QKD protocols. We found that the specifics of the sifting subroutine, which is
largely ignored in some well-known works in the literature, are crucial for the
security of the protocol. We found that some protocols in the literature have
a security loophole related to sifting and presented attacks that exploit them.
We suggested an alternative protocol that maintains much of the eﬃciency of
the problematic protocols, but which is not subject to the problems that we
identified. Our security analysis of the protocol incorporates the sifting stage
of the protocol, which not only helps to avoid security loopholes but also allows
to develop a more thorough understanding of the QKD security analysis. We
hope that this work inspires more complete security proofs of eﬃcient QKD
protocols that take sifting-related issues into account.
In chapter 6, we saw that ideas from QKD can be extended to a protocol
that allows to estimate an eavesdropper’s uncertainty about quantum infor-
mation. We proved that the min-max duality and a chain rule for smooth
entropies can be used to show that high amount of uncertainty about informa-
tion encoded in the X and Z-basis of a qubit implies high uncertainty about
the quantum information encoded in the qubit. We presented a protocol that
makes use of this result. It is designed as a distributed protocol for an ad-
versarial scenario: it distributes qubits about which an adversary has a high
uncertainty. As we explained, such a protocol may be used as a source for a
protocol that extracts entanglement from this source. More precisely, it may
be used as part of a protocol that expands a small initial amount of entangle-
ment into a larger final amount of entanglement, akin to QKD protocols which
expand a small initial shared key into a large final key.
However, this entanglement distribution perspective is not the only inter-
esting aspect of our result, which is in fact a more general result on min-entropy
estimation. For example, another interesting aspect are the implications of our
result on channel capacity tomography [Pfi+]. This concerns a non-adversarial
scenario, in which a channel that is implemented in the laboratory is tested for
its usability for some tasks. Quantum process tomography [CN97] is a method
that allows for such tests. However, since it aims at a complete description of
the channel in question, it requires a high amount of data that is collected us-
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ing a high number of diﬀerent measurement settings. Moreover, such schemes
typically operate under the i.i.d. assumption, which reduces their generality.
In contrast, our results can be applied to devise a test that collects data in
only two bases to estimate the min-entropy. In this non-adversarial case, our
protocol can be simplified such that Alice and Bob have random but perfectly
correlated basis choices (that is, they have no basis disagreements). The basis
choices still being random, this allows to test quantum channels with corre-
lated errors (i.e. no i.i.d. assumption is necessary). Instead of a full description
of the channel, this only yields an estimate of the min-entropy, but since the
min-entropy characterizes many practical tasks, this can serve as a relevant
figure of merit.
In chapter 7, we found a generalization of the min-entropy estimation to
a generalized class of probabilistic theories which, essentially, are only con-
strained by the no-signalling principle. One may raise the objection that
quantitatively, the bound on our decoherence quantity that we found for these
general constraints is weak (see the red region in figure 7.5). One reason for the
weakness of the bound is that it has been derived using a rather rough estimate
of the fidelity that bounds it by the trace distance (see proposition 7.23). As it
turns out in a follow-up work on this topic [HPW], this resort to the fidelity is
unnecessary, and a significantly improved bound can be derived by bounding
the fidelity directly. Apart from that, the strength of our result should not
be seen in the quantitative bound that we derived, but in the general concept
that it demonstrates. Instead of testing the measured data against the no-
signalling principle alone, further properties of nature can be used to further
constrain the optimization problem, such as fine-grained uncertainty relations
[OW10; HPW]. This way, the influence of such properties on decoherence can








Error rate calculations for the
attacks on iterative sifting
A.1 Attack that exploits non-uniform sampling
Here, we calculate the expected error rate for the attack on iterative sifting
which exploits non-uniform sampling, as explained in Section 5.5.1. We first
recall the relevant conventions that we made. The iterative sifting protocol
is described in Protocol 5.1. Eve performs an intercept-resend attack during
the loop phase of the protocol. In the first round, she attacks in the X-basis,
and in all the other rounds of the loop phase, she attacks in the Z-basis. We






Si   Ti . (A.1)
Moreover, recall that we assume that the X- and Z-basis is the same for Alice,
Bob and Eve, and that they are mutually unbiased. This way, if Alice and
Bob measure in the same basis, but Eve measures in the other basis, then Eve
introduces an error probability of 1/2 on this qubit.




P [⇥ = #]hE|⇥ = #i (A.2)
= P [⇥ = 01]hE|⇥ = 01i| {z }
 x
+P [⇥ = 10]hE|⇥ = 10i| {z }
 z
. (A.3)
Writing commas instead of logical conjunction symbols (^) for the next equa-






P [⇥ = 01, Nx = nx, A1 = B1 = 0] hE|⇥ = 01, Nx = nx, A1 = B1 = 0i
+P [⇥ = 01, Nx = nx, A1 6= B1] hE|⇥ = 01, Nx = nx, A1 6= B1i
+P [⇥ = 01, Nx = nx, A1 = B1 = 1]| {z }
0
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The third summand on the right hand side of Equation (A.4) vanishes because
⇥ = 01 is impossible if Alice and Bob have a Z-agreement in the first round
of the loop phase. The event
⇥ = 01 ^Nx = nx ^ A1 = B1 = 0 (A.5)
consists of all histories of the protocol in which Alice and Bob have an X-
agreement in the first round and nx X-agreements in total. Infinitely many
such histories are possible because an arbitrary number of disagreements is
possible. We express the probability of the event (A.5) as the marginal of the
probability of the event
⇥ = 01 ^Nx = nx ^ A1 = B1 = 0 ^Nd = nd . (A.6)





histories of the protocol, and each history
has the probability (p2x)nxp2z(2pxpz)nd . Therefore,
















Moreover, we have that







The validity of equation (A.10) can be seen as follows. On the second bit of S
and T , there is no error because it comes from a round in which all parties have
measured in the Z-basis. Hence, the left hand side of (A.10) is the probability
of getting an error on the first bit of S and T , divided by the total number
of bits, 2. Hence, we need to determine the error probability of the first bit.
If Nx = 1, then the first bit comes from the first round of the loop phase, in
which Alice, Bob and Eve have measured in the X-basis and hence, there is
no error. However, for Nx = nx, the first bit of S and T is chosen at random
from one of the nx X-agreements. In only one of these nx rounds, Eve has
measured in the X-basis, and in nx   1 rounds, she measured in the Z-basis.
Hence, the probability that Eve measured in the wrong basis on the first bit
of S and T is (nx   1)/nx, and therefore the error probability of the first bit
is 1/2 · (nx   1)/nx. Thus,






























APPENDIX A. ERROR RATE CALCULATIONS FOR THE ATTACKS
ON ITERATIVE SIFTING
and
hE|⇥ = 01 ^Nx = nx ^ A1 6= B1i = 1
4
. (A.14)



































































































Figure 5.6 shows a plot of hEi as in (A.17) as a function of px. As one can see,
hEi achieves a minimum of hEi ⇡ 22.8% for px ⇡ 0.73.
A.2 Attack that exploits basis-information leak
Now we calculate the expected error rate of iterative sifting for the attack
which exploits basis-information leak as described in Section 5.5.2. As before,
let hEi be the expected value of the error rate as defined in Equation (5.37).
Again, we assume that the X- and Z-basis are the same for Alice, Bob and Eve
and that they are mutually unbiased. Recall the strategy of Eve’s intercept-
resend attack: Before the first round of the loop phase, Eve flips a fair coin.
Let F be the random variable of the coin flip outcome and let 0 and 1 be its
possible values. If F = 0, then in the first round, Eve attacks in the X basis,
and if F = 1, she attacks in the Z-basis. In the subsequent rounds, she keeps
attacking in that basis until Alice and Bob first reach a basis agreement. If
it is an X-agreement (equivalent to ⇥ = 01), Eve attacks in the Z-basis in
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all remaining rounds, and if it is a Z-agreement (equivalent to ⇥ = 10), she
attacks in the X-basis in all remaining rounds.
The calculation of hEi goes as follows:
hEi = PF (0)hE|F = 0i+ PF (1)hE|F = 1i (A.19)
= hE|F = 0i (A.20)
= P⇥(01)| {z }
1/2
hE|F = 0 ^⇥ = 01i+ P⇥(10)| {z }
1/2
hE|F = 0 ^⇥ = 10i| {z }
1/4
. (A.21)
Equality (A.19) is just a decomposition of hEi into conditional expectations.
Equality (A.20) follows from the fact that the problem is symmetric under the
exchange of X and Z, i.e. under the exchange of 0 and 1. The only quantity
that is not trivial to calculate in Equation (A.21) is the expected value of the
error rate, given that Eve first measures in X and that the first basis agreement
is an X-agreement. It is calculated as follows:










hE|F = 0 ^⇥ = 01 ^Nx = nxi| {z }
nx 1
4nx










































⇡ 16.3% . (A.29)
A.3 Attack that exploits both problems
Here we present the error rate induced by the intercept-resend attack presented
in Section 5.5.4, which exploits both non-uniform sampling and basis informa-
tion leak. Let us recall the attack strategy. In the first round of the loop phase
of the iterative sifting protocol, she attacks in the X-basis. She keeps doing
that in subsequent rounds until Alice and Bob announce a basis-agreement. If
they announce an X-agreement, Eve attacks in the Z-basis in all the following
rounds. Otherwise, she keeps attacking in the X-basis.
The calculation of the error rate is similar to the calculations done in Ap-
pendices A.1 and A.2. We only show the result here:
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A plot of (A.30) is shown in Figure 5.6 as a function of px. As one can see,
the expected error rate has a minimum of hEi ⇡ 15.8% for px ⇡ 0.57. Hence,
this combined attack on both problems performs much better than the one on
non-uniform sampling alone (with a minimal expected error rate of ⇡ 22.8%,
see Section 5.5.1) and even better than the attack on the basis information
leak alone (with a minimal expected error rate of ⇡ 16.3%, see Section 5.5.2).
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